I. Introduction

Populism and polarisation have become prominent in defining international politics. They are reshaping governance and public discourse, undermining political stability and eroding democratic norms. Though often framed as a modern phenomenon tied to the twenty-first century, especially with the rise of right-wing populist movements in the West, their roots have long been entrenched in the political structures and extend far beyond the Western context. For instance, in the Middle East both have been extensively used to consolidate political power.

So far, there is no universally accepted definition of populism. It is being studied as a style rather than a fixed approach–as its manifestations are highly context-based. Here, the only common aspect is that irrespective of how it is viewed from an ideological lens, a political strategy, or a socio-cultural perspective, populism fosters polarisation, particularly worsening the “with us” or “against us” mentality. It is important to reiterate that polarisation is not a synonym for fractionalisation, as the two can coexist. Although, polarisation tends to emerge as the group becomes deeply divided and volatile, contributing to the destabilisation of institutional structures.

Lebanon serves as a convincing case study, showing how populism and polarisation interact to further challenge the government. Unlike many nations across the world, where both mechanisms gained significant attention, Lebanese history reveals a political system inherently designed around sectarian polarisation, which has long been exploited through populist rhetoric, continuing to dominate in present-day politics. The interplay between both hinders efforts for national unity and aggravates the country’s multifaceted crisis. This study applies a sociocultural lens to illustrate how sectarian-based rhetoric has been a tool used to shape the country’s power structure for decades. Further, it argues that the social movement that emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 2011, particularly during the 2019 protests, is also a product of socio-cultural populism where ordinary people mobilised against perceived elites and the political class. The “new populist” rhetoric was based on socioeconomic grievances, causing widespread resentment among the people who demanded political as well as economic reforms. To substantiate this argument, Critical Discourse Analysis will be used to investigate the widespread rhetoric that exists.

II. Governance Framework: Rise Of Populism

The Lebanese government is based on confessionalism, and was established through the National Pact of 1943. The unwritten agreement intended to balance the country’s religious communities by dividing the political positions according to the size of recognised sects. Since the Maronite Christians made up the majority of the population (29%), they were designated the presidency. Sunnis, the second largest group (22%), were assigned the role of Prime Minister, while the Shias, the third largest community (20%) were given the position of parliamentary speaker. Though the pact sought to limit sectarian division, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war resulted in an influx of 100,000-250,000 Palestinian refugees, mostly Sunnis. This shifted the delicate demographic balance as Sunnis began demanding greater representation in Lebanese politics.

The Maronite politicians began to rally, portraying themselves as the “Christian Defenders”, and instilling a fear of the “Islamization “of the country among their voters. On the other hand, Shia leaders focused on the plight of their impoverished population – using rhetoric to paint themselves as those who struggle against systemic neglect. Meanwhile, Sunni leaders stressed the need for greater equality and representation for Muslims, describing the Christians as a relic of Western imperialism. Such populist rhetoric eventually deepened the sentiments associated with identity, communities, sects, religion, and most importantly – protecting ones’ way of life against encroachment by “the others”. This made it impossible for any political settlement to be achieved.

As the leaders pursued a zero-sum game to consolidate power, sectarian factions began to form armed groups to protect their communities – turning polarisation into militarization along the lines of populism. The interplay of these dynamics resulted in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), while also making militias an integral part of the country’s political landscape. The war ended with the signature of the Taif Agreement (1989), which although claimed to have redistributed power, in reality failed to address the causes of the conflict and political polarisation which continued to be compounded by populist rhetoric.

The situation worsened following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, as an additional 1.5 million refugees fled to Lebanon – making up 25% of the population. The influx, coupled with the increasing need for social services, infrastructure and political institutions, showcased the limitations of the Taif Agreement, and thus contributing to the peak of populist rhetoric and polarisation. Both Christians and Sunni politicians blamed the refugees for the country’s social and economic challenges. Refugees lacking formal political rights were often scapegoated in political discourse, further intensifying the tension amongst communities. For example, while Hezbollah framed itself as the protector of Lebanese sovereignty and the Shia community, portraying Sunni refugees as a potential threat linked to extremist groups in the region, they also depicted hosting refugees as a symbol of solidarity with Syria, capitalising on anti-imperial sentiments in the country.

Another crucial dynamic at play was that both the Sunnis and Shias now outnumbered the Maronites, while the political system continued to favour them – leading to further grievances and calls for reforms. Similarly, Hezbollah’s rising military and political clout was unsettling for the Maronites and Sunnis in the country. These developments widened the rift between the polarised blocks, with each focusing on their own interests, making it difficult to form an effective government or pass progressive reforms.

Nevertheless, two major political parties emerged from this friction: the March 14 Alliance, comprising of the Maronites and Sunni Muslims; and the March 8 Alliance, which was a coalition of Shia Muslims and several Christian factions. The clash between both parties continued to divide the country along sectarian divisions, hampering any path for compromise or cooperation. Rather, political leaders focused on clientelist policies, distributing jobs and resources to their families as well as supporters. This system of patronage also boosted the culture of corruption and mismanagement, which then caused mistrust among the regional and international communities, resulting in a reduction in foreign aid and investment. A massive blow to the deteriorating economy. As the Lebanese public debt ballooned, the gap between the political parties and the wider population continued, and religious parameters paved the way for the realisation amongst the general population that economic survival must be a fundamental concern for society. With that, the recognition that political leaders continuing to employ rhetoric based on ideology, religion and culture instead of addressing economic miseries could not be seen as good governance. This eventually led to the 2019 protest (Thawra) – where people from all sects – unified and took to the streets demanding political and economic reforms.

