Bailey Gould
International Relations
Michaelmas Term, 2024
Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 131-148

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14290484

Introduction

This article aims to determine whether environmental change in the Niger Delta is better understood through a ‘Capitalocene’ framework and what the implications are for security.

Oil production in the Niger Delta, which is home to over six and a half million people, is degrading access to subsistence resources due to pollution and other consequences (Ibaba and Opukri, 2008, pp. 179-188). The results are environmental breakdowns, high levels of poverty, and poor quality of life, often leading to the secondary consequences of violent conflict and other security issues (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 4). Although the Niger Delta has historically experienced economic, socio-cultural, and environmental problems, which materialise in conflict and economic exploitation of humans and nature, it has been analysed primarily through a security lens (Obi, 2011, p. 222; Obi, 2014, pp. 150-151; Oviasuyi and Uwadjae, 2010, pp. 112-117; Mahler, 2010, p. 6; Majangwa and Agbiboa, 2013, pp. 75-77; Babatunde, 2017, p. 37; Bamidele and Erameh, 2023, p. 2; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 6-8; Ibaba and Opukri, 2008, p. 189).

An ‘oil curse’ hypothesis, positing nature as a resource, presents oil as monocausal in socio-economic, security, and environmental crises (Obi, 2011, pp. 227-230; Obi, 2014, p. 151). Economic, environmental and historical relations in the local area have only been used as contextual features, creating a rigid security framework for assessing the crises in the Niger Delta where the relations constitutive of nature are omitted (see Omoje, 2005, p. 331; Owalabi and Okwechime, 2007, pp. 4-10; Obi, 2011, pp.227-230; Mahler, 2010, pp. 27-30; Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 92; Udoh and Ibok, 2014, pp. 64-68; Obi, 2014, p. 51; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 6-8). This embeds dualistic conceptualisations that render nature a non-active agent in producing and reproducing security, environmental and economic crises. Nature is assigned the property of substance; it is a resource to be used and worked through. The recognition of colonial power structures which organise and produce the relations of nature in the Niger Delta are obscured by the current debate that focuses on state and human security, prompting a new understanding.

Capitalism in the Niger Delta, as a way of organising the relations of nature, should be examined to understand environmental change in the Niger Delta (Moore, 2016b, p. 6). The ‘Capitalocene’ refers to a framework that analyses how capitalism systematically produces and organises human and extra-human natures for the accumulation of capital, in turn reproducing environmental change. Notably, the Capitalocene transcends dualistic ontologies that construct nature and society as distinct units of analysis (Moore, 2017, pp. 597-602), thus moving beyond anthropogenic approaches to understanding the Niger Delta. The Capitalocene is used to reframe the case of the Niger Delta through a web of life interconnected by relations of capital (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192). Rather than assigning oil as monocausal in the production of crises, the Capitalocene’s application considers historical power structures congruent with capital accumulation. This forces an analysis of how pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial modes of production in the Niger Delta have established and reproduced unequal power relations that manifest violent and nonviolent resistance to oil production—intertwined by a ‘Cheap Nature’ logic, historical power structures organise and produce human and extra-human nature for the cyclical accumulation of capital through exploitation and appropriation (Moore, 2016a, pp. 97-109).

‘Cheap Nature’ is central to the Capitalocene framework, offering an analytical tool that uncovers how human and extra-human natures have been constructed as external to society and are therefore ripe for exploitation and appropriation of their ‘labour’ or ‘gifts’ (Moore, 2016a, pp. 86-87; McBrien, 2016, p. 117). Presupposed by their exclusion from society, human and extra-human natures manifest as a substance to be used and worked through for capital accumulation (Moore, 2016a, p. 88). This is a cyclical process whereby natures are continuously reproduced and treated as external to society for ever-cheapening capital accumulation (Moore, 2016b, p. 11; Moore and Patel, 2017, p. 22). The Niger Delta, through an understanding of ‘Cheap Nature’, becomes a frontier for the reproduction of international capital accumulation. Paradoxically, ‘Cheap Nature’ produces and reproduces a ‘negative value’ in capital accumulation because local environments and communities are cyclically degraded to ‘extinction’; in other words, nature pushes back (McBrien, 2016, p. 118).

Through the production and reproduction of ‘Cheap Nature’, human and extra-human natures are exploited for the cyclical accumulation of capital (Moore, 2016a, pp. 97-112). Presupposed by an exclusion from society, value is extracted from nature through its exploitation and appropriation. The Necrocene attributes the exploitation and appropriation of nature to irreversible ecological destruction because the creation of value produces and reproduces a ‘negative value’ (McBrien, 2016, pp. 117-118). ‘The accumulation of capital is the accumulation of potential extinction’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 116). The process of surplus value production, through a logic of ‘Cheap Nature’, is unsustainable because nature is hostile to capital accumulation and cannot be overcome through a capitalist productivity logic (McBrien, 2016, pp. 117-118). Nature’s ‘gifts’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 117), in turn, can no longer be extracted, having reached breaking point. This produces a ‘negative value’, resulting in ecological, species and cultural extinction because nature’s capability to create value in capital accumulation is eroded (McBrien, 2016, p. 118). Negative value in the Niger Delta manifests itself in socio-economic, environmental, and security crises. Human and extra-human natures cannot be exploited further, leading to resistive violence, environmental breakdown, and degradation.

The current understanding of the Niger Delta necessitates an alternative framework, which reframes the case of the Niger Delta, paying attention to historical power structures that perpetuate the processes of exploitation and appropriation that lead to resistance. The Capitalocene and Necrocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192; McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119) offer a conceptual lens to reframe the case of the Niger Delta, synthesising the relations of power, nature, and capital within a web of life. This article seeks to explore how the Capitalocene can provide an alternative understanding of environmental change and what the implications are for security in the Niger Delta.

By applying an alternative understanding to the case of the Niger Delta, it is argued that crises in the Niger Delta are not solely a consequence of oil production. Socio-economic, environmental, and security crises in the Niger Delta are instead interconnected through historical power structures produced, organised, and perpetuated by capital for the production of value. Human and extra-human natures have been historically exploited and appropriated, producing negative value because nature pushes back against the contradictory relations of capital. Negative value provides nuance to the debate, creating a new way of thinking about crises in the Niger Delta regarding the agency of nature. The security implications materialise in an understanding of the Necrocene (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119), forcing an analysis of nature’s agential contribution to crisis production in the Niger Delta. By reframing the knowledge of the Niger Delta’s environmental change through the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) and Necrocene (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119) frameworks, a novel perspective on the region’s persistent socio-economic, environmental and security challenges is uncovered. This alternative understanding alters the perception of security from a state-centric issue to an ecological, socio-economic issue.

