Jasmine Kalstein, Amina Lučkova, Elisabetta Ragonese, Marta Sacco, and Réka György
Comparative Politics
Michaelmas Term, 2024
Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 79-98

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14288946.

Introduction

The study on collective memory refers to the memories and emotions that individuals share being members of a group, whether that be a small or large one (Licata and Mercy, 2015, p. 194). Collective memories are instrumental in defining, maintaining, and mobilising social identities (Licata and Mercy, 2015, p. 195). As a consequence, they are strategically used by governments to achieve their political agenda and shape national identity (Mälksoo, 2023, p. 2). The use of collective memory as a political tool is increasingly evident in contemporary politics and has become subject to contestation as it is prone to instrumentalisation, institutionalisation, securitisation, and weaponisation by or for particular groups to achieve certain political ends (Mälksoo, 2023). Thus, nationalist narratives play a crucial role in framing historical events in a way that mobilises public support and justifies government actions (Mälksoo, 2023). Hence, our research will focus on two case studies, Russia and Israel, to examine how the weaponisation of collective trauma and memories affects a nation’s socio-political development over time.

Our main objective is to critically examine public statements made by political actors in Russia and Israel to address our research question: How do Russia and Israel weaponise collective trauma to mobilise public support and legitimise military action? To investigate this topic thoroughly, we consider the following sub-questions: What are the key historical traumas most frequently referenced by Russia and Israel in contemporary political discourse? What role does government narrative in state media play in perpetuating the legitimisation of military action? We apply Foucault’s theory of power and discourse to analyse patterns and strategies in the mobilisation of collective memory, building on the notions of collective memory, collective trauma, and victimhood nationalism. Our methodology involves a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of transcripts of public statements published through state media platforms.

This study highlights the role of memory in politics, revealing its susceptibility to manipulation by political actors (Mälksoo, 2023, p. 3). Socially, it underscores the dangers of distorting historical narratives and weaponising memory to shape public opinion and legitimise national violence. Academically, it offers a comparative analysis of Russia and Israel, identifying similarities in how each state exploits collective trauma to unify its populace, justify actions, and reinforce national identity. Hence, by using a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), research demonstrates that although these countries differ in their geography, culture, history, and politics, they are similar in the ways they weaponise trauma, which should be taken into consideration by scholars for future research.

Theoretical Framework

Guiding Theory

This study’s analytical framework is grounded in Michel Foucault’s theory of power and discourse, particularly through the key concepts of power/knowledge and governmentality, using it to analyse the manipulation of shared knowledge and the profound impact this has on social and political dynamics in Russia and Israel (Tierney, 2008; Haugaard, 2022). Foucault’s theory departs from the traditional understanding of power, which primarily focuses on identifying who holds power, the support systems in place, or the juridical-institutional models within a given country (Agamben, 1998, p. 5). Instead, Foucault emphasises the concrete ways in which power infiltrates individuals and their lives, essentially exploring where power becomes visible (Agamben, 1998). According to Foucault, knowledge functions as a power mechanism, not merely reflecting reality but shaping it, with discourse determining what is considered legitimate knowledge or truth (Foucault, 1980).

Moreover, Foucault asserts that power and knowledge are mutually constitutive: knowledge is created within power relations, and power, is maintained and expanded through the knowledge it produces (Foucault, 1980). In this context, collective memory becomes a potent tool in which states can exert control over public perceptions, turning historical narratives into instruments of governance (Tierney, 2008, p. 97). The ability to shape discourse surrounding collective memory allows state actors to influence how societies remember past traumas, thereby guiding behaviours, fostering national identities, and legitimising political agendas (Tierney, 2008). This dynamic is also crucial to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which focuses on the subtle governance techniques used to manage populations (Li, 2007, pp. 275–276). In this framework, political figures and institutions subtly steer societal conduct by framing historical narratives and constructing social realities, fostering a form of control that operates through seemingly neutral domains like knowledge, education, or, as we claim, collective memory, rather than overt force (Foucault, 1980, p. 122).

While Foucault’s framework is highly influential, it has its limitations. Jürgen Habermas (1987, p. 274), for example, argues that Foucault’s conception of power is overly diffuse, making it difficult to pinpoint where power resides or how it operates in specific contexts. According to Habermas, Foucault’s theory can also portray individuals as passive subjects of power, leaving little room for agency or effective resistance (Habermas, 1987). However, we find that Foucault’s theory fits our analysis because it allows us to critically examine the discursive mechanisms through which historical trauma can be transformed into a powerful political tool. By applying Foucault’s framework, we can analyse how discourse around collective traumas is strategically manipulated by political figures in Russia and Israel to create narratives that justify ongoing military aggression and rally public support. Specifically, this framework enables us to explore how both countries invoke traumas of the Second World War (WWII) to shape public perceptions, mobilise collective memory, and legitimise state actions.

Complementing this framework, we incorporate the concepts of victimhood nationalism, collective memory, and collective trauma to comprehensively understand this impact (Habermas, 1987; Roediger and Abel, 2015, p. 359; Erikson, 1976, pp. 153–154). Russia and Israel’s use of collective memory highlights its role in forming national identity (Appendix 1; Appendix 2). This manipulation, facilitated through existing structures, holds sway over social and political relations and alters historical narratives. Given this, it is especially pertinent to address how political actors, such as Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, strategically exploit collective memories, as their statements can be seen as justifications and reinterpretations of military actions (Erikson, 1976).

