An Exploration of the Electoral Systems of Hong Kong: Representation and Governance

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While there is extensive academic literature on the two most commonly used electoral systems—the single-member district (SMD) and the proportional representation system (PR system)—less research has been done on comparing the binomial electoral system and the PR system. This paper seeks to fill the gap in academic literature by exploring whether the binomial system is inferior to the PR system in terms of representation, and whether the binomial system is prone to producing less political parties in the legislature as compared to the PR system. This research paper will study the natural experiment of Hong Kong, where the list-PR system was abolished by Beijing in 2021 and was replaced with a binomial electoral system. Contrary to the general understanding of the academic literature, the study finds that a binomial system does not produce a less representative electoral outcome, nor does it produce a less fragmented parliament.

INTRODUCTION

While there is extensive academic literature on the two most commonly used electoral systems–the single-member district (SMD) and the proportional representation system (PR system)—there is very little study on comparing the binomial electoral system and the PR system. The lack of study on the binomial electoral system is partly because it is not as commonly adopted as SMD and PR so there are limited cases for scholarly investigation. However, the binomial electoral system—in which there are two constituencies per electoral district–can be regarded as the middle ground between SMD and PR because its district magnitude is higher than SMD but lower than most of the cases under the PR system. As such, this research seeks to fill the gap in academic literature by answering two important questions about the binomial electoral system. Firstly, is the binomial system inferior to the PR system in terms of representation? Secondly, is the binomial system prone to producing less political parties in the legislature as compared to the PR system?

To answer these two questions, this paper will adopt an observational study of the natural experiment of Hong Kong. Since, the transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997, Hong Kong had long run its election for the directly-elected constituencies of the Legislative Council (LegCo) under a list-PR system. This list-PR system was abolished by Beijing in 2021 and was replaced with a binomial electoral system for all the directly-elected constituencies. This paper will compare how the two electoral systems have shaped the representation of pro-Beijing citizens in Hong Kong and how they have shaped the fragmentation of the legislature. The reason that this study will only focus on pro-Beijing legislative councillors is that there have been evident political crackdowns on pro-democracy politicians since 2020. Therefore, focusing only on the pro-Beijing group can eliminate the unwanted impacts of Beijing's suppression of dissent to the natural experiment. In other words, this paper will only focus on the competition *within* the pro-Beijing camp as opposed to the competition between the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-democracy camp. As the support rate of the pro-Beijing camp is relatively static and its supporters have always constituted around 40% of the wider society, this natural experiment is expected to accurately capture the impacts of the change in the electoral system (Kaeding 2017, 161).

Contrary to the understandings of the academic literature, this research finds that the binomial system does not produce a less representative electoral outcome as compared with the list-PR system. Nor is it more conducive to governance by producing a less fragmented LegCo. The rest of this research paper will be structured in three parts. The first will be a literature

review to develop the theoretical hypotheses on how the two types of electoral systems may influence representation and governance differently. Then, this paper will discuss the use of observational natural experiment as an appropriate research method, and the details of the case of Hong Kong in the research design. The final part of the paper will compare the levels of representation and fragmentation of the LegCo of Hong Kong under the list-PR system with that of the binomial system, and will provide a conclusion.

The Binomial and Proportional Representation Systems

The binomial electoral system is a system in which each electoral district elects two parliamentarians, meaning that the fixed district magnitude is two. In practice, different political parties usually submit their lists of candidates for the election to compete for the two seats in an electoral district. This system was only implemented in a small number of countries across history. One of the countries that previously adopted the binomial system is Chile, in which the system was imposed by Pinochet's military dictatorship. Huneeus (2015) conducted a case study of Chile and found that there were enormous deficiencies in this system, such as over-representation of the largest minority and more intense competition *within* parties than between them. As it is very difficult for the largest party to win more than double the amount of votes of the second-largest party, each party would tend to win only one of the two seats. In nearly all of the electoral districts in Chile under the binomial system, one seat was allocated to Concertación and the other to Alliance for Chile (Huneeus 2015). As such, the main competition between candidates is about their positions on the lists, but less so between the lists (Huneeus 2015).