Literature Review

The Niger Delta, since the discovery of oil in 1956, has become Africa’s most valuable oil-producing region (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 4). However, oil exploration and production negatively impact the environment and humans in the local area. The local climate has degraded, facilitated by multiple activity sources such as oil pipe corrosion, sabotage of oil facilities, pipe leaks, extraction, transportation, and the oil storage environment (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 4-5). Characterised by oil spills, the consequent pollution negatively impacts the health and well-being of local environments and people, polluting drinking water and diminishing subsistence sources from fishing and agriculture (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 4-5).

Economic and environmental crises occur due to environmental degradation in the Niger Delta (Ibaba and Opukri, 2008, p. 189). Degradation of the local environment produces and reproduces conflict in the local area, manifesting in local resistance to environmental and economic exploitation (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 7). This is characterised by non-militant and militant resistance to oil companies and the state and is proliferated by reaction to state militarisation to secure resources (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 7). Since the apex of oil-related activity in the Niger Delta, environmental, economic, and security challenges continue to impact the local environment negatively and people to a great extent. This necessitates a re-evaluation of the crises in the Niger Delta, critically, to expand the understanding of the relations constitutive of crisis production and reproduction.

The current literature comprises varying frameworks of analysis. However, it is mainly congruent with an oil curse hypothesis (Obi, 2014, pp. 148-150), inhibited by an anthropogenic logic. This is reflected in applying traditional security perspectives, albeit contextualised by political economy frameworks. The literature obscures the role of nature in the case of the Niger Delta through centring state and human-centred analysis of an oil curse. The Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) and Necrocene (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119) challenge the human/nature binary implicit in current analyses, thus shedding new light on the case of the Niger Delta and aiding a nuanced understanding of the violence and exploitation in the area throughout history. This is critical to expand the debate and uncover the extent to which oil-based capital accumulation is constitutive of capitalism’s tendency to organise human and extra-human nature for the cyclical cheapening of capital, inherently leading to negative value, causal and symptomatic in the production and reproduction of crises in the Niger Delta (McBrien, 2016; Moore, 2016a).

Oil-Curse Hypothesis Of The Niger Delta

The Niger Delta has primarily been analysed through a security lens (Obi, 2011, p. 222; Obi, 2014, pp. 150-151; Oviasuyi and Uwadjae, 2010, pp. 112-117; Mahler, 2010, p. 6; Majangwa and Agbiboa, 2013, pp. 75-77; Babatunde, 2017, p.37; Bamidele and Erameh, 2023, p. 2; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 6-8; Ibaba and Opukri, 2008, p. 189). The existence of an oil curse is implied (Obi, 2014, pp. 148-150), whereby natural resource wealth is a barrier to sustained economic and political growth, fuelling violence and instability (Cotet and Tsui, 2013, p. 77). Oil is presented as monocausal in producing and reproducing crises because oil wealth perpetuates violent economic and political conflict (Obi, 2014, p. 148) through environmental and economic destruction. Since the 1990s, literature has primarily focused on resistive violence in the Niger Delta through a security lens, thus portraying it as a direct result of oil exploitation and exploration (Oviasuyi and Uwadjae, 2010, pp. 112-117; Majangwa and Agbiboa, 2013, pp. 75-77; Udoh and Ibok, 2014, pp. 64-68; Babatunde, 2017, p. 7; Bamidele and Erameh, 2023, p. 2).

Viewing the area through a restrictive lens, like the oil curse, inhibits the analysis of the Niger Delta by asserting the state as central (Obi, 2014, p. 149). An understanding of the Niger Delta through the oil curse lens is therefore restricted to the post-independent state, as oil was only discovered in the mid-twentieth century (Obi, 2011, pp. 222-223). Traditional conceptions of security are reflected in a positivist assumption that prioritises state-centric analyses, which in turn frame resistive violence as military security threats, creating a paradox in the understanding of the Niger Delta. States secure natural resources (namely, oil) militarily, increasing conflict and resistance to oil-related activity (Trombetta, 2021, p. 160). This lens reduces the consideration of contextual factors and varying agents in the production of crises in the Niger Delta, prioritising state security and resistive threats to oil resource control.

The oil curse hypothesis, however, has opened the debate to critical insights, uncovering the extent to which the state controls natural resources for revenue production at the expense of minority groups and indigenous communities (Omoje, 2005, p. 323; Owolabi and Okwechime, 2007, pp. 11-20; Mahler, 2010, pp. 14-27; Obi, 2011, pp. 222-224; Udoh and Ibok, 2014, pp. 71-75; Obi, 2014, p. 150; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 8-9). This represents an epistemic shift in the oil-curse hypothesis from frameworks of analysis which focus primarily on state security to broader frameworks that reassert humans as the primary object of insecurity in oil production (Owolabi and Okwechime, 2007, p. 4). The oil curse hypothesis presents the state as a rentier state in so far as most of its national income is derived from external revenue (Omoje, 2005, p. 322). Oil export revenues in the Niger Delta were at twenty per cent of GDP in 2000 (The World Bank, 2024). In considering a rentier state, humans are added to the analysis of crises in the Niger Delta. Specifically, the historical conditions created by the state and companies that have produced and reproduced capability for oil production are uncovered. The reproduction of human insecurity is attributed to historical conditions that necessitate resistance to oil production (Omoje, 2005, p. 332; Owolabi and Okwechime, 2007, pp. 25-30; Mahler, 2010, pp. 27-29; Obi, 2014, p. 150; Obi, 2011, pp. 225-230; Ifedi and Anyu, 201, p. 92; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 8). A contextualised layer is added to the understanding of the Niger Delta through the recognition of external actors in oil-based accumulation (Omoje, 2005, p. 323).

The rentier state conception of the oil curse implies an alliance between the state and oil-producing actors (Omoje, 2005, p. 322), opening the literature on the Niger Delta to varying analyses linking capitalism, colonialism, and state complicity in the production of violent resistance to environmental crises (Owolabi and Okwechime, 2007, p. 16; Obi, 2011, pp. 222-227; Mahler, 2010, p. 22; Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 74; Udoh and Ibok, 2014, pp. 64-68; Obi, 2014, p. 150; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 7). With this turn, contemporary relations in the Niger Delta are presented as a reflection of colonial modalities mechanised through a triple alliance (Omoje, 2005, p. 323; Obi, 2011, pp. 227-232). The understanding of the Niger Delta is expanded, given the historical mutual relationships between the state, multinational companies, and local capital that reproduce human insecurity. This includes an examination of historical economic structures and the extent to which they produce and reproduce conflict and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta (Obi, 2011, p. 234). Social, cultural, political, and institutional factors of the crises in the Niger Delta are historicised as existing before the advent of oil wealth, delegitimising the oil-curse hypotheses (Mahler, 2010, pp. 22-29). The historicisation process offered by the literature provides a more nuanced perspective than the oil curse, illustrating how historical injustices reproduce human insecurity in the Niger Delta. This perspective sets the ground for a novel contribution to the literature, expanding a limited security approach which has as its premise oil as monocausal to include recognition of Niger Delta histories in crisis.