Conceptualisations

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Collective memory, as conceptualised by Henry Roediger and Magdalena Abel (2015), refers to memories shared by members of a group that are fundamental to shaping its social identity (Roediger and Abel, 2015, p. 359). This concept is crucial for our research as it seeks to scrutinise how collective memory can be strategically mobilised, especially within nation-states, which are often built around specific sets of shared memories. Furthermore, this shows that memories not only reinforce identity but also can serve as instruments of social and political behaviour (Mlynář, 2014, p. 230). When viewed through an instrumentalist lens, this process aligns with Foucault’s power/knowledge framework, wherein collective memory is transformed into collective knowledge, shaping societal dynamics and power relations (Tierney, 2008).

COLLECTIVE TRAUMA

This analysis is grounded in the notion that mobilising collective memory often entails exploiting the collective trauma embedded within these shared memories, which can resonate across generations. Therefore, Kai Erikson’s (1976) definition of collective trauma, described as a ‘blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people and impairs the prevailing sense of communality,’ is particularly relevant, as it identifies how trauma can affect social cohesion and influence collective identity over time (Erikson, 1976, pp. 153–154). This concept is especially pertinent for examining how collective trauma can be exploited for political gain, particularly in the cases of Russia and Israel, both of which have histories deeply intertwined with significant traumatic events—most notably the experiences of WWII. By delving into these dynamics, this research aims to investigate how political discourse draws on collective trauma to mobilise public sentiment, ultimately serving to legitimise military actions and potentially broader political objectives.

VICTIMHOOD NATIONALISM

Trauma, as a concept of historical and narrative proportion, is most often associated with victimhood. This paper will, therefore, employ Adam B. Lerner’s concept of victimhood nationalism to investigate how Russian and Israeli political actors reportedly exploit historical narratives of suffering and victimisation (Lerner, 2020, p. 64). Victimhood nationalism, according to Lerner, emphasises the strategic use of past traumas to foster a collective memory that unifies the populace, claims authority, and legitimises political ends (Lerner, 2020). By portraying the nation as perpetually vulnerable, this concept rallies internal solidarity and justifies militarisation and territorial claims. Consequently, by highlighting historical grievances, this narrative seeks national and international sympathy as well (Lerner, 2020). This concept will be applied to examine how Russia and Israel’s historical narratives of collective trauma are leveraged through state media to influence contemporary politics and international relations by reinforcing a perpetual sense of victimhood.

TRAUMA WEAPONISATION

To advance the understanding of how trauma is manipulated in the context of war, this paper introduces the concept of trauma weaponisation as a strategic process wherein state actors construct narratives that rationalise and justify state policies, particularly in relation to war, by framing contemporary threats as extensions of past traumas. Building on Erikson’s (1976) definition of collective trauma, trauma weaponisation involves the intentional harnessing and amplification of this collective trauma to serve as a political instrument, cultivating a sense of existential threat and rallying public support, thereby legitimising aggressive or defensive military actions. Unlike traditional studies on the political manipulation of collective memory, which often emphasise how historical events are reinterpreted to construct national identity or justify political stances (Müller, 2002, p. 3), trauma weaponisation specifically examines how the collective suffering of the past is strategically repurposed to evoke fear, solidarity, and a sense of urgency. Consequently, this concept offers new insights into how collective suffering is not merely remembered but strategically exploited to legitimise state violence, thus adding a nuanced layer to our understanding of how trauma operates as a powerful instrument in political discourse and conflict.

Literature Review

Scholarly discussions on memory politics, particularly in Russia and Israel, reveal how both countries use historical narratives to advance political agendas (Rosenfeld, 2023, p. 820). The politics of memory in Russia and Israel are heavily influenced by the manipulation of national and collective memory, leading to heightened feelings of victimisation and a longing for a future where the once-victimised emerge as powerful and dominant (Nuzov, 2022; Lerner, 2020). Collective memory, defined as a socially constructed interpretation of historical events, plays a fundamental role in shaping a nation’s self-perception and its responses to both internal and external challenges. As Gilad Hirschberger (2018) notes, while trauma itself fosters a sense of vulnerability, collective trauma can solidify national identity by rallying communities around shared experiences of suffering, thus providing a collective purpose.

Lina Klymenko and Marco Siddi (2020) focus on mechanisms such as the securitisation of memory to illustrate how governments invoke selective memories of past events to justify present-day political actions and reinforce national identity (Klymenko and Siddi, 2020, pp. 945–946). For example, the authors elucidate how Ukrainian politicians have reinterpreted the country’s historical ties with Europe to support its geographical pivot away from Russia and towards the European Union, thereby cementing an identity that distances Ukraine from its Soviet past (Klymenko and Siddi). Similarly, Gavriel D Rosenfeld (2023) introduces the concept of illiberal memory, characterised by a rejection of self-critical historical narratives that acknowledge guilt for past atrocities and promote nationalistic, triumphalist, and often revisionist accounts of history (Rosenfeld, 2023, pp. 822–823). However, much of the existing literature predominantly focuses on the long-term reshaping of national identity through the manipulation of collective memory (Klymenko and Siddi, 2020).

The literature on the memory politics of Russia emphasises how the Russian narrative is deeply intertwined with the Great Patriotic War. The Ukraine Crisis saw 3509 references in various media sources, conflating it with the Great Patriotic War (McGlynn, 2022, p. 152). The Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany is a pivotal foundation for Russian national identity and collective memory, which is constantly revoked by the incumbent government to garner support for its political actions (McGlynn, 2022). In contrast, much of the discourse surrounding Israel highlights how memory politics is shaped by a collective Jewish trauma–the Holocaust (Lerner, 2020, p. 62). By emphasising the persecution and suffering endured by Jews during WWII, the state cultivates a collective victim mentality that purportedly justifies political and military actions, portraying them as essential for the survival and protection of the Jewish people (Bergen, 2021).

