2024 Essay Competition Winner

How do voting systems affect the perception of democracy?

by Erica Yip Pei Yuan

Elections are frequently regarded as the cornerstone of democracy, yet the voting system has the potential to significantly affect voters’ perceptions of the legitimacy of political processes. “To the extent that citizens believe elections are fair, they will also tend to regard the government as legitimate and the democratic process as effective,” as Robert A. Dahl eloquently puts it [1]. At its finest, democracy ought to represent the people’s will while fostering a feeling of responsiveness, equity, and faith in the political system. Voting procedures, however, differ greatly, and how they are designed can either increase or decrease public trust in democratic institutions. This raises an important question: How do various electoral systems affect how the general public views democracy?

Fundamentally, is the electoral system—majoritarian or parliamentary—considered the better representation of democracy? Effective governance is essential to representative democracies because it enables prompt policymaking. Governments with a one-party majority can carry out their manifesto pledges without having to negotiate coalitions after elections. This encourages efficient government because, as long as it can convince its backbench members, the government can authorise required legislation while it is in office. To better understand how majoritarian and PR systems impact public perceptions of democracy, this essay will delve into how they affect accountability, representativeness, and crisis response. 

Majoritarian Frameworks and Proportional Systems

Majoritarian regimes, which frequently result in one-party governments, offer stability and transparent accountability, which may increase public confidence in decisive government. Single-party majority administrations can effectively implement policy commitments by minimising coalition negotiations and establishing a clear accountability link between voter choice and government action. Tsebelis (1999) [2] points out that during times of crisis when governments need flexibility to move swiftly without being constrained by coalition agreements, this clarity in decision-making is essential [3].

However, single-party majority results depend on the electoral system’s disproportionality, in which the front-runner gets a “bonus” of more seats. According to Vowles (1995) [4], this strengthens what Dahl refers to as “democratic efficacy” by enabling voters to observe the immediate effects of their decisions on governance, which in turn increases public trust. Norris (1997) [5] goes on to say that the majoritarian goal of “inflating the number of seats for the leading party” promotes an effective working majority for the implementation of policies [6]. Public perception of strong government and accountability is fostered by this system, particularly when confronted with national issues.

On the other hand, PR systems aim to more precisely represent the variety of voter preferences by providing a wider range of viewpoints and satisfying the principles of justice and inclusivity. To pander to citizens’ sense of equity, PR systems lessen the gap between voter intent and parliamentary representation by making sure that seats closely match the vote share. “The mean minimal majority in 75 legislatures elected under PR was 1.96 parties, indicating broader representation than in majoritarian systems where single-party majorities prevail,” as Rae (1996) observes [7].

Nevertheless, coalition governments provide a problem for PR’s inclusion, which may cause delays in the formulation of public policy. Since coalition composition is frequently determined by elite negotiating rather than direct voter choice, Meyer (1983) [8] contends that coalition negotiations may cause citizens to feel disengaged from political decisions. Although this procedure gives different voices in the government, it may reduce efficiency, especially when dealing with pressing issues.

Since smaller coalition parties may have disproportionate influence, Blais (1991) [9] cautions about the possibility of unfair distortions. Small ultra-Orthodox parties, for example, have used their crucial positions in coalition administrations in Israel to obtain policies that benefit their supporters, which may have strained the public’s image of justice [10]. Although PR systems are excellent at representing a wide range of voter preferences, they may come at the expense of government clarity and decisiveness.

The voice of the people

The ambiguity created by coalition negotiating in PR systems might weaken the clear connection between the choice of the public and the establishment of the government. Coalition-building may disguise the role of the electorate, despite advocates’ claims that it promotes cooperation and moderates policy excesses. Meyer (1983) [11], for instance, notes that in Belgium, voters may feel disengaged from policy results due to post-election talks because they are unable to forecast which compromises would be reached. The idea that “vox populi, vox dei”—that the people’s voice is the government’s voice—is called into question by this seeming divergence, which could further undermine public confidence in democratic procedures.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, supporters of PR argue that coalition bargaining acts as a moderator, resulting in outcomes that correspond with the median voter. Such concessions are not always possible, though, as Shapiro (2018) [12] and Blais (1991) [13] point out, especially when coalition partners have opposing ideologies. Under such circumstances, PR systems could inadvertently externalise costs to larger constituencies while promoting exclusive policy gains for coalition parties. Voters’ sense of justice may be called into question by this intricacy since coalition concessions may put party interests ahead of the will of the group.