Historicisation Of The Niger Delta

An evolutionary process is uncovered in the historicisation of the Niger Delta that assesses how historical legislation and policies of administrative powers have shaped access to and control of resources, in turn resulting in conflict (Omoje, 2005, p. 323; Obi, 2014, pp. 150-151). In this sense, Ifedi and Anyu (2011, p. 74) capture an abstract temporality that offers analytical insight into the Niger Delta. Historical policy legacies detrimental to the welfare of indigenous citizens are causal in the reproduction of human insecurity crises in the Niger Delta (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 92).

The literature on the pre-colonial history of the Niger Delta presents slavery as the decisive economic factor, mode of production, and beginning of crisis, bringing the debate out of a post-colonial episode (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 76). The slave trade in the Niger Delta was built by European powers trading with Nigerian elites (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, pp. 76-81). Local people became marginalised by dominant ethnic groups trading with European merchants and, therefore, had little to no control over their political and economic destiny (Watts, 2004, pp. 61-75; Ukiwo, 2007, p. 590; Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, pp. 76-81; International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 2). Characterised by unequal power relations, slavery begins the production and reproduction of grievances often attributed to the advent of oil wealth in the Niger Delta, creating historical movements of resistive violence to dispossession and expropriation (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, pp. 76-81).

Following the abolition of slavery and the division of Africa by European powers, the palm oil trade continued patterns of dispossession and expropriation, leading to resistive violence. The Royal Niger Company pursued colonial administration of the Niger Delta, institutionalising unequal power structures presupposed by ethnic disparities (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 77). Through the use of military and economic modalities of colonial rule, local communities are dispossessed of their subsistence resources while the state secures palm oil resources (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 77). This perspective illustrates a link between pre-colonial and colonial modes of production, characterised by ethnic disparities, providing an abstract temporality in the analysis of the Niger Delta.

With powers embedded in colonial oil laws, the independent Nigerian state (from 1960) gained control over the ownership of oil after the civil war (1967-1970), resulting in further land expropriation from Niger Delta communities (Obi, 2011, pp. 222-223). Oil-based accumulation of capital dispossessed people from their land and means of subsistence based on ethnic disparities (Obi, 2011, p. 227), in turn reproducing the historical conditions for militancy, resistive violence, and environmental breakdowns (Majangwa and Agbiboa, 2013, p. 72). The Nigerian state (Nigerian National Petroleum Company) owns a fifty-five per cent share of the largest oil-producing joint venture: Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited Joint Venture (Amnesty International, 2023, p.6). The understanding of the mutual relationship between the state and oil companies, revealed by the conceptualisation of the rentier state, uncovers the state’s rationale behind maximising profits from oil-based capital accumulation with a complete disregard for local people and the environment (Omoje, 2005, p. 322). The state again, however, becomes central in the literature on the Niger Delta, owing to its power to legislate on the oil environment (Omoje, 2005, pp. 323-326).

Through contextual understandings, the state is conceptualised as normatively poised to generate income, presupposed by the dispossession of local Niger Delta communities, creating divide and conflict (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 9). Marxist perspectives use this understanding to deviate from traditional security conceptions, which dominate the basic understanding of the Niger Delta, instead emphasising the causal capacity of economic relationships materialised in historical power structures which create crises in the Niger Delta. Viewing indigenous communities as an ensemble of humans at the core of unequal social relations based on hierarchically interrelated structures provides insight into the insecurity reproduced by historical modes of capitalist production such as that of slavery and the palm of oil trade (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 4). Environmental and security crises are analysed as produced and reproduced through capital’s manipulation of differences, degrading social cohesion through the exploitation of resources and capital accumulation (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 76). Examining the intersection of class and race in the Niger Delta is presented as beneficial to analyses of the crisis, allowing for a deeper understanding of inequality that produces resistive violence (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 5-8). Social relations are analysed as mediated through race and class, emphasising the institutionalisation of unequal power structures that affect humans rather than the state. People in the Niger Delta are historically constructed as subordinate through various modalities of colonial rule and, in turn, subject to exploitation and expropriation by the state and companies in the oil-dominated economy of the Niger Delta (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, p. 4).

Although a historicised understanding of the Niger Delta offers a wider understanding of the converging crises, expanding the scope from a limited conception of security located in a post-colonial episode, the debate remains largely focused on anthropogenic security (Mateos, 2021, p. 35). Critical interjections into the literature, appearing to overcome the oil curse hypothesis through a systematic focus, tend to revert to a focus of anthropogenic security discourse. An analytical shift which recognises the agency of nature is essential to the understanding of crises in the Niger Delta. The focus on human and or state security creates rigid frameworks for assessing the local area that cannot capture the constitutive relations complicit in the production of crises because nature is continuously conceptualised as a substance to be used and worked through. By integrating the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) and Necrocene (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119) frameworks into the analysis of the Niger Delta, a complex interplay between capitalism and crises is revealed. The new theoretical understanding of the Niger Delta reevaluates the crises beyond political and economic grievances to include all relations in a web of life that reproduce environmental, economic, and security crises.

Theoretical Framework: Capitalocene And Necrocene Perspectives

Moore (2015a, pp. 75-91) identifies a human/nature binary, artificially created by capitalism to construct nature as external to society and thus as something to be used and worked through for the accumulation of capital (Moore and Patel, 2017, pp. 23-25). The Capitalocene locates the origins of this narrative with the Cartesian dualism (Moore, 2015a, p. 5), conceptualising ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ as distinct and separate units only interacting with ‘man’s’ input; ‘I think, therefore I am’ (Moore, 2021, p. 18). This mind/matter dualism was adopted by the ‘modern’ Western world and legitimised the differentiation of nature and society, as well as human and non-human, in so far as ‘man’ (mind) can doubt the existence of reality (matter) and thus construct it accordingly (Keck and Flachs, 2022, p. 2179). Capitalism, underpinned by a Cartesian ontology, requires as a precondition the distinction of society and nature, from which the civilisational organisation of capitalism advances (Moore, 2017, p. 600). Humans and nature are constructed as external to society, a part of nature, providing a justification for racial, gendered, and classed forms of exploitation and appropriation of nature for the accumulation of capital (Moore, 2015a, pp. 51-74). This distinction will build on the anthropocentric contextualisation of the Niger Delta to consider nature as agential in environmental, economic, and security crises.