Moreover, the binomial system can be detrimental to fully fledged representative democracies because of the exclusion of small parties and the over-representation of the second-largest party. Before the electoral reform in 2015, the Alliance for Chile—the second-largest party—gained nearly the same influence as the largest party in the Chilean legislature (The Economist 2015). The binomial system also renders smaller parties underrepresented, as was the case with the Communist Party in Chile before 1973 being completely excluded from the parliament (Huneeus 2015). Apart from Chile, Poland also has a short history of adopting the binomial electoral system. Kaminski (2001) suggests that the introduction of this system to Poland was mainly to manipulate the electoral results so that the Polish United Workers' Party could maintain its electoral advantage. Although there are abundant disadvantages of adopting the binomial system, it is not completely without its worth, as Siavelis (1997) found that the binomial system encourages the formation of coalitions because smaller parties have to cooperate and gain wider support for a higher chance of entering the legislature. In short, the binomial system may prevent extreme party fractionalistation.

As for the PR system, there has been extensive understanding of its advantages and disadvantages in the academic literature. The PR system is a multi-member district electoral system where the seats of each district are allocated based on the proportion of votes each party or each list receives. As such, most of the votes in an election affect the final results, and only a very small number of votes are potentially 'wasted'—even under a system of non-transferable vote—as compared to the SMD and binomial systems. Duverger's law holds that a PR system tends to lead to a multi-party electoral result while the SMD system is likely to produce a two-party outcome. Since smaller parties can more easily enter the legislature under PR, this system prevents the tyranny of the majority. Lijphart (1991) found that countries that adopt the PR system tend to have better democratic performance. Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) also contend that the PR system is very strong in accurately representing the electorate's views. Therefore, the biggest advantage of PR is its democratic representation.

While the PR system is generally regarded as one of the best electoral systems, it also has its defects, namely an accountability issue and the fragmentation of parliament. There is usually a trade-off between representation and accountability in different electoral systems (Carey and Hix 2011). As the PR system has a tremendous advantage in proportionality, it faces challenges in making the elected politicians directly accountable to its voters, especially when it is a closed-list PR system like the one in Hong Kong before 2021 (Gallagher and

Mitchell 2005). As aforementioned, the PR system is conducive to allowing various small political parties to enter the legislature, so it creates challenges for the governance and passing of bills in the legislature. This is evident in the example of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, which always has more than ten political parties in it. In addition, the PR system may potentially lead to executive-legislature deadlock under a presidential system, and may lead to difficulty in the formation of effective governing coalitions under a parliamentary system (Linz 1990). For example, in the case of Israel, the Lapid Administration was formed by an eight-party coalition, which could not reach consensus on policy issues. As such, the PR system is conducive to democratic representation but has its disadvantages in governance, especially when the district magnitude is high, and the threshold is low (Carey and Hix 2011).

Based on the aforementioned literature, this research hypothesises that the binomial system is more disproportionate and inaccurate in democratic representation, but more effective in governance, than the PR system. In terms of democratic representation, the binomial system usually under-represents the most popular party, over-represents the second most popular party, and stamps out all other smaller parties. On the contrary, under the PR system, the seats for every electoral district are allocated based on voters' preferences as long as the political parties pass the threshold. As such, the first hypothesis contends that the binomial system produces more misrepresentation of voters' views as compared to the PR system. On the other hand, with regards to governance, the low likelihood of small parties entering the legislature under the binomial system means that they tend to form coalitions or integrate into one large party. The magnitude of each electoral district is fixed at two, so the number of political parties in the legislature is often less than that under the PR system but higher than that under the SMD system. Therefore, the second hypothesis posits that the binomial system, in generating a smaller number of political parties in the legislature, can promote effective governance.

Natural Experiment and the Case of Hong Kong

A natural experiment is the most suitable method to compare between the binomial system and the PR system, because as aforementioned, the binomial system is relatively new and has been adopted in only a small number of countries over a short period of time. Given the very limited amount of data on the binomial system, it is not very meaningful to run a large-N regression analysis to measure the correlation between the binomial system and electoral representation, as well as the correlation between the binomial system and the effectiveness of governance. As such, the best methodological approach is to investigate a particular case in detail to understand the causality between electoral systems and representation, as well as electoral systems and the fragmentation of legislature. However, there are two big potential problems of adopting natural experiment in this study. The first concerns the causal identification. As there are many factors which may affect the representation and governance outcomes of Hong Kong, it is difficult to confirm that the different performances of governance and representation before and after 2021 are due to the change in electoral system and not other potential variables. The second issue is about the external validity of the research results. As this research only focuses on one single case, Hong Kong, how can the research outcome be generalisable? This research will tackle both of these problems.

