Written by Avery Ngo & edited by Isabel Clapp
Apr 15, 2025
I. Introduction
In an era where populism has “leapt from the fringe” to dominate mainstream politics, the question of how societies achieve political legitimacy has become increasingly urgent for both scholars and policymakers. Democratic governance now faces acute challenges as populist rhetoric exploits social fractures and polarises public debate, threatening to erode the shared civic space essential for meaningful dialogue. As democracies grapple with conflicting interests and diverse perspectives, the public sphere emerges as a critical space where these tensions are negotiated – or exacerbated. Philosophers Jürgen Habermas, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and Hannah Arendt, in On Revolution, offer profoundly different frameworks for understanding this space and its role in legitimising political authority.
While both Habermas and Arendt regard public discourse as central to democratic politics, they differ fundamentally in their understanding of political legitimacy. Habermas emphasises rational consensus as a legitimising ideal, but the strain of populist pressures amplifies the framework’s limitations – namely, its susceptibility to power imbalances, risk of domination, and reliance on an imperfect mechanism of public opinion. In contrast, Arendt critiques the pursuit of consensus, arguing instead that legitimacy arises from the plurality of action and the participation of individuals in a shared public space. By reframing political engagement as an ongoing, unpredictable process rather than a quest for uniform agreement, Arendt offers a vision of the public sphere better equipped to withstand the polarising dynamics of contemporary populism.
II. Habermas and the Limits of Consensus
Habermas’ reliance on the unattainable ideal of rational consensus to justify political legitimacy exposes an inconsistency in his framework, as he assumes that imperfect real-world public discourse can achieve the practical outcomes necessary for legitimising political decisions. The rise of populism only exacerbates these limitations by further destabilising the conditions required for rational deliberation. Populist movements thrive on “emotionally charged rhetoric,” binary oppositions, and the construction of an “us versus them” mentality, which undermines the possibility of open, inclusive discourse.
Before addressing the inconsistency within Habermas’ framework, it’s necessary to outline his understanding of the public sphere. Habermas describes the public sphere as a space where public debate was intended “to transform voluntas into a ratio that in the public competition of private arguments come into being as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the interest of all.” In his view, the public sphere legitimises political acts by transforming private interests into a collective rationale through deliberation.
Yet, as evidenced by the practical constraints of time and the limitations of the bourgeois public sphere, consensus is realistically unattainable. The deliberative process required to address all perspectives and resolve conflicts would demand an infinite time horizon. Every new argument or perspective introduced necessitates further discussion, re-evaluation, and potential compromise, creating an unending cycle of deliberation. Moreover, as time progresses, circumstances evolve creating endlessly new contexts, rendering the ideal of true consensus perpetually out of reach. Furthermore, Habermas himself acknowledges that real-world deliberations are rarely free of coercion. Habermas states that “a series of fictions in which the self-understanding of the bourgeois consciousness as ‘public opinion’ was articulated…in its connection with the presupposition of a natural basis”. Here, the notion of “public opinion” can be distinguished from “consensus”. To Habermas, public opinion was the more realistic form of consensus. It’s not entirely uniform and uncoercive. It’s a representation of an aggregation of views expressed rather than a universally agreed upon product of rational-critical debate. The issue lies in the bourgeois project’s deliberate conflation of public opinion with consensus. The bourgeoisie presented what was public opinion – an aggregation of the bourgeois viewpoint – as a consensus grounded in what was claimed to be “natural” to legitimise their political actions.