For Moore, this division is foundational because Anthropocene narratives overlook the agency of nature in society’s organisation (Moore, 2015a, pp. 1-33). Important here is the critique of ‘Green Arithmetics’, a conceptualisation that illustrates nature and society as fundamentally separate and distinct units mirroring a Cartesian Dualism (Moore, 2015a, p. 2). This perspective, congruent with anthropogenic narratives (Steffen et al., 2007), portrays nature as a substance or resource to be used and worked through for the accumulation of capital (Moore, 2015a, pp. 221-225). Nature as an agent in capitalism is obscured. Substance is prioritised over relations, eliminating the ability to analyse the relations between nature and humans in capitalist society. Such narratives assign humans/society primacy as a homogenous agent, acting unitarily upon nature as a material resource for exploitation and appropriation (Moore, 2015a, pp. 221-225). Moore (2015a) rather proposes a racialised, gendered, and classed capitalism, dependent on the historical exploitation and appropriation of nature and presupposed by a human/nature dualism. This will delegitimise the oil curse hypothesis, which assigns oil to reproduce resistive conflict and environmental breakdown rather than positioning crises as symptomatic of a logic that constructs nature as cheap.

The Capitalocene framework suggests that capitalism is in a constant search to cheapen the cost of production, given the primacy of profit, and that in doing so, it must cheapen the cost of Nature (Moore, 2016a, pp. 97-109). The processes of cheapening are congruent with narratives that conceptualise nature and society as distinct units (Moore, 2015a, pp. 75-91). Moore (2015a, pp. 93-109) suggests that capitalism relies on two relational processes: the exploitation of cheap labour and the appropriation of cheap energy.

Foundational to the exploitation of cheap labour is a racial and gendered formation of society whereby certain groups of people are constructed as external to society and thus treated as part of nature, a substance to be used, worked through, and exploited by unpaid work (Moore, 2016a, p. 84). Here, Moore (2016a) expresses a Marxist analysis of the exploitation of labour and value production. The Capitalocene, however, expands the analysis beyond substance and economic relationships (Moore, 2016a, p. 94). Capitalism, historically materialised through colonial modalities, is conceptualised as constructing particular groups external to society and, therefore, to nature, constructing such groups as ripe for exploitation (Moore, 2015a, pp. 221-225).

The second process of cheapening production is comprised of the appropriation of energy (Moore, 2016a, p.109). Capitalism, treating nature as a substance, appropriates its free gifts to put capital to work. Appropriated, cheap energy, food, and raw materials decrease the cost of production and increase capital accumulation. Therefore, capitalism is dependent on and structured for the appropriation of global natures (Moore and Patel, 2017, p. 19). These natures are ‘commodity frontiers’ or areas from which capitalism can appropriate and put to ‘work’ nature for the accumulation of capital (Moore and Patel, 2017, pp. 18-25). ‘Commodity Frontiers’ are not regions but instances of inter-regional movement materialised through relations of power, profit, and nature (Moore, 2021, p. 2).

Through an exploration of work and energy, Moore (2015a, pp. 51-75) introduces ‘Cheap Nature’ to suggest foreign capitalist powers revert to colonial modalities to cheapen the cost of accumulation. Illustrative of colonial logic, human and extra-human natures are organised by capitalism for exploitation and appropriation. ‘Cheap Nature’ offers insight into the crises of the Niger Delta, assessing the extent to which humans and nature have been cyclically subordinated in the region. A cyclical process of cheapening can be identified through slavery to oil accumulation, which produces resistance to frontiers of exploitation and appropriation (McBrien, 2016, p. 117)

An attendant framework of the Capitalocene aids the analysis of the implications for security in the Niger Delta, following the introduction of ‘Cheap Nature’. The Necrocene (McBrien, 2016) frames capitalist expansion and the logic of ‘Cheap Nature’ through the process of becoming extinct, in so far as the logic of capital produces and reproduces ‘negative value’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 117). Negative value refers to the process of capital accumulation extinguishing language, culture, species and environments by cyclically cheapening nature to the point that its ‘free gifts’ can no longer be extracted (McBrien, 2016, p. 118). Nature is inherently hostile to a capitalist logic of productivity and therefore cannot cyclically produce and reproduce capital accumulation. This materialises in ecological, environmental, social, cultural, and economic degradation, which inhibits further capital accumulation (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-117). Violent conflict in the Niger Delta can be traced to contempt for and resistance to current and historical exploitation and appropriation of human and extra-human natures.

In the Capitalocene, then, the object of analysis is shifted from solely humans or the state to the relations of and between humans, nature, and capital in a web of life (Moore, 2015a, p. 1). The literature of the Niger Delta, however, has generally been focused on security, conceptualising the crises as a result of an oil curse. The Capitalocene framework expands the referent object of analysis beyond that of humans and the state to include nature, providing a more nuanced approach to the Niger Delta crises. The Capitalocene and Necrocene are inclusive of all relations between and of humans and nature, expanding reductive analyses of class, ethnicity, individuals, companies, and state (Moore, 2015a, p. 9). In the case of the Niger Delta, an alternative framework could provide insight into the extent to which nature, constitutive of human and extra-human natures, is organised by capitalism in a web of life which leads to negative value materialised in crises.

In summary, the crises of the Niger Delta, fuelled by the exploitation of humans and nature, necessitate a re-evaluation of the current literature. The debate remains centred around an oil curse hypothesis, focusing on political and economic grievances materialised in violent conflict. The current debate perpetuates the primacy of the state in the analysis because it secures oil from resistance, creating a paradoxical development politics sustained through endemic violence. Human and economic approaches have uncovered the contextual factors of the Niger Delta crises, although they overlook the role of the environment and the interrelationship of humans and nature within discourses of security. The Capitalocene offers valuable insights by expanding the analysis to include the agential contribution of nature in the production of crises in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta understood through a new framework can contribute to a nuanced understanding of violence and exploitation in the area because nature produces a negative value constitutive of resistance and environmental breakdown. The Capitalocene critically engages the debate to uncover the extent to which capital accumulation is part of capitalism’s tendency to organise humans and nature for an ever-cheapening cost of accumulation and, therefore, complicit in the reproduction of crises in the Niger Delta.