The first problem is related to different factors, such as Beijing's suppression of pro-democracy movements and the silencing of dissent which may influence the democratic representativeness and the governance of Hong Kong. These factors include the imposition of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (commonly known as the 'National Security Law') in 2020 and the political reform by Beijing in 2021. Beijing's aim in imposing these changes was to stamp out pro-democracy politicians from the LegCo, who are regarded as 'unpatriotic'. As the political reform imposed by Beijing not only included the change in electoral system but also a change in the composition of the LegCo and the establishment of the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee to vet aspired candidates, these factors may have influenced the results of the LegCo election in 2021.

To eliminate the unwanted effects of these variables, this research will only compare the electoral results of the pro-Beijing camp for the directly-elected constituencies of LegCo before and after 2021. Kaeding (2017, 161) points out that the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy groups have always maintained a consistent level of support in Hong Kong. Support for the pro-Beijing camp has always been around 40% of the whole society and the level of support for pan-democrats has always been around 60%. This feature of the political landscape has been tested time and again, as demonstrated in, for example, the election for District Council in 2019, in which the pro-Beijing group received 41.32% of all the votes and pan-democrats won 57.44% of all the votes (BBC 2019; Chan 2019). Similarly, in the 2016 LegCo elections, the pro-establishment camp won 40.17% of the total votes while the pro-democracy camp received 55.02% (Registration and Electoral Office 2016). Given the consistent level of support for the pro-Beijing group, this paper will only compare the electoral results for the pro-Beijing candidates so that Beijing's crackdown on dissent will not have any unwanted impacts on the research. In terms of the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee and the reform on the composition of the LegCo, these reforms have extremely little impact on the competition among pro-Beijing political parties in LegCo elections, as these policies were designed to specifically target those viewed as 'unpatriotic'. Focusing only on geographical constituencies of LegCo elections can also eliminate the unwanted impacts brought about by the reform on the composition of LegCo. As such, the levels of representation of pro-Beijing groups before and after 2021 should accurately capture the impacts of the change in the electoral system.

Another important issue is about the external validity of the research results. There are a lot of unique features of Hong Kong that may affect democratic representation and governance performance. For example, Lee (2020) and Ma (2017) both found that the Liaison Office in Hong Kong (LOCPG) plays an active role in coordinating between the different pro-Beijing political parties in LegCo elections. Its coordination work on behalf of Beijing may influence the electoral outcomes in Hong Kong. In addition, LOCPG also facilitates or even participates in the policy discussion between the pro-Beijing executive branch and the pro-Beijing lawmakers, which may have influenced the governance of Hong Kong. As these factors are unique to the case of Hong Kong under the constitutional order of 'One Country, Two Systems', it is inevitable that they pose a challenge to the generalisability of the research results. Nevertheless, this research develops the two hypotheses by deduction after reviewing literature on different cases around the world, such as Chile and Poland, which adopted the binomial system before. As such, this research tries to minimise the negative impacts on external validity due to the methodological approach of natural experiment.

The data of this research are obtained from the website of the Registration and Electoral Office, a department of the Hong Kong Government. In order to compare the representational outcome of each pro-Beijing political party, for the 2012 LegCo election and the 2016 LegCo election, the total number of votes received by each pro-Beijing party is divided by the total number of votes the pro-Beijing camp earned. This is to calculate the proportion of votes each pro-Beijing party received relative to the total votes that the whole pro-Beijing camp received. Take the 2016 LegCo election as an example. The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) received 16.68% of the votes for geographical constituencies (Registration and Electoral Office 2016). This figure (16.68%) is divided by 40.17%, the proportion of votes the pro-Beijing camp received for geographical constituencies in that election (Registration and Electoral Office 2016). In other words, this paper focuses on the proportion 41.52% (16.68% / 40.17% X 100%), which is the percentage of votes that the DAB won competing with other pro-Beijing political parties. The figure 41.52% will then be compared with the proportion of directly-elected constituencies that DAB held relative to all the directly-elected constituencies that the pro-Beijing camp held. The calculation method is the same: dividing the number of directly-elected constituencies DAB won (7 seats) by the total number of directly-elected constituencies the pro-Beijing camp obtained (16 seats), resulting in the number 52.94% (Registration and Electoral Office 2016). Then, this paper will compare the proportion of votes (41.52%) with the proportion of seats (52.94%) for DAB in the LegCo election of 2016 and come up with a margin of misrepresentation. The purpose of

doing this is to facilitate a comparison between the LegCo election results of 2012 and 2016 with the results of the LegCo election of 2021, in which the pro-democracy candidates were barred from running, and the composition of LegCo had changed. The summary of the data and calculation results are summarised in the Appendix for reference.