This creates a tension that is further exacerbated by the rise of populism – how can Habermas recognise that public opinion historically has fallen so short of his ideal of consensus, yet treat public opinion as a matter of direct practical relevance? Remember, his argument about consensus is that, as a product of rational debate within the public space, consensus legitimises political actions as necessary. And yet, he claims that the subpar form of consensus – public opinion – can also legitimise political actions. This can be seen in his critique of the “law of opinion,” which he describes as being “binding by a secret and tacit consent” and could not be “applied in some way to the laws of the state” “unlike public opinion”. By rejecting “opinion,” he highlights the importance of public opinion within a public sphere as a tool for political legitimacy or to influence “laws of the state”. Thus, while Habermas acknowledges the failure of real-world public opinion in achieving the ideal of rational consensus, he still relies on this imperfect mechanism to justify political legitimacy, leaving unresolved the tension between theoretical ideals and reality. This tension becomes even more pronounced in the current age of populism. Just as the bourgeoisie presented their own viewpoint as “natural consensus,” populists today use performative majoritarianism to legitimise their authority. For example, populists often rely on plebiscitary democracy, including referenda, mass rallies, social media engagement, to create a sense of false direct representation. By framing issues as existential battles between the “people” and the “elite,” populists can falsely claim they have a majority consensus. This dynamic creates a structural disadvantage for minorities, whose perspectives may be deemed irrational when they do not align with populist leaders. They are often characterised as “enemies of the people” and, in moral terms, as “self-seeking, corrupt conspirators against ordinary citizens, often with hidden links to outside powers”. Thus, the weaknesses of Habermasian consensus are revealed further with populism.
Habermas might respond to this critique by explaining how he saw rational debate as a normative ideal of the public sphere and something that could be achieved in a post-Marx world free of dependence on property owners. However, this defence does not resolve the fundamental tensions in his framework. Habermas does not limit rational discourse to this theoretical role; instead, he treats it as an empirical possibility essential for legitimising political decisions, as demonstrated in his discussion of public opinion versus “opinion”. He assumes that public discourse can form the “public will” within a manageable timeframe, allowing for practical conclusions about what is just or legitimate. This assumption introduces a critical issue. While the ideal of rational discourse is unattainable in real-world conditions, Habermas still applies its anticipated outcomes to practical political deliberations. This slippage between theory and practice leads to what can be described as a circular logic in Habermas’ framework. On the one hand, he recognises that real-world deliberations are rarely free of coercion and may result in false consensus shaped by systemic inequalities or exclusionary dynamics . On the other hand, Habermas assumes that rational discourse can approximate what consensus would emerge under ideal conditions. He uses this hypothetical outcome, envisioned as perfectly rational, inclusive, and uncoerced, as a benchmark for evaluating real-world deliberations. However, this imagined consensus is speculative and presumes the existence of a universally acceptable outcome that ideal conditions would reliably produce. Populism worsens this slippage. Rather than public opinion serving as an evolving expression of reasoned debate, populist movements actively reshape it to fabricate consensus. Through emotional rhetoric, mass mobilisation, and media dominance, populists manufacture the appearance of democratic will while suppressing dissent. If Habermas treats public opinion as a necessary, albeit flawed, mechanism for legitimacy, populism reveals that it’s not merely flawed but vulnerable to deliberate manipulation. Thus, Habermas’s reliance on consensus can inadvertently serve populist agendas.
III. Arendt and the Potential of Plurality
Arendt provides a counterpoint to Habermas that resonates compellingly in the context of populism, as it more directly addresses the needs of both minorities and any group vulnerable to marginalisation. Arendt rejects the ideal of consensus, arguing that it’s both unattainable and contrary to the essence of plurality politics. She sees politics as a web of promises and commitments that sustain collective power through mutual obligations and action. Legitimacy arises not from uniform agreement but from active participation in institutions that create spaces for dialogue and enable collective freedom.
Arendt objects to the pursuit of consensus because it’s fundamentally at odds with the essence of authentic political life. Arendt mentions approvingly from the Federalist Papers: “When men exercise their reason coolly and freely… they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them”. She argues that the very act of forming opinions depends on the existence of plurality, which enables dialogue, engagement, and action. As she notes, “no formation of opinion is ever possible where all opinions have become the same”. In this way, Arendt challenges Habermas’ premise that rational deliberation can produce a unified consensus, proposing instead that the vitality of the public sphere lies in its diversity of thought and action.