Methodology

This article utilises a qualitative approach to answer the research question: is environmental change in the Niger Delta better understood through the Capitalocene, and what are the implications for Environmental Security?

By using a qualitative approach, positivist assumptions which attempt to produce ‘scientific’ truths are overcome by interpretivism, allowing for a more subjective interaction with the question (Smith, 2009, p. 55). Rather than attempting to create a universally applicable explanation of the case of the Niger Delta, context-dependent knowledge is collected and produced because predictive theories cannot be found in the study of human affairs (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). A qualitative approach is the most appropriate way to answer the research question because it allows for a subjective interpretation of the research question and the variables at issue (Smith, 2009, p. 55), which is critical to the research aim. This is relevant to this article as it focuses on uncovering the relations between capital, power and nature.

To collect data, a desk-based review of relevant secondary literature was undertaken. Online search engines were utilised to identify and collect data relevant to the analysis of the case of the Niger Delta. The secondary data sources contain information constitutive of historical and contemporary analysis that shows a potential relation between environmental change and oil extraction in the Niger Delta. The data considers the history, capitalist practices, colonial legacy, and environmental change in the Niger Delta.

The analysis of the research question utilises a case study approach. The case study approach allows for the construction of a wider narrative (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 237-240), in this case, constructed through the application of the theoretical framework, the Capitalocene and Necrocene. The analysis synthesises debates from the literature review to assess the historical structures and contemporary dynamics concerning power, capital, and nature. A strong case is constructed from which to make interpretations and produce an alternative understanding of the case of the Niger Delta, foregrounded in a theoretical framework.

Case Study Analysis

Through the lens of the Capitalocene, this case study analysis seeks to transcend static, monocausal explanations of the crises in the Niger Delta. Historical, structural, and systemic factors, such as legacies of slavery and colonialism – which have shaped post-colonialism in the Niger Delta- are examined to uncover the web of power dynamics, resource extraction and resistance that generate a nexus of crises in the Niger Delta. In the broadest sense, the relationships between ecosystems and economic systems are uncovered (Costanza, 2020, p. 1) through a comprehensive analysis of the appropriation and exploitation of human and extra-human natures. The study illustrates the extent to which capital, power and nature are organised by capitalism to accumulate capital (Moore, 2015a, p. 1). When using the Capitalocene framework, the security implications centre around recognising nature’s agential contribution to crises through ‘Cheap Nature’. Nature pushes back against capital accumulation processes, creating a negative value causative in crisis production.

Capitalist Exploitation And Coloniality

By analysing the case of the Niger Delta through the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192), slavery is uncovered as the foundation for the reproduction of grievances, leading to resistive conflict, economic and environmental breakdown (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 62). Slavery marks the beginning of a process of dispossession, expropriation, appropriation and exploitation by capital of human and extra-human natures in the Niger Delta. The Capitalocene framework (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) exposes the historical roots of conflict and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, uncovering slavery as a type of primitive accumulation (Moore, 2017, pp. 600-607; Moore and Patel, 2017, pp. 14-38, Mateos, 2020, pp. 31-34; Wolford, 2021, p. 1629). During slavery, the people of the Niger Delta were taken from their land and means of subsistence, exported to a foreign country and forced to work for little or no wage (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 62). Slavery produces and reproduces nature for the accumulation of capital, creating a historical legacy still perpetuated in the contemporary Niger Delta. The alternative framework, constitutive of the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) and Necrocene (McBrien, 2016), reconfigures the case of the Niger Delta, overcoming limitations which place the case of the Niger Delta in restrictive conceptualisations that identify oil as monocausal in the production of crises.

The reproduction of crises in the Niger Delta is underscored by a type of primitive accumulation presupposed by a logic of disparity. Primitive accumulation, in the sense that it is the beginning of a capitalist epoch, illustrates the genesis of nature’s organisation by and through capital (Moore, 2021, p. 27). Slavery was the paramount mode of production in the Niger Delta from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 62), with twenty-four per cent of enslaved West Africans exported to the Americas thought to have come from Delta ports (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 2). Slavery was legitimised by the exclusion of particular races from society, constructed as part of nature, and a force for production characterised by unpaid labour (Moore and Patel, 2017, p. 24). Necessitated by rivalry for economic and political supremacy, local conflict was produced amongst competing ethnic groups, giving rise to local elites trading with foreign powers (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 76). British, French, Portuguese, Dutch and Swedish slave merchants competed to buy enslaved people. Ethnic groups like the Ijaw people, therefore, became marginalised by dominant ethnic groups trading with European merchants and, in turn, had little to no control over their political and economic destiny (International Crisis Group, 2006, pp. 2-4; Ukiwo, 2007, pp. 591-593; Watts, 2012, p. 455). This begins a regional split mediated through ethnic disparities, further embedded through relations with foreign powers which organise the material and structural conditions of the Niger Delta (Obi, 2011, p. 233; Obi 2014, p. 151; Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p.92). Structural and material conditions are characterised by the exploitation and appropriation of nature (Smith, 2007, p. 34), legitimised by a logic of accumulation perpetuating the conditions for crises. A logic of ‘Cheap Nature’ is uncovered in the analysis of primitive accumulation in the Niger Delta. Through slavery, the process of cyclically cheapening the cost of accumulation in the Niger Delta begins. However, treating nature as a cheap resource produces resistance – inherently reproducing conflict.

Slavery begins a historical cycle of resistance to appropriation and exploitation of extra-human and human natures, mediated through the exclusion of particular groups from ‘society’ (Mateo, 2021, pp. 32-33). The excluded groups become ripe for exploitation and appropriation. The slow erosion and overuse of human and extra-human natures inherently contribute to conflict because ‘society’ resists and pushes back (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 84). Oil is not monocausal in the creation of conflict and environmental crises, but instead, viewed through the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192), slavery begins the production and reproduction of a nexus of crises in the contemporary Niger Delta.