While existing literature thoroughly examines the manipulation of collective memory in these nations, the concept of trauma weaponisation offers new insights that extend beyond this well-established research. Trauma weaponisation, as articulated in recent scholarship, focuses on the deliberate amplification of past traumas to evoke strong emotional responses that justify immediate political or aggressive actions. Unlike broader memory manipulation, which works over time to reshape historical narratives for long-term legitimacy, trauma weaponisation exploits specific traumatic events to mobilise public support for urgent, often aggressive policies. This shift in focus from long-term narrative construction to the immediate instrumentalisation of trauma offers a new lens for understanding how governments leverage history to justify their actions. While traditional studies on memory politics investigate the reshaping of collective memory over time, trauma weaponisation emphasises how historical suffering is repurposed to provoke strong emotional responses and facilitate immediate political gains. By incorporating this concept, the study of memory politics can better account for contemporary cases such as the war in Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where trauma is weaponised to galvanise public support and legitimise aggressive state actions. Thus, this research provides a deeper understanding of how memory politics and trauma weaponisation function in tandem to influence geopolitical conflicts, offering a comparative analysis that bridges existing gaps in the literature on collective memory and political strategy​​​.

Methodology

The study employs a comparative approach, specifically a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), to assess how Russia and Israel adopt similar strategies in leveraging collective memory despite their significant differences in history, culture, and political systems. MDSD is a comparative research methodology that examines cases with inherent differences to identify shared patterns or political outcomes (Steinmetz, 2019, p. 178). By focusing on these two distinct contexts, MDSD enables the identification of shared discursive patterns and political strategies, ensuring that these observations are not coincidental but reflect broader patterns of political behaviour (Steinmetz, 2019). The primary goal of this approach is to understand how governments adapt historical narratives to serve contemporary political agendas, offering broader theoretical insights into the strategic use of memory politics, particularly in warfare. The selection of Russia and Israel as case studies is based on their seemingly shared reliance on the collective memory of WWII to underpin their current political actions.

In the case of Russia, President Vladimir Putin links the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to the Great Patriotic War by portraying it as a fight against neo-Nazism. This framing echoes Russia’s historical fight against fascism, thereby justifying the invasion and rallying public support (Dawsey, 2022). Similarly, in his recent statements, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu evokes the Holocaust in the ongoing 2023 Israel-Hamas War, depicting it as part of a continuous existential struggle to ensure the survival of the Jewish people (IsraeliPM, 2023). By comparing both cases, this study aims to reveal how collective trauma can be systematically incorporated into state discourse to construct a moral rationale for military aggression. A critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be applied to examine these shared discursive strategies. CDA is particularly suited to this study as it examines how language and communication shape and reflect societal power dynamics (Locke, 2004, p. 25). In this context, CDA will facilitate the analysis and comparison of political speeches and official statements through state-controlled media in Russia and Israel.

In the Russian case, a significant limitation arose from the lack of available data due to European sanctions on Russian media, which required sourcing information from unofficial websites. The media programme selected for the analysis is Evening with Vladimir Solovyev, chosen for its relative accessibility online and its popularity in Russia. Evening with Vladimir Solovyev is a Russian talk show representing popular perspectives regarding the war in Ukraine and relations with the West (Locke, 2004). The episodes are only available without English subtitles, necessitating proficiency in Russian for the analysis. Moreover, since the analysis of the Russian case relies on this single source, we used additional academic sources and reports from accredited news platforms to provide additional context. Yet, since Putin passed a law criminalising public opposition to the war, the selected data source effectively captures the apparent strategic use of discourse through state-controlled media, providing a solid basis for the analysis (Troianovski and Safronova, 2022). Two episodes of the talk show were chosen for critical analysis based on their coverage of two pivotal events in 2022: the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the announcement of partial mobilisation on 21 September 2022. Conducting critical discourse analysis on Russian television programmes is crucial for examining the discourse surrounding Ukraine, as sixty-two per cent of the Russian population relies on state media as their primary source of information, especially following the government’s blocking of platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter in 2022 (Statista, 2023; Vinokour, 2022).

In the Israeli case, the analysis focuses on four public statements made by Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the 2023 Israel-Hamas War, as disseminated through the IsraeliPM YouTube channel. This platform was chosen for its role as an official outlet in Israel, which claims to offer direct, unfiltered communication from the prime minister. Notably, the analysis relies on this source because Netanyahu controls his narratives by largely avoiding interviews with Israeli news outlets—except for the supportive Channel 14—and instead relies on pre-recorded video messages or brief press conferences with a limited, pre-selected group of journalists (Schneider, 2023).

The acquired data will be processed as follows: all relevant episodes and statements will be transcribed to create a textual dataset, converting the spoken words from the videos into written text. Subsequently, the text will be analysed and categorised through coding to look for potential recurring themes. Based on existing theoretical frameworks, we identified three main frameworks to guide our coding process: victimisation discourse, legitimisation discourse, and mobilisation discourse. These frameworks serve as the foundation for developing our codes, which will be used to critically analyse the data. Additionally, we incorporated various guiding questions derived from the theoretical framework section for each discourse to deepen the analysis and ensure a comprehensive understanding of the discursive strategies employed by both Russia and Israel. These questions also facilitate a systematic examination of how collective memory, trauma, and victimhood nationalism are utilised in political rhetoric.