Illusions of Accountability

In a representative democracy, accountability is essential as it enables citizens to hold governments responsible for the results of their policies. This is made simpler under majoritarian regimes with single-party governments since voters can easily identify and replace incompetent officials [14]. Small changes in the percentage of votes cast can give the opposition more influence and strengthen the electorate’s ability to bring about change. On the other hand, because power is shared among the parties whose post-election negotiations dictate the course of policy, coalition administrations may erode this accountability link. The fact that “fewer governments were completely dismissed by the electorate in PR than in FPTP,” according to Vowles (1995) [15], indicates that voters had less influence over coalition governments.

Proponents of PR contend that while post-election coalitions can change the balance of executive power, representative democracies ought to reflect popular choices in parliamentary representation. Within a coalition, a tiny party with few seats may have a big impact and maybe disproportionate authority over executive decisions. Because parties with low voter support may have veto power and influence policy at the expense of the general voters, this situation may give rise to feelings of unfairness [16].

Searching for the “Electoral Sweet Spot”

To increase government accountability, PR systems can be modified to limit the number of parties in parliament; majoritarian systems, on the other hand, may not be as adaptable in this regard. According to Carey and Hix (2011) [17], a modified low-magnitude PR system produces “disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler coalitions,” thus resolving the trade-off between accountability and representativeness. Increases in representativeness offset the corresponding decrease in accountability at district magnitudes between four and eight seats. Lower district magnitudes favour larger parties, whereas higher district magnitudes allow tiny parties to win more seats. They assert that they have found an “electoral sweet spot” at moderate district magnitudes, where there is a higher chance of achieving “good outcomes” concerning accountability and representation than at extreme district magnitudes.

Even in the sweet spot, there is little chance of getting such a “good outcome.” The most likely result under this PR system is still a trade-off between an accountable government and a strongly represented parliament. The trade-off between representativeness and accountability is still unresolved, despite evidence presented by Carey and Hix (2011) showing that it is non-linear. This is a result of their PR strategy’s inability to integrate “the best of both worlds.” “On all four criteria—disproportionality, voter-government distance, effective number of parties, and number of parties in government—the predicted likelihood of having better-than-median outcomes is relatively low, peaking just above 10%” [18]. Since the democratic legislature is not representative of all people due to the sacrifice of representation, the argument for modified PR systems is defeated, leading its fundamental idea to be no longer valid. Majoritarian systems can be adapted to complement a plurality-elected legislature, with seats elected on PR from party lists to make up for disproportionality, as Germany’s additional member system indicates [19].

Conclusion

Given that policy outcomes blatantly reflect the electorate’s choice, majoritarian systems—which have one-party governments—promote a high sense of accountability [20] and direct voter impact when compared to other voting systems [21] (Vowles, 2000; Clark,2017). PR, on the other hand, places a strong emphasis on fair representation and inclusivity, which improves perceptions of justice but frequently dilutes direct voter power through coalition negotiations (Meyer, 1983; Blais, 1991). In all likelihood, no single strategy fully meets all democratic objectives, and each system has a unique impact on democratic conceptions. Any voting system’s efficacy rests on how well it conforms to the social environment and the general public’s expectations for responsiveness, accountability, and justice. For democratic administration to continue to be legitimate and trustworthy, these systems must be flexible enough to accommodate a range of needs.