Following the abolition of slavery, environmental and economic grievances which resulted in the conflict were proliferated by continuing exploitation and appropriation of nature (Ifedi and Anyu, 2011, p. 92; Obi, 2011, p. 233; Obi, 2014, p. 151; Miapyen and Bozkurt 2020, p. 9). Colonial production relations with human and extra-human natures of local communities are reproduced to serve the interests of capital (Moore, 2015a, pp. 58-59). Local communities remain underdeveloped and have poor access to subsistence resources (Pergmaier, 2018, p. 131). Capital interests are met; however, local communities are underdeveloped, and environments depleted (Smith, 2007, p. 34; Watts, 2012, p. 455; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 5-9). The British-led Royal Niger Company, in its production of palm oil in the nineteenth century, followed oppressive colonial practices mediated through racial disparities and militant and economic rule (Bassey, 2006, p. 4). Mineral laws of 1889, 1907 and 1914 assigned oil resources to state ownership (Raji and Abejide, 2014, pp. 64-69; Ikepeze and Ikepeze, 2015, p. 5), which in turn, produced and reproduced appropriation and dispossession of nature as a means of capital accumulation in the Niger Delta. The state facilitated the capital accumulation process, often militarily, in contradiction with local communities, further increasing resistance to oil production (Omoje, 2005, p. 329; Watts, 2012, pp. 453-455). Locating the origins of the reproduction of grievances with the advent of slavery and ensuing colonial practices, the Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) framework provides a lens to analyse the relations of and between power, capital, and nature (Moore, 2015a, p. 1). From slavery to colonial modalities of rule, the Niger Delta has been historically constructed for the accumulation and cheapening of capital, materialised in the dispossession and exploitation of extra-human and human natures.

Since the discovery of oil in the 1960s, which marked independence, oil activities in the Niger Delta have capitalised on the unpaid work/energy of human and extra-human natures, conditions created by the colonial legacy of exploitation and appropriation in the local area (Obi, 2014, pp. 150-151). The post-independent state is therefore rooted in colonial powers, using similar modalities of rule to extract value from nature in the Niger Delta, with little benefit accruing to the local communities (Ebeku, 2008, pp. 400-403; Ukiwo, 2009, p. 2). During the civil war, from 1967-1970, military rulers assigned ownership of oil resources to the Nigerian state (Obi, 2011, p. 223). The Land Use Act of 1978 empowered the national government to seize private land for oil activities (Udoh and Ibok, 2014, p. 62). The seizure of land inherently cheapens the cost of accumulation, disregarding the cost of purchase (Udoh and Ibok, 2014, p. 62). Human and extra-human nature is organised to cheapen capital accumulation by the state and multinational companies. Through oil-based capital accumulation, the post-colonial state mirrors colonial power structures, whereby dominant groups organise nature for the accumulation and cheapening of capital. The state monopolises power, privileging itself in oil exploration and production legislation to focus on short-term investment of derivative revenues rather than long-term diversified investment in local communities (Omoje, 2005, p. 324). The analysis of coloniality in the Niger Delta allows for the consideration of the activities undertaken by the state, foreign states, and companies with regard to the perpetuation of historically unequal power relations. Power relations are mediated through racial and ethnic disparities, which create crises (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192)

This has dislocated the area’s ecology and threatened the local communities’ social, economic, and cultural stability (Babatunde, 2017, p. 32; Obi, 2011, p. 233; Obi, 2014, p. 150; Omoje, 2005, p. 332; Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 4-5). Local people have cyclically been displaced from their land and water resources as capital relations in the local area render land unusable and perpetuate the degradation of crops for food, as well as contaminating water sources (Bamidele and Erameh, 2023, pp. 4-5). Local communities constructed as external to ‘society’, have sought to push back, and resist a historical legacy of exploitative practice that diminishes their subsistence access (Pesa, 2022, p. 394). Legislation such as the Oil Pipeline Act of 1958 (Bassey, 2006, p. 7), however, absolves the environmental responsibility of oil-producing actors (state and companies) when third-party sabotage occurs. Therefore, the conditions for ignoring degradation are created by resistance to oil activities, which absolves companies of responsibility to compensate affected communities (Bassey, 2006, p. 7). Legislation perpetuates an unequal power relation because nature is treated as a ‘battleground’, a space where grievances are settled at no cost to the state or oil-producing company. The construction of ‘nature’ as non-agential in the capital accumulation process (Moore, 2016a, p. 87) protects the relations of capital over nature as a substance, something to be used and worked through (Moore, 2015a, p. 76). Colonial modalities of rule underscore contemporary crude oil production and exude a capitalist colonial legacy, materialised in the violent appropriation, exploitation, and protection of resources for capital accumulation (Moore, 2015a, pp. 2-5).

Beginning with slavery, a logic of exploitation and appropriation is produced in the treatment of the Niger Delta, underscored by ethnic disparities and a capitalist logic which constructs certain groups and nature as external to society. The analysis has uncovered the perpetration of a colonial logic entrenched in the post-colonial state of Nigeria. Patterns of exploitation and appropriation persist, creating a paradox that exacerbates crises’ materialisation in economic, environmental, and socio-cultural forms. The Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) offers insight into the multi-faceted nature of crises, inter-connected in their relations between and of capital, power, and nature. Given nature is exploited and appropriated, a logic of ‘Cheap Nature’ is present. Nature is cyclically cheapened through exploitation and appropriation to lower the cost of capital accumulation. Capital does not just exploit human and extra-human natures; it threatens the necrosis of species, cultures, environments and ecologies (McBrien, 2016).

‘Cheap Nature’ And Capital Accumulation

Important in the case of the Niger Delta is the concept of ‘Cheap Nature’ and its inherent negative value (Moore, 2015b, p. 24; McBrien, 2016, p. 117). Nature, constructed as external to society through colonial modalities of rule and extraction, is ripe for exploitation and appropriation. The process of ‘Cheap Nature’ utilises capital, empire, and science capacities to appropriate and exploit the unpaid work/energy of human and extra-human natures (Moore, 2016a, p. 89). ‘Cheap Nature’ is exemplified in the exploitation and appropriation of nature for capital accumulation from the pre-colonial to post-colonial period, directly contradicting extra-human and human natures. ‘Cheap Nature’ becomes central to the framework when considering the case of the Niger Delta because the extent to which unpaid energy/work is appropriated and exploited must cyclically increase to maintain and increase levels of capital accumulation (Moore, 2016b, p. 11).

The historical legacy of the cyclical accumulation of ‘Cheap Nature’ is constitutive of dispossession and marginalisation, as well as environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, inherently fuelling local conflict movements in resistance to exploitation and negative value. ‘Cheap Nature’, applied to the case of the Niger Delta, increases the understanding of history, and offers an abstract tool which uncovers the relations of nature, power, and capital in the capital accumulation process. The alternative understanding illustrates how and to what extent humans and nature have been organised to accumulate capital. Importantly, it also highlights the agency of nature in the production and reproduction of grievances, in so far as ‘negative value’, inherent in the appropriation of ‘Cheap Nature’, degrades nature and creates the conditions for resistance and violent conflict because ‘nature pushes back’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 135). Subsistence resources, environments, cultures, and peoples are depleted to such an extent that there is a real risk of extinction. The ‘gifts’ of nature will reach a breaking point, whereby no more can be extracted due to its eradication (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119).