Discourse	Guiding Questions	Explanation
Legitimisation	What actions, policies, or social arrangements are legitimised through the discourse?	The question helps identify the specific objectives behind discourse, such as justifying military actions and implementing policies.
	How are narratives or stories used to create a sense of legitimacy?	The question examines the role of historical narratives and language in portraying actions or policies as ‘necessary’.
	What underlying ideologies or power structures are reinforced through the legitimation discourse?	The question explores how the discourse supports existing power structures and ideologies, reinforcing the authority of those in power.
Victimisation	Who is depicted as the perpetrator or oppressor in the discourse?	The question identifies the groups portrayed as antagonists, contributing to the narrative of victimisation.
	How is agency attributed or denied to the victims?	The question examines whether the victims are portrayed as passive and helpless or active agents, influencing their perception of their role and capacity for action.
	What are the potential consequences of the victimisation discourse for the victims and society at large?	The question looks at the broader implications of portraying certain groups.
Mobilisation	What actions or behaviours are being encouraged or incited in the discourse?	The question identifies the specific actions or behaviours the discourse seeks to promote, such as public support for military efforts or participation in nationalistic activities.
	What narratives, stories, or metaphors are employed to contextualise the issues?	The question examines how language and metaphors are used to frame issues in a way that resonates emotionally with the audience.
	What emotional appeals are present in the discourse?	The question explores using emotions like fear, pride, or anger to mobilise the public.
	What are the potential social or political consequences of the mobilisation discourse?	The question examines the broader impact of the discourse on society and politics, including changes in public opinion.

While the chosen methodology provides an efficient framework for conducting an in-depth critical analysis, several other limitations must be acknowledged. The researchers’ backgrounds, experiences, and affiliations may affect the positionality regarding the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, thereby introducing a degree of bias into the analysis. To increase the confirmability of the study, researchers have reflected on these potential biases and considered the impact their positionality may have on the interpretation of the data and findings. Additionally, given the presence of personal affiliations with these states, all researchers in the group independently coded and analysed the data to ensure the credibility of the research. Although the findings may not be broadly generalisable to other contexts, this research aims to contribute to the broader discussion of memory politics, particularly concerning how historical traumas can be employed to influence contemporary political dynamics.

Analysis

BACKGROUND

The Russian Federation’s use of historical memory as a political tool is critical to its contemporary national identity and political strategy (McGlynn, 2022, p. 141). Under President Vladimir Putin, state-controlled media significantly shapes public perception, particularly regarding military actions and national security (McGlynn, 2022). The strategic use of memory becomes evident in the narratives constructed around the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine since 2022. The narratives employed by the government often draw on historical references to World War II, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazism, creating a powerful linkage between past and present military actions (McGlynn, 2022, pp. 142–143). The Russian government consistently invokes the memory of these conflicts to foster a sense of national pride and unity, as well as to justify contemporary political and military actions.

The process of mobilising historical memory has been particularly noticeable in the context of the Ukraine conflict. By portraying current military engagements as a continuation of the fight against fascism and neo-Nazism, the Russian state seeks to mobilise public support and legitimise its policies (McGlynn, 2022, p. 152). The Russian state media plays a critical role in this process, serving as a political tool for disseminating official narratives that shape public perception. Programmes such as Evening with Vladimir Solovyev are central to this effort, providing a platform for state-approved discourse that reinforces the government’s objectives and agenda.

In Israel, the mobilisation of collective memory and historical trauma is equally significant in shaping national identity and justifying military actions. The memory of the Holocaust, in particular, is a central component of Israeli national consciousness and is frequently invoked in political discourse to underscore existential threats and the necessity of defensive measures (Bashir and Goldberg, 2014, p. 78). Historical trauma serves not only as a foundation of Israeli identity but also as a powerful tool for legitimising state policies, especially in the context of ongoing conflicts with neighbouring entities and the broader Arab world (Bashir and Goldberg, 2014, p. 80).

The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, often utilises collective traumatic memory to frame contemporary security challenges in terms of historical victimisation and survival. Netanyahu’s speeches, disseminated through the prime minister’s official social media accounts, such as his YouTube channel, consistently refer to traumatic memories, such as the Holocaust, depicting past traumas as current dangers. This rhetoric seeks to unify the public and cultivate support for military actions (IsraeliPM, 2024).

Victimisation Discourse

RUSSIA

In the discourse analysed from Evening with Vladimir Solovyev on 24 February 2022 and 21 September 2022 (Videoklub, 2022), Solovyev presents elements of Putin’s speech in which he employs a victimisation narrative to justify Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

To solidify his narrative, Putin states to the Russian populace that ‘your fathers and grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazis, defending our common homeland, so that today it would be the neo-Nazis who seized power in Ukraine’. By invoking historical collective trauma, Putin reinforces the nation’s ‘post-communist identity’, particularly by referencing World War II and the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazism (Videoklub, 2022; Nuzov, 2022, p. 811). Consequently, a dichotomy of good versus evil is created, portraying Russia as a moral force fighting against neo-Nazism and continuing its historical struggle against fascism. Furthermore, by linking contemporary Ukrainian leadership to neo-Nazism and fascist ideologies, Putin forms a connection between past and present threats, positioning Russia as a desperately needed defender against the resurgence of extremism (Videoklub, 2022). The invocation of ancestors who fought against Nazism adds an emotional layer to his speech, portraying the current Ukrainian conflict as a continuation of the fight against neo-Nazi forces (Videoklub, 2022). This use of language draws tight connections between the trauma of the past and the continuation of victimhood in the present, reinforcing the central thesis that Russia employs collective memory to justify its actions and maintain a narrative of historical victimisation. This aligns with Foucault’s theory of discourse and power, which posits that controlling collective memory is a form of exercising power (Tierney, 2008, p. 97). By shaping collective memory, Putin effectively manipulates the frameworks through which history is understood and interpreted.

Putin, in his speech, further highlights how Russia has been unfairly compared to Nazi Germany, particularly by Ukrainian President Zelensky (Tierney, 2008). He points out that such comparisons are not only baseless but also profoundly offensive, given Russia’s historical role in defeating Nazism during World War II. The narrative amplifies Russia’s victimisation by suggesting that its efforts and sacrifices are being disrespected and distorted by contemporary enemies such as Ukraine.