Findings, Discussion and Analysis
Representation
The research results show that the binomial system does not produce a less representative LegCo for the pro-Beijing parties compared to the PR system, meaning that the first hypothesis is not established. In the first place, there is no evident under-representation of the largest party under the binomial system. As shown in **Table 1**, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the largest pro-Beijing party, won 51.43% of the votes and was allocated half of the seats in the 2021 LegCo election under the new binomial system. The two figures (51.43% and 50%) are very close and thus indicate that the largest party was not under-represented. If we compare DAB's results across the LegCo elections of 2012, 2016 and 2021 (**Table 1**), it is evident that the misrepresentation under the PR system was similar to the misrepresentation under the binomial system. Under the PR system, DAB secured 52.94% of seats by 47.40% of votes in 2012 so the difference between the two figures was 5.54%, which is even higher than the 1.43% difference under the binomial system. In the case of the 2016 LegCo election, DAB won 43.75% of seats by 41.52% of votes, meaning that the difference was 2.23%, which is not lower than 1.43% as this research hypothesised. As such, there is no evidence that the largest pro-Beijing political party is under-represented under the binomial system.

In terms of the second-largest party, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (HKFTU), there is also no indication that it is much more over-represented under the binomial system. HKFTU secured 15% of the seats with 14.53% of the votes in the LegCo election of 2021. The difference was only 0.53%, meaning that the impact of over-representation is minimal. If we compare the level of over-representation under the binomial system (0.53%) with the level of misrepresentation under the closed-list PR system of 2012 and 2016, it is clear that the misrepresentation of HKFTU was even worse under the PR system. In 2012, HKFTU was over-represented by a margin 1.1%. In 2016, HKFTU was underrepresented by a margin 0.65%. In other words, the binomial system did not render the second-largest party under-represented and thus did not produce a less representative legislature.

Another hypothesised argument is that small parties would be marginalised and would not get elected under the binomial system, but this natural experiment also demonstrates that this argument may not be correct. In the LegCo election of 2021, for example, a lot of small political parties such as the New Prospect for Hong Kong, Professional Power, Roundtable, etc. all got some directly-elected constituencies (Cheng 2021). While none of these parties is either the largest or second-largest, all of them are also represented in parliament. For example, New Prospect for Hong Kong, a small political party that seeks to represent those who immigrated from mainland China to Hong Kong (established less than three years before the LegCo election of 2021), fielded only one candidate and won a seat under the binomial system with 23.97% of the votes (Cheng 2021; Registration and Electoral Office of Hong Kong Government 2021). This demonstrates that political parties that represent minorities do not seem to be excluded due to the binomial electoral system. According to **Table 1**, one-fourth of all the directly-elected constituencies was secured by non-traditional political parties in the LegCo election of 2021. This figure is much higher than the proportion of seats small parties won in the LegCo elections of 2012 and 2016. As such, the evidence does not fit with the hypothesis that small political parties would form coalitions or be excluded from LegCo under the binomial system.

In short, there is neither evident under-representation of the largest party, over-representation of the second-largest party, nor exclusion of small parties as expected under the binomial system. The first hypothesis of this research is thus rejected.

	Proportion of votes to total votes of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2012	Proportion of seats to total seats of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2012	Proportion of votes to total votes of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2016	Proportion of seats to total seats of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2016	Proportion of votes to total votes of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2021	Proportion of seats to total seats of pro-Beijing camp in LegCo election of 2021
DAB	47.40%	52.94%	41.52%	43.75%	51.43%	50%
HKFTU	16.55%	17.65%	19.40%	18.75%	14.53%	15%
NPP	8.81%	11.76%	19.24%	18.75%	11.35%	10%
Liberal Party	6.31%	5.88%	2.46%	0%	(Did Not Send Any Candidate)	(Did Not Send Any Candidate)
BPA	(Not Applicable)	(Not Applicable)	5.70%	6.25%	(Did Not Send Any Candidate)	(Did Not Send Any Candidate)
Other pro-Beijing parties	20.93%	11.76%	11.58%	12.50%	22.69%	25%

