Collective Impact: A Sceptical Approach

ABSTRACT:

Enough people acting in a certain way can produce significant, collective harm. But if my individual act makes no perceptible difference to this harm, do I have a moral obligation to change my behaviour? Previous literature argues yes, individuals do have a moral obligation to change their behaviour in these cases; collective harm requires individual responsibility. But in this article I argue against this tradition by presenting a sceptical solution to problems of collective impact. This article will comprise four parts. First, we consider a definition of problems of collective impact. Second, we examine a consequentialist solution from Shelly Kagan, before, thirdly, presenting Julia Nefsky’s non-superfluous contribution argument. Finally, I argue for a sceptical solution to these problems, claiming that, although individuals can make a non-superfluous contribution towards change, individuals do not have moral obligations in cases of collective impact problems. Instead, moral obligations fall to both the collective, either governments or regulatory-bodies, and those who profit from collective harms. In essence, this article argues that collective harms require collective responsibility