Putin’s assertion that ‘Russia has never initiated a war’ is deeply entrenched in a perpetuated victimhood mentality, implying that Russia has historically been forced into conflicts against its will, portraying the nation as a constant victim of external aggression (see Appendix 1). Additionally, Putin’s statement on ordering Russian troops to treat ‘the Ukrainian military with respect,’ despite being the enemy, adds another dimension to the victimisation discourse (see Appendix 1). By emphasising the respectful treatment of Ukrainian soldiers, Putin argues that Russia, despite being a constant victim of foreign aggression, maintains ethical standards and humanity (Tierney, 2008). Therefore, Putin suggests that Russia is merely defending itself against threats initiated by Ukraine rather than instigating them, thus justifying current military actions as a continuation of a long-standing struggle to protect the country. The portrayal of victimhood allows Putin to assert Russia’s agency in the conflict, presenting military intervention as a necessary measure to secure peace and safeguard Russian-speaking communities.

ISRAEL

Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements demonstrate a coherent strategy of victimisation discourse that mobilises collective trauma and reinforces the perception of Israel as a nation perpetually at risk. In his narrative, Hamas and international bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which condemn Israel’s military actions in Gaza, are consistently depicted as oppressors. At the same time, Israel is portrayed as the innocent victim subjected to unprovoked aggression and unjust accusations, thus constructing a binary opposition between the ‘aggressors’ and the ‘victims’, simplifying complex conflicts into clear-cut moral dichotomies (Hadar, 2019, p. 16). By repeatedly invoking the Holocaust and drawing parallels between past and present threats, Netanyahu unifies the Israeli population under a shared sense of victimhood—an intrinsic component of Israeli national identity (Hadar, 2019, p. 15). On 9 October 2023, Netanyahu released a statement declaring war against Hamas following the 7 October massacre (IsraeliPM, 2023). Netanyahu began his statement with a powerful assertion: ‘We didn’t want this war. It was forced upon us in the most brutal and savage way,’ and further emphasised the brutal and allegedly antisemitic nature of Hamas’s attacks by stating that ‘innocent Israelis’ including ‘Holocaust survivors’ were among the victims, thus linking between the current conflict and historical traumas (IsraeliPM, 2023).

Netanyahu released another statement where he condemned the ICJ’s decision to issue an interim ruling mandating Israel to implement measures to prevent genocidal acts against Palestinians following the genocide charges filed against Israel by South Africa (Sokol, 2024). In his statement, Netanyahu asserts that Israel, just like any other sovereign state, has a fundamental right to defend itself. Therefore, the ‘vile attempt to deny Israel this fundamental right is blatant discrimination against the Jewish state’ (IsraeliPM, 2024). By depicting South Africa’s attempt to halt Israel’s military actions in Gaza as a discriminatory act against the ‘Jewish state’, Netanyahu connects present-day criticisms of Israel with the historical persecution of the Jewish people, making South Africa’s charge of genocide not only untrue but ‘outrageous’, adding that ‘decent people everywhere should reject it’ (IsraeliPM, 2024). The statements above elucidate Netanyahu’s strategic exploitation of collective memories of historical suffering to construct a moral framework that portrays Israel as a perpetual victim, thereby underpinning his perspective on matters of morality and justice.

On 20 May 2024, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Karim Khan, announced the pursuit of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, alongside three Hamas leaders, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity (Bowen, 2024). Netanyahu responded by asserting that the charges against him and Gallant are nothing but ‘an attempt to deny Israel the basic right of self-defence’ and adds that by seeking arrest warrants, ‘Mr Khan takes his place among the great antisemites in modern times,’ comparing Khan’s actions to those of ‘infamous German judges who donned their robes and upheld laws that denied the Jewish people their most basic rights and enabled the Nazis to perpetrate the worst crime in history’ (IsraeliPM, 2024). By equating Khan with these notorious judges, Netanyahu effectively invokes the most profound collective trauma of the Jewish people, thereby bolstering the victimisation narrative and reinforcing the perception of Israel as unjustly targeted and continuously under existential threat.

Legitimisation Discourse

RUSSIA

Examining both speeches extracted from Evening with Vladimir Solovyev on the two different occasions through the lens of legitimisation, it becomes increasingly clear that, in the case of Russia, specific mechanisms are used to justify military actions (Videoklub, 2022; O-politico, 2022). In the first selected speech, Putin unearths the notion that ‘a person cannot feel truly free if his people are not free.’ This statement ties the concept of freedom intrinsically to a sense of collective trauma, emphasising the idea that the suffering of the people through indirect oppression automatically implies their own imprisonment (Videoklub, 2022). Such a sense of imprisonment may indeed be recalled by Russian citizens, perhaps because of the events of the siege of Leningrad, which is sometimes compared to the Holocaust regarding the magnitude of destruction and its consequences for the population (Bidlack and Lomagin, 2012, pp. 1-14).

This is not only interesting because of Putin’s invocation of catastrophic events that are considered highly traumatising for the people he entices but also because Israel employs a similar tactic– appealing to the genocide of the past to mobilise collective memories and legitimise present violence (Bidlack and Lomagin, 2012; Videoklub, 2022; IsraeliPM, 2023). It is then as if every military action could be justified as a legitimate response to the trauma of the past, which still permeates the collective consciousness (Videoklub, 2022). Here, we observe the power that narratives of collective trauma hold in legitimising war.