Table 1 | Comparison of Electoral Results on Representation (Geographical Constituencies Only)

(Registration and Electoral Office 2012; Registration and Electoral Office 2016; Registration and Electoral Office 2021) (See Appendix 1 for the details of calculation)

Fragmentation of LegCo and the Impacts of Governance

The research results also show that the second hypothesis—that the binomial system would create a less fragmented LegCo and is conducive to governance—is wrong. As aforementioned, this research only compares the intra-pro-Beijing camp competition. According to **Table 2**, although the total number of political parties among the directly-elected constituencies was smaller (eight) under the binomial system than under the proportional representation system (twelve and thirteen)—seeming to suggest that the hypothesis is correct—this difference can be attributable to reasons other than the electoral system such as the establishment of the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee in 2021 and the imposition of the National Security Law since mid-2020. As such, for assessing the impacts brought about by the change in electoral system, this essay will only compare a fixed political spectrum as a controlled variable for the research. **Graph 3** is a simplified version of the political spectrum in Hong Kong. For the sake of comparison, this essay will only focus on how many political parties were and are in LegCo on the left side of the vertical line of the graph because pro-democracy parties (in yellow) were all excluded in the LegCo election of 2021.

According to **Table 2**, the binomial system has created eight political parties in LegCo following the election of 2021. This number is higher than the numbers of pro-Beijing parties created by the closed-list PR system in 2012 and 2016 respectively. The number of pro-Beijing political parties in the LegCo was five following the election of 2012, and it was four following the election of 2016. While the political system in Hong Kong resembles presidentialism, and there are both radical pro-labour (e.g. Federation of Trade Unions) and very pro-business (e.g. Business and Professionals Alliance & New People's Party) parties in the legislature, it is evident that the binomial system does not prevent fragmentation of the legislature within the pro-Beijing camp due to a lower district magnitude compared to the PR system. Many policy issues such as the abolishment of the offsetting mechanism of the Mandatory Provident Fund still posed challenges to the functioning of the political system due to the fractionalisation of the city's parliament although all political parties were pro-Beijing after 2021. Therefore, the binomial system does not produce a less fragmented LegCo compared to the PR system. The second hypothesis is thus rejected.

	Total Number of Political Parties among Directly-Elected Constituencies (Excluding all independent lawmakers)	**Total Number of Pro-Beijing Political Parties among Directly-Elected Constituencies** (Excluding pro-Beijing independents)	**Total Number of Pro-Democracy Political Parties among Directly-Elected Constituencies** (Excluding pro-democracy independents)
LegCo 2012-2016	12	5	7
LegCo 2016-2020	13	4	9
LegCo 2021-2025	8	8	0

Table 2 | Total Number of Political Parties Among All Directly-Elected Constituencies in LegCo

(Registration and Electoral Office 2012; Registration and Electoral Office 2016; Registration and Electoral Office 2021)

Possible Explanation of the Research Results by Other Factors

While the research results seem to repudiate the general understanding of electoral systems in academic literature, they are not without their limitations. Although the research design tries to minimise the impact that other variables have on the dependent variables, the results can possibly be explained by other factors. In fact, the Liaison Office in Hong Kong (LOCPG) may have actively prevented any electoral outcome of misrepresentation and may have intentionally manipulated the electoral results of 2021 to allow more parties to be in the LegCo. Lee (2020) points out that LOCPG can discipline and coordinate nearly all the pro-Beijing elites in Hong Kong. Beijing often uses the rhetoric of 'improving the political system' to describe and justify the political reforms imposed unilaterally by the central government to stamp out pro-democracy politicians from sharing power. Thus, the possibility of Beijing manipulating the results by coordinating between the different pro-Beijing political parties through LOCPG is not too far-fetched. The purpose of manipulating the electoral result of 2021 was to propagandise Beijing's rhetoric that launching crackdown on dissent 'improved' the political institutions and political situation in Hong Kong. If backdoor coordination between pro-Beijing parties occurred through the LOCPG, it would not have been difficult to portray the binomial system as representing the pro-Beijing electorates' views accurately due to the relative stickiness of the political stances of most Hong Kong people. Encouraging the formation of more pro-Beijing political parties to run for the LegCo election of 2021 would also align with Beijing's narrative that the reform did not silence people with diverse views. Therefore, the research results discussed in this paper could have been influenced by the backdoor work of the LOCPG.