Authentic politics, Arendt argues, is rooted in the ongoing process of forming opinions through dialogue rather than the possession of fixed or “correct” opinions and then acting upon it. This process of engagement involves “the oratory and the business, the thinking and the persuading, and the actual doing”. The formation of opinions is not an individual activity but a deeply relational one, dependent on the dynamic interactions of those with different perspectives. Another way to think about Arendtian discourse is as a network of exchanges of promises among individuals. Promises bind individuals to one another in mutual commitments that sustain the power generated through collective action. She writes “binding and promising, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence”. This describes what politicking means to Arendt. It’s not necessarily a rational debate where people agree upon an action that is in the best interest of all, but a multi-layered web of promises and commitments, woven together by the diverse motivations and objectives of individuals. This culminates in the “actual doing” in the execution of these promises. This relational nature of action ensures that politics remains a space of collective agency, where power arises from the engagement of individuals. Within populism, having a vision of political engagement that is fundamentally interactive offers a framework that is more adaptable to contemporary political divisions. Unlike Habermas, who sees legitimacy as emerging from rational agreement, Arendt sees it as arising from participation itself. This approach helps counter populism’s tendency to suppress dialogue through leader-driven mandates by intentionally celebrating diverse thought and action. For minorities, this vision offers a more empowering framework, as it does not demand conformity to a homogenising ideal but instead preserves their distinctiveness as essential to the political process. Arendt’s emphasis on “action” over “agreement” ensures that minority voices are not only heard but also capable of initiating change within the public sphere. Crucially, this pluralistic orientation has the potential to mitigate the extremes of populism by ensuring that no single faction or leader can monopolise ‘the will of the people’.
Institutions are what creates these spaces and enables collective action. Arendt writes that the “ultimate end of revolution was the [creation of a] constitution of a public space where freedom could appear” with freedom understood as the “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm”. What legitimises political action and births a state from its revolutionary fetus, therefore, was participation in the public sphere. In the face of populism, which often seeks to weaken institutional checks by a so-called unified will of the people, constitutions serve as critical safeguards. There is a reason why populist leaders so frequently attempt to “repeal” or dismantle constitutions. Constitutions are fundamental for enabling authentic politics by providing the structural conditions necessary for individuals to present, negotiate, and make commitments. The fact that populist movements often exploit the gap between representatives and the public to justify dismantling such institutions demonstrates both their own importance and the importance of maintaining a strong and stable one. Arendt’s discussions of constitutions are therefore vital, as it’s the best way to resist the centralisation of power to maintain a truly democratic space.
To summarise, constitutions, in this sense, institutionalise promises, creating spaces that can generate political action. What unites free individuals is not consensus in thought but consensus in a collective commitment to institutions that allows for active participation. As such, legitimacy lies in the active participation within the public sphere. With populism, where both plurality and institutions are often challenged, this commitment prevents the erosion of democratic engagement.
IV. Conclusion
The rise of populist movements brings new urgency to the debate between Habermas and Arendt over the public sphere. Their fundamental disagreement lies in their diverging priorities. For Habermas, the ideal public sphere legitimises state policy by transforming private interests into collective rationality through rational-critical debate. While Habermas envisions a public sphere where rational deliberation transforms private interests into collective reason, Arendt rejects this model, arguing that democracy thrives on the coexistence of diverse perspectives rather than their reconciliation into a unified whole. This distinction is particularly consequential today, as the mechanisms that Habermas assumes facilitate rational discourse, including public opinion, debate, and deliberation, are increasingly susceptible to populist manipulation. Habermas’ model assumes that public discourse, even if imperfect, can approximate rational consensus.
Yet, populism reveals the dangers of this assumption. By presenting their agenda as the “will of the people,” populist leaders fabricate consensus through emotional rhetoric, media dominance, and exclusionary discourse. The pursuit of consensus, rather than fostering inclusivity, becomes a tool for enforcing ideological homogeneity and marginalising dissent. Arendt’s framework offers a more resilient alternative. Rather than treating legitimacy as the product of consensus, she argues that it arises from participation itself. Democracy is not about resolving differences through rational agreement but about ensuring a space where differences can be expressed, negotiated, and acted upon. This focus on plurality resists the authoritarian tendencies of populism, which thrives on suppressing alternative perspectives. The debate between Habermas and Arendt is more than an abstract philosophical discussion. It has direct implications for how democracies respond to the challenges of populism. In a political climate where discourse is often weaponised, Habermas’ reliance on consensus appears increasingly fragile. By contrast, Arendt’s vision, rooted in plurality and participation, offers a more robust defence against the forces of exclusion and authoritarianism. She reminds us that democracy’s strength lies not in the elimination of disagreement but in its capacity to accommodate and engage with diverse perspectives. A political system that prioritises engagement over uniformity and participation over enforced agreement is best equipped to withstand the pressures of populism and preserve democratic principles.