However, it is through the idea of glory perpetuated in both discourses that Putin’s rhetoric strengthens. Russia seemingly rejects the victim narrative, instead clinging to the ghosts of its empire to fuel nationalist sentiments. This narrative forms the base for justifying actions initiated to defend Russian honour, as articulated by Putin: ‘For 1,160 years, we have learned that it is extremely dangerous for Russia to even temporarily weaken its sovereignty or abandon its national interests. Throughout history, such periods have threatened our very existence. We will not make those mistakes again’ (O-politico, 2022). The use of the word ‘seemingly’ beforehand is fundamental; although Putin aims to construct a narrative surrounding Russia’s strength in facing its enemies, Russia is not capable of completely detaching itself from the role of the victim. The reliance on victimhood nationalism is perpetually needed to appeal to national trauma (O-politico, 2022). Consequently, these two facets create an image of Russia that is inherently contradictory, framing it as an intimidatory force while simultaneously being haunted by historical events that undermine such claims. This contradiction does not shy away from using the suffering of the citizens derived from those same events to promote war (O-politico, 2022; Videoklub, 2022). This contrasting perspective clarifies how the glorification of Russia, according to Putin’s narrative, and the victimisation of the nation are opposing forces. Instead, their combination perfectly exemplifies the role of memory in the employed discourse (Videoklub, 2022). These elements reinforce one another, primarily because of Russia’s wilful ignorance of the inconsistencies between them; they do not need to acknowledge the fallacy present in their combination, as their use of trauma is a deflection powerful enough to reassert the weaponisation of such trauma (Videoklub, 2022).

Furthermore, the reference to the sacrifices of ancestors who fought against the Nazis establishes a historical precedent that legitimises current actions as a continuation of a noble struggle. This use of historical continuity as a defence suggests that just as previous generations defended the ‘homeland’, present-day actions are part of this righteous cause (Videoklub, 2022). The selective use of individuals as models works perfectly within the narrative constructed by Russia; it is proof of an ongoing threat that glorifies the war. Putin states, ‘Yes, dear friends, we are missing a generation’, implying that they have already lost something to the enemy– an entire generation–and must fight to reclaim it to become whole again (Videoklub, 2022). This statement again connects military action to the domestic level. Putin recounts a conversation: ‘But today I asked my grandson if you would need to take a weapon and go, would you? He told me that Putin had come up with the war, and therefore, he needed to go. And I say that I will take my very own Berdanka made of straw, and I will go to fight for Russia’. This narrative denounces any absolute generational separation; Putin’s response enforces this gap, asserting that the war is a direct response to this loss, thereby bringing the discourse back to national defence (Videoklub, 2022).

ISRAEL

Benjamin Netanyahu’s legitimisation discourse constructs a compelling rationale for Israel’s military operation in Gaza, framing it as a necessary response to Hamas’s attack on 7 October. This narrative is deeply rooted in the historical collective trauma of the Jewish people. For example, in his statement on 9 October 2023, Netanyahu creates an urgent and emotional narrative that underscores the necessity of a forceful response by detailing the gruesome attacks carried out by Hamas on Israeli citizens (IsraeliPM, 2023). He states, ‘Hamas terrorists bound, burned and executed children. They are savages. Hamas is ISIS’ (IsraeliPM, 2023). By making a clear-cut comparison between Hamas and ISIS, Netanyahu situates the conflict within a broader global struggle against terrorism—an internationally recognised framework of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’—thereby reinforcing Israel’s perpetuated role in a collective fight against extremism (IsraeliPM, 2023).

This discourse seeks not only to secure domestic support but also to influence international perceptions, portraying Israel as a just and lawful actor defending itself against existential threats (IsraeliPM, 2024). For example, Netanyahu’s statement regarding the verdict of the ICJ further legitimises Israel’s military actions by presenting them as both legally and morally justified. He contends that Israel remains ‘unwavering’ in adhering to international law and in its sacred commitment to ‘continue to defend our country and defend our people’ (IsraeliPM, 2023). Furthermore, Netanyahu’s response to ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan strengthens the perceived moral high ground of Israel’s actions compared to the atrocities committed by Hamas by portraying Khan’s actions as ethically and morally flawed. According to Netanyahu, Khan’s decision to seek arrest warrants against ‘the democratically elected leaders of Israel is a moral outrage of historic proportions’ (IsraeliPM, 2023). This discourse supports Israel’s existing power structures that prioritise national security and defence, legitimising government actions and policies as essential for the state’s survival.

Mobilisation Discourse

RUSSIA

The formation of a distinct ‘Russian identity,’ encompassing historical events and cultural elements, is a significant narrative used to mobilise public support for military action. This discourse strategy fosters an ‘in-group mentality’ by creating a collective identity that resonates with shared memories among Russians. Mobilisation is achieved through the relatability of these personal and collective memories. For example, a guest speaker recited a poem that incorporated personal moments related to family and nature, alluding to the homeland and thereby reinforcing Russian identity (Videoklub, 2022).

A vital aspect of this discourse is the frequent reference to ancestry and historical events, which promotes a form of victimhood nationalism, as exemplified by Putin’s speeches that evoke the memory of grandfathers who fought in World War II (O-politico, 2022). Additionally, this emphasis on historical and cultural narratives serves to legitimise the occupation of territories like Donetsk and Luhansk. Russian state media portrays these areas as inherently Russian, inhabited by Russian people, as frequently echoed in Putin’s speeches and by guests on the evening show (O-politico, 2022). In summary, claiming that the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk are inherently Russian effectively mobilises public sentiment, as citizens may view military action as essential for safeguarding their identity and protecting their people in these regions.