Another possible explanation is the change in political culture. The institutional change was not the only political change after the anti-extradition bill movement. Before 2019, most of the political contestation in the city was between the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-democracy camp. Under this political culture, many pro-Beijing capitalists, middle class and labour had less incentives to build different political parties but joined the few traditional pro-Beijing political parties to compete with pro-democracy politicians. However, after the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, democracy movements were suppressed. This may have encouraged the different pro-Beijing groups with varying interests and policy preferences to form their own political parties. As such, the change in political culture might have influenced the representation and fragmentation of the LegCo.

Conclusion

Traditional academic literature contends that the PR system represents electorates' views more accurately than its binomial counterpart. However, the PR system is also more prone to creating a fragmented parliament as compared to the binomial system. While Beijing

LP

BPA
NPP

DAB

FTU

Pro-Business

POD

Pro-Labour

CP

DP

LP

PP
LSD

Pro-Beijing | Pro-Democracy

(allowed to participate in LegCo election of 2021) | (Restricted from participating in LegCo election of 2021)

Graph 3 | Political Spectrum in Hong Kong

unilaterally imposed a political reform in Hong Kong in 2021, changing the system of the LegCo election from a closed-list PR system to a binomial system, this essay adopts the case of Hong Kong as a natural experiment for a comparison between these two types of electoral systems. The research results found that the binomial system did not over-represent the largest party nor under-represent the second largest party. The binomial system also did not reduce fragmentation of LegCo due to a usually smaller district magnitude. In short, the results demonstrate the exact contrary of the understanding of academic literature.

While the research results should raise some doubts on the comparative strengths and weaknesses of different electoral systems, they should not be taken as a complete repudiation of the traditional understanding of the two types of electoral systems because of the inevitable flaws on internal and external validity. Some unique characteristics of Hong Kong such as the special role of LOCPG in the city's politics and the change in political culture after the anti-extradition bill movement may have had some impacts on the representativeness and the fragmentation of the legislature. In the future, further research should be conducted through large-N regression analysis if possible, to render the findings of this research more generalisable, or potentially reject them altogether.

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APPENDIX

	Proportion of votes received	Proportion of votes received to total votes pro-Beijing camp received	Number of seats received in LegCo	Proportion of seats received in LegCo to total seats pro-Beijing camp received
DAB	20.22%	47.40%	9	52.94%
HKFTU	7.06%	16.55%	3	17.65%
NPP	3.76%	8.81%	2	11.76%
Liberal Party	2.69%	6.31%	1	5.88%
BPA	(Not Applicable)	(Not Applicable)	(Not Applicable)	(Not Applicable)
Others	8.93%	20.93%	2	11.76%
Total (pro-Beijing camp)	42.66%	100%	17	100%

2012 LC election - Results for Geographical Constituencies (under PR system)

(Registration and Electoral Office of Hong Kong Government, 2012)

	Proportion of votes received	Proportion of votes received to total votes pro-Beijing camp received	Number of seats received in LegCo	Proportion of seats received in LegCo for pro-Beijing camp
DAB	16.68%	41.52%	7	43.75%
HKFTU	7.83%	19.40%	3	18.75%
NPP	7.73%	19.24%	3	18.75%
Liberal Party	0.99%	2.46%	0	0%
BPA	2.29%	5.70%	1	6.25%
Others	4.65%	11.58%	2	12.5%
Total (pro-Beijing camp)	40.17%	100%	16	100%

2016 LC election - Results for Geographical Constituencies (under PR system)

(Registration and Electoral Office of Hong Kong Government, 2016)

	Proportion of votes received	Number of seats received in LegCo	Proportion of seats received in LegCo for pro-Beijing camp
DAB	51.43%	10	50%
HKFTU	14.53%	3	15%
NPP	11.35%	2	10%
Liberal Party	0%	0	0%
BPA	0%	0	0%
Others	22.69%	5	25%
Total (pro-Beijing camp = all seats of LegCo)	100%	100%	100%

2021 LC election - Results for Geographical Constituencies (under binomial system)

(Registration and Electoral Office of Hong Kong Government, 2021)