‘Negative value’ is materialised in violent conflict and environmental degradation of the Niger Delta, producing and reproducing resistance to the extraction of ‘Cheap Nature’ in the local area. ‘Cheap Nature’ offers an analytical tool for assigning cause in conflict (Woroniecki et al., 2020, p. 9) because a negative value is created (McBrien, 2016, pp. 116-119). Assessments of the Ogoniland environment and Ogoni indigenous communities have outlined the real threat of extinction for indigenous cultures and nature due to the treatment of nature as a cheap resource for extraction, generating the conditions for protest (Amnesty International, 2014, pp. 1-16) Taking form in violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns against environmental and socio-economic exclusion (Ibeanu, 2000, pp. 26-28) local communities fight against ‘negative value’ but also reproduce ‘negative value’ (McBrien, 2016, pp. 118-120). Capital depletes and subordinates’ nature, proliferating resistance further inhibiting value production conditions. Access to subsistence and revenue resources is minimised or elided (Ibeanu, 2000, p. 31; Omoje, 2005, p. 332; Tantua and Kamruzzaman, 2016, pp. 5-8). Thus, local communities have sought to reduce how nature is organised by capital to accumulate capital. ‘Negative value’ is perpetuated by both the state and oil companies through a logic congruent with that in the pre-colonial and colonial periods of the Niger Delta. Operationalised by multinational corporations and facilitated by the state, a logic of ‘Cheap Nature’ depletes nature to such an extent that no more can be extracted (McBrien, 2016, p. 118), creating security implications. The organisation of nature by capital fuels violent resistance because value and ‘negative value’ are extracted from human and extra-human natures. The Capitalocene provides a new understanding of security and local development in the local area to that of the monocausal oil curse hypothesis, synthesising economic, environmental, and security crises through the conceptualisation of capital organising and reproducing a ‘web of life’ for the ever-cheapening of production (Moore, 2015a, pp. 221-225).

Shell’s recent withdrawal from the oil-producing region (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 15) illustrates the unsustainability of reproducing nature as a cheap substance for capital accumulation. It provides an example of how reframing the case of the Niger Delta has a beneficial impact on the understanding of security. The logic of ‘Cheap Nature’ is unsustainable and inherently produces ‘negative value’ (Moore, 2015b, p. 24; McBrien, 2016, p. 117). Shell’s oil production in the Niger Delta has created ‘negative value’ by polluting water sources, destroying land and creating vast economic inequalities in the Niger Delta, which in turn leads to resistive conflict (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 1). Shell has treated nature as an everlasting substance to be used and worked through for the accumulation of capital, accumulating vast profits with little to no regard for local communities and environments (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 4). Their withdrawal from operations (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 15; Bousso, 2024) exemplifies an accrued ‘negative value’. This is because ‘Cheap Nature’ no longer offers a viable rate of capital accumulation for Shell, producing and reproducing a ‘negative value’ materialised in violent conflict and environmental breakdown in the local area, which threatens Shell’s operations. Nature, constitutive of human and extra-human natures, is being depleted in accumulation. When organised for the cheapening of accumulation, the ‘free gifts’ of nature no longer materialise as ‘free’ but rather necessitate greater economic, environmental, and socio-cultural costs for Shell (McBrien, 2016, pp. 16-119). Shell’s operations have therefore contributed to the historical production of converging crises in the Niger Delta because of the extraction of value from human and extra-human natures (Miapyen and Bozkurt, 2020, pp. 8-9).

Given the involvement of Shell and its monopoly on oil production in the Niger Delta (Shell owns/owned thirty per cent of the state-owned petroleum company), its recent withdrawal suggests the extraction of ‘Cheap Nature’ is no longer economically viable due to the ‘negative value’ it produces, materialised in environmental degradation and conflict (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 6). Shell’s decision to withdraw exemplifies the concept of ‘negative value’, which finds that the appropriation and exploitation of nature are inherently contradictory and paradoxical (McBrien, 2016, pp. 118-135). Shell has not taken adequate actions to remediate communities and environments following pollution, not even publishing the true extent of their environmental impact (Amnesty International, 2023, p. 22). This illustrates/highlights its treatment of nature as cheap, a substance to be used and worked through for capital accumulation. Shell has been condemned for the indiscriminate destruction of both human and extra-human natures since their involvement beginning in 1956, even urged to rehabilitate communities and redevelop the environment (Amnesty International, 2014, pp. 4-5). Nature has historically been treated and materialised as cheap by Shell, producing ‘negative value’ as the ‘gifts’ of human and extra-human nature no longer materialise in capital accumulation. The extraction of value and inherent ‘negative value’ perpetuate crises because environments and communities are depleted to such an extent that violent resistance and environmental breakdown occur. The exploitation and appropriation of ever-cheapening nature reproduce conflict and environmental degradation conditions.

Applying the Necrocene framework to ‘Cheap Nature’ expands the understanding of the Niger Delta to illustrate capital accumulation as the accumulation of potential extinction (McBrien, 2016, p. 118). The Necrocene further analyses the extent to which oil production has created conflict, materialised in resistance to exploitative practices. Conflict in the Niger Delta has been assessed as resistance to the degradation and extinction of local environments, cultures, languages, and people due to oil-related activities (Obi, 2014, p. 151). Local perspectives illustrate an understanding of the relationship between cheapening and ‘negative value’ depicted in an alternative understanding of the Niger Delta. Local poetry portrays an interrelationship between oil accumulation by multinational companies and environmental degradation in the production of crises; ‘[This] drove the seasons mental and to walk on their heads … so many trees beheaded and streams mortally poisoned in the name of jobs and wealth!’ (Ojaide, 1997, p. 13). It is implied that oil production, for capital accumulation, creates environmental crises and cannot be justified by economic profits and capitalist development (Pesa, 2022, pp. 393-395). The Niger Delta environment is no longer perceived as a resource for subsistence or an improved life, characterised as substance, but rather a metaphor for death implemented by multinational companies and the Nigerian State.

The Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) recognises the constitutive relations of capital accumulation, which inherently materialise in depletion and potential extinction (McBrien, 2016, p. 118) because nature has been historically organised as a substance to be used as cheaply as possible for the accumulation of capital (Moore, 2016a, p. 87; Abba and Onyemachi, 2020, pp. 6-14). By introducing ‘negative value’ and the accumulation of capital as the potential accumulation of extinction, the long-term security and development impacts in the case of the Niger Delta are uncovered. Given more than sixty per cent of people in the Niger Delta rely on the natural resources of the environment for subsistence, the pollution caused by oil production threatens the life of the area (Babatunde, 2017, p. 37). Water has been polluted, killing food sources, and damaging the area’s ecology. In addition, soil fertility has been damaged, prohibiting subsistence farming and damaging the area’s ecology (Amnesty International, 2009, p.1). Local views illustrate the real impact of oil production on the local area, metaphorized through death and blood (Abba and Onyemachi, 2020, pp. 6-14). Framing the case of the Niger Delta with regard to the process of ‘Cheap Nature’ and ‘negative value’ reflects local voices which live and are at risk of potential extinction (Bousso, 2024), highlighting the Capitalocene as an appropriate framework for understanding environmental change and security in the local area.

Therefore, capitalism is a web of life, organising humans and nature, presupposed by unequal power structures (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192). Capital accumulation is the ‘reciprocal transmutation of life into death and death into capital’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 117). Mechanised through the cyclical process of cheapening, nature’s ‘free gifts’ become free no more and directly contribute to the production and reproduction of crises in the local area. Economic, environmental, social, cultural, and political grievances materialise in resistive conflict, poverty, and environmental breakdown (Obi, 2014, pp. 150-151). What then becomes apparent is the agency of nature in the case of the Niger Delta, perpetuating ‘negative value’ because nature pushes back against resource extraction. This is captured in the sense of human and extra-human natures. For example, oil production increases flooding, forcing oil activities to be relocated, and nature pushes against resource extraction (Oge-Chimezie, 2018, p. 95). This alternative understanding refocuses the agency of nature as opposed to human and state-centred approaches when considering security.

In consideration of the case of the Niger Delta then, the Capitalocene and Necrocene frameworks enhance the understanding by linking the appropriation and exploitation of nature with the degradation of the environment and consequent resistance (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192; McBrien, 2016). A broader consideration for the web of actors in the conflict process is uncovered. The alternative framework analyses the organisation of human and extra-human natures for ever-cheapening production, suggesting capital accumulation produces conditions for resistance and conflict. The degradation of the environment, as well as the socio-cultural and economic issues, threaten the communities of the Niger Delta and necessitate a response, a reaction to ‘negative value’. The state and multinational companies are thus complicit in the production and reproduction of conflict because they remain central actors in capital accumulation, working through a logic of accumulation and ‘Cheap Nature’, which create unequal power relations necessitating reactionary resistance. The contextualisation of structural violence through the appropriation and exploitation of nature and humans, historically constructed as cheap, illustrates the social constitutive ties between nature, capital and power that shape economic processes causal in the production of crises in the Niger Delta (Mateos, 2020, pp. 39-40).

The Capitalocene (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192) offers a conceptual lens in which to reframe the case of the Niger Delta. It encourages the consideration of historical context necessitating the analysis of how colonialism has established unequal power relations. Intertwined by the logic of ‘Cheap Nature’, the relations of capital continue to produce and reproduce ‘negative value’ in so far as the local environment and communities are cyclically degraded to the point of ‘extinction’ (McBrien, 2016, p. 118). The Capitalocene, thus, integrates varied perspectives, synthesising relations of power, nature, and capital through a web of life that capitalism produces and organises (Moore, 2015a, pp. 189-192). The case of the Niger Delta has been reassessed to broaden the understanding, linking historical power structures to contemporary dynamics of exploitation, appropriation, and conflict. The alternative framework goes beyond the limited scope of security frameworks, analysing the Niger Delta about power, capital, and nature. Nature in the Niger Delta has been historically produced and reproduced as cheaply as possible, beginning with slavery through to contemporary administrations.

Conclusion

This article has investigated whether the Capitalocene framework offers a more nuanced understanding of environmental change and security in the Niger Delta in comparison to traditional-security focused approaches. The analysis illustrates that the Capitalocene provides a valuable alternative framework from which to assess the complex web of life, constitutive of the relations between power, capital, and nature that generate environmental degradation, economic instability, and insecurity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

The literary status quo, depicted in traditional security frameworks, was highlighted in the literature review. Assigning oil as monocausal in the production of crises ignores historical and contemporary patterns of exploitation and appropriation of nature inherent in capital accumulation, presupposed by excluding human and extra-human natures from society. The Capitalocene, however, expands the understanding by drawing on historical power structures intertwined by a logic of ‘Cheap Nature’. The analysis of power structures exposes the cyclical accumulation of capital throughout history in the Niger Delta by the extraction and degradation of both human and extra-human natures as complicit in the production and reproduction of environmental, economic, and security crises.

The case study of the Niger Delta uncovers the extent to which pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial modes of production have produced and reproduced unequal power relations, treating the Niger Delta’s human and extra-human natures as a substance to be used and worked through for the accumulation of capital. The logic of ‘Cheap Nature’, inherently producing ‘negative value’, is practised, and implemented by the state and multinational companies. Negative value’, produced and reproduced by Shell, has resulted in environmental pollution, resource depletion, and marginalisation of local communities, perpetuating violent and nonviolent resistance to oil production and capital accumulation by appropriation and exploitation.

By analysing the case of the Niger Delta through the Capitalocene, the root causes of insecurity are uncovered. Contrary to traditional conceptions of oil security, resource control and competition, historical and contemporary patterns of exploitation and appropriation of human and extra-human nature create insecurity. This shifts the focus from an oil curse to historical patterns of subordination, thereby forcing a new way of understanding development and security issues in the Niger Delta. Materialised in ‘negative value’, the ‘free gifts’ of nature become free no more as they push against capital relations, exemplified in the analysis of Shell’s withdrawal. The accumulation of capital, therefore, is the potential accumulation of extinction in the Niger Delta. Conflict is necessitated by a desire for emancipation from a historical legacy of ‘Cheap Nature’. It should be understood by synthesising environmental, economic, and security breakdowns symbiotic with capital accumulation.

Overall, the Capitalocene provides a greater understanding of environmental change and security in the Niger Delta. Moving beyond traditional security analysis to the acknowledgement of a more comprehensive set of actors agential in the production and reproduction of crises uncovers the constitutive relations of power, capital, and nature, complicit in crises. The state and multinational companies have, throughout history, been complicit in the appropriation and exploitation of both human and extra-human natures, condemned by a logic of capital accumulation. A new understanding is crucial for developing sustainable and equitable solutions in the Niger Delta and similar regions facing environmental degradation and insecurity within a capitalist world system.

Bailey Gould