ISRAEL

Netanyahu’s statements employ a sophisticated mobilising discourse that intertwines collective memory of past traumas, national identity, and contemporary political imperatives to galvanise both domestic and international audiences. By strategically invoking the Holocaust—a potent symbol of Jewish suffering and resilience among younger generations—Netanyahu constructs a narrative that ostensibly honours historical collective memory. However, he uses it as a powerful tool to mobilise this collective trauma among younger generations, fostering and reinforcing the perpetuated victimhood mentality within the population. As he announced the war on Hamas on 9 October 2023, Netanyahu stated, ‘Once, the Jewish people were stateless. Once, the Jewish people were defenceless. No longer’ (IsraeliPM, 2023). This discourse juxtaposes past vulnerabilities with present strengths, aiming not to signify a break from a history of persecution, which the Jewish people were subjected to, but rather to reinforce it. The collective trauma of the Holocaust is mobilised from generation to generation, maintaining a state of vigilance and readiness within the Israeli population. Netanyahu then proclaims, ‘Israel will win this war [against Hamas], and when it wins, the entire civilised world wins’ (IsraeliPM, 2023). By linking Israel’s fight against Hamas to a universal battle for civilisation, he seeks to mobilise international support, presenting Israel’s military actions as essential for maintaining global order.

Furthermore, by pledging ‘Never Again’ in response to the ICJ’s verdict regarding genocide charges against Israel—on International Holocaust Remembrance Day—Netanyahu emphasises that the threats faced today, referencing the October 7 attacks, are continuations of historical atrocities (IsraeliPM, 2024). On the Eve of the National Holocaust Remembrance Day, he recounts the words of Holocaust survivor Izzy Kabilio, a 96-year-old man, who asserted that ‘The State of Israel today is the only refuge for the Jewish people’. This statement reinforces the necessity of a solid and secure Jewish state (IsraeliPM, 2024). Such commemorations are designed to evoke strong emotional responses and a sense of collective duty among Israelis, thereby ensuring that the collective memory of the Holocaust is mobilised to the younger generations. In portraying the current conflict as part of an ongoing struggle to ensure the survival and security of the Jewish people, Netanyahu weaponises the collective trauma of the Holocaust and historical antisemitism. This reinforces the perception of Israel as a perennial victim that must remain vigilant and robust in its defence.

Comparison

When comparing the cases of Russia and Israel, it becomes clear that both states use similar discursive strategies to achieve their respective political objectives despite the vast differences between them. The ways in which these strategies are deployed reflect each nation’s unique geopolitical position and internal dynamics. These narratives are not simply historical recollections but carefully constructed discourses that shape public perception in ways that align with each government’s objectives.

A critical commonality between how Russia and Israel weaponise trauma lies in their portrayal of present-day military engagements as extensions of existential struggles from the past. Both countries draw on events from World War II to evoke a deep emotional resonance among their populations, depicting their military actions as necessary for national survival. Despite the similar outcomes, few distinctions are found regarding the direction and focus of these discourses. One of the key differences found in this comparison is that, in Russia, trauma is weaponised through the invocation of the Great Patriotic War and is primarily directed inward, targeting the Russian populace. In contrast, Israel’s approach is more outward-facing: the trauma of the Holocaust is invoked not only to justify domestic security measures but also to defend Israel’s actions on the international stage. For example, Putin’s narrative of Russian victimhood focuses heavily on historical pride, invoking the Soviet Union’s triumph over the Nazis as a source of national strength. Netanyahu’s rhetoric, on the other hand, leans into the fragility of Israel’s existence and the ever-present threat of annihilation.

Netanyahu’s invocation of the Holocaust serves a dual purpose. Domestically, it solidifies the Israeli public’s sense of existential threat by drawing direct parallels between Hamas and the Nazis, positioning Israel as the perpetual victim of aggressive, ‘genocidal’ forces (IsraeliPM, 2024). By doing so, Netanyahu cultivates a powerful narrative that reinforces the necessity of defensive measures to ensure the survival of the Jewish people. This narrative is not merely a domestic tool but also aims to generate international legitimacy and sympathy. Netanyahu’s condemnation of the ICJ and ICC for their criticism of Israel’s military actions in Gaza reflects an outward-facing strategy of defending Israel’s image on a global scale. Unlike Putin, Netanyahu must actively court international support—especially from Western allies, such as the United States—to sustain its military and economic aid (Masters and Merrow, 2024). His narrative, therefore, simultaneously underscores Israel’s adherence to international law and presents Israeli military actions as a lawful and moral defence against terrorism.

In contrast, Putin’s rhetoric is more isolationist and antagonistic towards international institutions and Western powers (Berger, 2022). Putin dismisses foreign criticism–such as comparisons between Russia’s actions in Ukraine and those of Nazi Germany–as unjust and propagandistic, given Russia’s historical role in defeating Nazism during WWII (Berger, 2022). By doing so, Putin constructs a narrative in which Russia is perpetually under siege, threatened by neo-Nazi forces and victimised by global misrepresentation, contrasting Netanyahu’s positioning of Israel as a defender in a universally recognised fight against extremism (IsraeliPM, 2023).

Alternative Explanations

While collective memory and historical narratives provide valuable insights into how governments mobilise public support, it is equally important to consider alternative explanations that contribute to this support. A key argument is that the system itself, rather than the population’s knowledge or beliefs, plays a central role in mobilising public opinion and support for government actions. In the case of Israel, beyond Netanyahu’s use of discourse, two key factors offer potential alternatives to trauma weaponisation in mobilising support for and justifying military actions: the rise of neo-Zionist right-wing populist ideologies and the co-optation of the Israel Defence Force into Israeli society and politics— (Pinson, 2022; Veys, 2020). As highlighted by Halleli Pinson (2022), the rise of neo-Zionist populism has significantly influenced public discourse over the past fifteen years. This ideology prioritises Israeli territorial expansion, particularly in the West Bank, rejects compromises with Palestinians, and advocates for a vision of a security-focused, Jewish ethno-nationalist state (Pinson, 2022, pp. 126–127, 129–131; Robbins, 2023).