Footnotes

  1. Roberta Dahl, “ON DEMOCRACY,” n.d., https://newuniversityinexileconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Robert-A.-Dahl-On-Democracy-1998-1.pdf.
  2. George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (September 1999): 591–608, https://doi.org/10.2307/2585576.
  3.  See footnotes 2
  4.  Vowles, Jack. “The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 16, no. 1 (1995): 95–115. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601171.
  5.  Norris, Pippa. “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 18, no. 3 (1997): 297–312. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601345.
  6.  See footnotes 5
  7.  Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1975.
  8.  Browne, Eric C., Francis G. Castles, George Sanford, David Hine, Geoffrey Pridham, Stanley Henig, Jeff Bridgford, et al. 1985. “Book Reviews.” West European Politics 8 (2): 180–90. doi:10.1080/01402388508424533. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System : Issues and Alternatives (New York ; Philadelphia ; Eastbourne, Uk ; Etc.: Praeger, 1984).
  9.  Blais, André. “The Debate over Electoral Systems.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 12, no. 3 (1991): 239–60. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601505.
  10.  Mat Nashed, “Who Are Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox and Will Conscripting Them Sow Discord?,” Al Jazeera, July 21, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/7/21/who-are-israels-ultra-orthodox-and-will-conscripting-them-sow-discord.
  11.  See footnotes 7
  12.  Shapiro Ian, “Democratic Competition: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” www.youtube.com, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=py-e9-NvFn0.
  13.  Blais, André. “The Debate over Electoral Systems.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 12, no. 3 (1991): 239–60. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601505.
  14.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, “3 Responsibilities Every Government Has towards Its Citizens,” World Economic Forum, February 13, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/government-responsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/.
  15.  See footnotes 4
  16.  Kulachai, Waiphot, Unisa Lerdtomornsakul, and Patipol Homyamyen. 2023. “Factors Influencing Voting Decision: A Comprehensive Literature Review” Social Sciences 12, no. 9: 469. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12090469
  17.  Carey, John M, and Simon Hix. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (February 1, 2011): 383–97.
  18.  See footnotes 10
  19.  See footnotes 10
  20.  See footnotes 3
  21.  William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder, Principles of Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Carlifornia Cq Press, 2017).

Bibliography

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “3 Responsibilities Every Government Has towards Its Citizens,” World Economic Forum, February 13, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/government-responsibility-to-citizens-anne-marie-slaughter/.

Arend Lijphart, and Bernard Grofman. Choosing an Electoral System : Issues and Alternatives. New York ; Philadelphia ; Eastbourne, Uk ; Etc.: Praeger, 1984.

Blais, André. “The Debate over Electoral Systems.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 12, no. 3 (1991): 239–60. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601505.

Browne, Eric C., Francis G. Castles, George Sanford, David Hine, Geoffrey Pridham, Stanley Henig, Jeff Bridgford, et al. 1985. “Book Reviews.” West European Politics 8 (2): 180–90. doi:10.1080/01402388508424533.

Carey, John M, and Simon Hix. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (February 1, 2011): 383–97.

Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. Principles of Comparative Politics. 3rd ed. Carlifornia Cq Press, 2017.

Dahl, Roberta. “ON DEMOCRACY,” n.d. https://newuniversityinexileconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Robert-A.-Dahl-On-Democracy-1998-1.pdf.

Kulachai, Waiphot, Unisa Lerdtomornsakul, and Patipol Homyamyen. 2023. “Factors Influencing Voting Decision: A Comprehensive Literature Review” Social Sciences 12, no. 9: 469. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12090469

Mat Nashed, “Who Are Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox and Will Conscripting Them Sow Discord?,” Al Jazeera, July 21, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/7/21/who-are-israels-ultra-orthodox-and-will-conscripting-them-sow-discord.

Norris, Pippa. “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 18, no. 3 (1997): 297–312. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601345.

Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1975.

Ian, Shapiro. “Democratic Competition: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” www.youtube.com, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=py-e9-NvFn0.

Tsebelis, George. “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis.” American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (September 1999): 591–608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585576.

Vowles, Jack. “The Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 16, no. 1 (1995): 95–115. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601171.