Let us also acknowledge the political reality of the contemporary era – though protests have led to the resignation of government officials, reversing decades of populism and polarisation is a daunting challenge that requires time, sustained efforts and commitment from the populace. In conducting this study, it appears that protests and civil movements can ignite a new form of populism or it can further escalate the divisions among people in the country. Interestingly, this new form of populism can co-exist with traditional populism, and in the case of Lebanon they are becoming deeply entangled and responsive to one another.

III. Impact Of Protest: Rise Of New Populism

The 2019 demonstration, centred on shared grievances against the country’s political elites, gave birth to grassroot movements that aimed to create an inclusive political structure based on transparency, accountability and civil engagement. This study claims that the chants and slogans used throughout the protest are a new form of populism. At their core, they channel a unified people’s collective anger and frustration against the traditional and dominant power. Isn’t this a characteristic of populism – us (the people) vs them (the political elite)? While this new populism does not necessarily have to be viewed in a negative light, it is also worth noting that every concept has its risks depending on how it is applied and what it promotes. Activists and leaders who arise from such movements become the voices for people who have been marginalised by the government. In some cases, people were using their own sectarian, nationalist, and gender identities as a way of expressing their social miseries, positioning themselves as victims of a broken system. History has taught us that when protestors use rhetoric based on varied agendas, it often dilutes the main message, leading to fragmentation and loss of public support.

Nevertheless, the protest led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, leaving the problems to caretaker Hassan Diab who promised to respond to protestors’ outcries. Unfortunately, the dichotomies between rhetoric and action underscored the difficulties of transforming populist sentiments into reform in a deeply divided power structure. The Beirut Blast in 2020 and its aftermath exposed this systematic weakness in governance and institutions. Diab’s government’s failure to promptly respond to the blast was faced with severe backlash. This phenomenon is termed “populist fatigue” – which occurs as the gap between the rhetoric of change and the reality of inaction grows too great. Moreover, his resignation showed his failure to effectively maximise the rising new populist sentiments for reform and accountability. Furthermore, his acknowledgement of responsibility for the blast ultimately led to the perception of his weakness and ineffectiveness. As a result, existing political actors are increasingly viewed as incapable of facilitating genuine change, further leading to scepticism towards anyone associated with the status quo regardless of their populist rhetoric.

Other politicians who intended to leverage the people’s sentiment attempted to fill the vacuum left by Diab’s resignation. At this point, old populist leaders adapted and restructured their rhetoric while keeping their interest in focus, reasserting themselves as the reformers and champions of the people to gain more political influence. Though each faction crafted its own rhetoric in an attempt to connect to the disillusioned citizens of the country, the lack of a unified way forward led to further disintegration of the political landscape, resulting in a protracted impasse to form a new government. Eventually, politicians reverted to the old model by electing a billionaire businessman Najib Mikati as the new Prime Minister in 2021. The noise of political bargaining once again drowned the cries for real change.

Additionally, the 2022 election showed the persistence of old populist approaches, as sectarian identities played a significant role in the country’s political mobilisation. Traditional parties continued to secure a majority of seats and political influence. The most interesting aspect being that most of the independent candidates and civil activists who participated in the election in an attempt to form an alternative political party began compromising with the traditional parties, out of fear of losing political influence. This situation could be changed with time if the electorate continue to vote for civil political parties, to the point where they can overthrow the old political structure. Meanwhile, the new populist leaders must coexist with the traditional ones who continue to preserve partisan interests and polarising rhetoric, once again making it impossible to form a government from 2022 to December 2024.

IV. Challenges

In January 2025, Lebanon elected a new president who presents himself as a reformer, however, his journey ahead is not easy. Navigating the path strewn with challenges will require strategic calculation. Addressing historical grievances and avoiding rekindling old sectarianism could deter efforts to pass critical reforms ensuring the state’s welfare. Re-building trust among people and demonstrating accountability by resolving social and economic issues with the practical limitations of the government will be a significant challenge. One way to overcome this is to attempt to restore regional and international aid. The new government also needs to address the ongoing security concerns in the region

V. Conclusion

This study draws a parallel by raising the question – is this new version of populism an improvement on the old one? This is undoubtedly a subjective question and the answer may differ based on personal perception. In a globalised era, new populism is more relevant and better suited to tackling contemporary political issues, especially as it has the potential to evolve while harnessing the rapid technological development and cultural shifts in society. It deals with modern issues such as liberalisation, identity, and cultural value in a context where religion is not a major apparatus. In the case of Lebanon, new populism can be seen as an attempt to break away from historical sectarian politics. It revolves around the younger and more diverse population of the country looking for change. However, new populism is not perfect, as there are still concerns surrounding exclusionary tendencies. There is the risk that it will eventually become another “us” vs “them” narrative, which can polarise society – particularly along minority, immigrant and gender lines.

The famous quote by Che Guevara, “The revolution is not an apple that falls when ripe” aptly captures the essence of Lebanon. Like the apple forced to fall, the quest for change and reforms disrupted the political landscape, leading to the resignation of government officials one after another. But, when a rebellion is in its early stages and has multiple leaders with different opinions, there is often confusion and disorganisation, making it difficult to channel the collective energy into a meaningful change. Whether the fallen apple rots on the floor or is crushed by the political elite is something that will be determined by the Lebanese electorate.