These ideologies, which are perpetuated through educational curricula, promote a vision of Israel as an exclusively Jewish state, limiting exposure to Palestinian perspectives, delegitimising internal opposition by presenting any critique as a threat to national security and fostering an overall more right-wing worldview—particularly among the younger generations (Robbins, 2023, pp. 126–127). For example, a poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in January 2023 revealed that seventy-three per cent of Jewish Israelis aged eighteen to twenty-four identify as right-wing, compared to forty-six per cent of those aged sixty-five and older (Robbins, 2023).

Additionally, Tugche Veys’s (2020) research on the deep integration of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) into Israeli politics and society since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 shows its profound role in shaping public attitudes (Veys, 2020, p. 3). The IDF is a highly respected institution in Israel, and many of its members have transitioned into political leadership roles throughout the years, ensuring that military perspectives heavily influence policy decisions (Veys, 2020, pp. 3–4). This blurring of military and civilian spheres, according to Veys, led to a normalisation of militaristic governance, where security concerns often dominate political discourse (Veys, 2020). The deep respect for military service in Israel contributes to the perception that those with military experience are best suited to guide the nation in matters of defence, further reinforcing public support for military actions (Veys, 2020, pp. 6–7).

In Russia’s case, the suppression of dissent and fear of repression are significant factors that limit opposition to the actions of the government (Sakwa, 2010, p. 1152). The Russian government has enacted strict laws that criminalise opposition to the war, imposing heavy penalties for protests and anti-war narratives (Sakwa, 2010). For instance, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, thousands of Russians took to the streets in anti-war protests, which were met with mass arrests and fines (BBC, 2022). During these protests, thousands of people were detained, and the authorities quickly introduced further legal measures to make it easier to imprison individuals (BBC, 2022).

Such repressive actions by the government create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, effectively discouraging the population from expressing any anti-war sentiment. The threat of fines, imprisonment, and long-term repercussions leads many to remain silent or even outwardly supportive, regardless of their true beliefs. Therefore, systemic repression is a critical factor in sustaining public support for the war, as it limits the possibility for alternative opinions to surface or gain momentum.

In addition, the economic and social benefits provided by the state for military service may incentivise many Russians to support military action. A significant proportion of those enlisted in the military come from rural regions, which are often characterised by higher levels of poverty and limited economic opportunities (The Moscow Times, 2022). For individuals in these areas, joining the military can offer a pathway to economic stability and social mobility (The Moscow Times, 2022).

Government-provided benefits such as pensions, public-sector jobs, housing assistance, and other forms of state support make military service an attractive option for those seeking financial security (Massicot, 2022). These benefits create a form of economic dependency on the state, particularly in communities where alternative job opportunities are scarce (Massicot, 2022). As a result, many individuals and their families become reliant on the military and defence-related industries for their livelihoods. This economic reliance not only fosters support for military engagements but also makes opposition to war less likely, as criticising the government’s military actions could jeopardise the very benefits that provide economic stability.

In summary, the structural relationship between economic incentives and military engagement highlights how economic factors, alongside repression, contribute to sustaining public support for war.

Conclusion

This study delves into the complex ways in which Israeli and Russian state media weaponise collective memory. We highlighted the role of Foucault’s theory of discourse and power, including the concept of power-knowledge, in understanding how power is exercised through shared knowledge and collective memory. Foucault’s theory emphasises how deeply personal and individual aspects of human experience can be shaped and controlled by state mechanisms for political or social purposes. By choosing memory as a site of government intervention, this paper shows how the state can subtly manipulate collective memory to serve its interests, influencing how individuals perceive history and current events. This manipulation transforms memory from a private realm into a tool for achieving government objectives, reflecting broader power dynamics in society.

Specifically, our research examined how the Russian and Israeli governments strategically use collective memory to reinforce national identity and serve as a political and social control tool to mobilise public support and legitimise military action. We analysed how Russia emphasises patriotic duty and historical continuity, framing current conflicts as essential to defending the Russian people and territories. In contrast, Israel invokes the Holocaust to highlight past vulnerabilities, mobilising collective trauma to reinforce a state of vigilance and readiness, portraying military actions as necessary for national survival against contemporary threats.

Moreover, both Russian and Israeli state media use the memory of World War II events to justify and reinforce the image of their countries as victims of external aggression and to mobilise citizens by recalling past traumas. Grounded in Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge and governmentality, which illustrates how power can be analysed outside traditional juridic-institutional frameworks and established political systems, this paper examines the weaponisation of collective trauma as a mechanism for legitimising military action and reinforcing national identity in two markedly different countries. Despite their differences in size, historical contexts, and geopolitical environments, both nations utilise collective trauma to shape narratives that justify their military endeavours and strengthen national unity. This analysis highlights the pervasive role of memory in the exercise of power and its implications for national identity and state legitimacy.

This study offers valuable insights into memory politics, presenting a thought-provoking framework for analysing the construction of national identity and the roots of conflict. By examining how collective memory is manipulated, our findings lay the groundwork for future research aimed at developing strategies to counteract the use of collective memory as a tool to justify military actions. Moreover, understanding these dynamics can contribute to more effective dialogue and reconciliation efforts in societies marked by historical trauma and conflict. This study ultimately highlights the importance of critical engagement with memory politics in fostering a more nuanced understanding of national identity and conflict resolution.

Jasmine Kalstein, Amina Lučkova, Elisabetta Ragonese, Marta Sacco, and Réka György

© The Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.