Adrien Daniere
Comparative Politics
Michaelmas Term, 2024
Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 14-32
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14288863

I. Introduction

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is crucial to the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy. Its main ambition is to foster structural reforms in neighbouring countries to strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect of human rights in what would become a ‘ring of friends’ (European Commission, 2003), sharing the EU’s core normative principles. Moldova, before being granted candidate status to the EU in 2022, was part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The opening of negotiations for the accession of Moldova to the European Union (EU) in December 2023 raises the question of whether the EU played an important role in the quick democratisation of the country. Many argued the ENP did not induce the expected structural reforms in neighbouring countries (Pomorska and Noutcheva, 2017; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022). Within Eastern Europe, the ENP is facing the threat of Russia’s influence over post-Soviet countries. Enshrining values of democracy and good governance in the region becomes not only a structural objective for the EU but also a way to wield its normative power against Russia.

Ian Manners defines the EU’s normative power as its ability to transfer its norms and values, notably democracy and good governance, to the international scene through foreign policy (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Tessa de Wekker and Arne Niemann suggest analysing the effectiveness of the EU’s normative power in the ENP through cognitive and ideational factors, among which ‘normative process’, or the extent to which ENP policies are commonly tailored to each country by EU and local officials, and ‘normative impact’, or the extent to which ENP policies allow for the effective implementation of norm-based reforms in partner countries (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 9). In this article, I look at Moldova and Armenia, two democratic Eastern European countries affected by Russian influence, yet with different levels of corruption and democratic development. The research questions are:

RQ1: How successful is the ENP in promoting effective democracy and good governance reforms in Moldova and Armenia?
RQ2: How does this impact the role of the EU as a normative power?

This article argues that the successful promotion of democracy and good governance reforms in Moldova and Armenia by the ENP is hindered by low inclusivity in consultation processes with local authorities and by the fact that the implementation of democracy and anti-corruption reforms was not equally effective in Armenia and Moldova. As a result, the role of the EU as a normative power in Armenia and Moldova has remained limited.

I will first set the background of my analysis through a literature review, an analytical framework, and a methodology section. The following empirical analysis will focus on evaluating the ENP’s promotion of democracy and good governance in Armenia and Moldova through the most recent Action Plans (APs) that the EU built with each country. I will analyse these Action Plans’ normative processes (shared decision-making) and their normative impact (effective reform implementation) against the democracy and good governance objectives for each country. Third, I will compare my findings on the normative process and normative impact of EU Action Plans in Armenia and Moldova to assess whether these case studies support the case for the EU’s normative power.

II. Literature Review

A. Defining The ENP

Launched in 2004 by the European Union (EU) and revised in 2012 and 2015, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the overarching framework for the EU’s foreign policy towards its eastern and southern neighbourhoods. It is aimed at sixteen neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus), the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), the Middle East (Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt) (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022, p. 285). The ENP aims to develop a ‘ring of friends’ (European Commission, 2003), as formulated in Article 8 of the EU, ‘The Neighbourhood Clause’ (European Union, 2016, p. 20). In that sense, the ENP tends to strengthen prosperity, stability, and security in its neighbourhood and avoid new dividing lines with its neighbours (European Commission, 2003; 2004). The ENP is unable (or unwilling) to offer the incentive of accession to the EU, contrary to the EU enlargement policy (Whitman and Wolff, 2012, p. 5). Instead, it offers to support European neighbourhood Countries (ENC) in structural, political, economic, and institutional reforms aimed at strengthening democracy and good governance, but also at reinforcing modernisation and economic liberalisation (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022, p. 279).

The ENP’s approach to such structural reforms is founded on principles of partnership, common interests, differentiation, and joint ownership—depending on the neighbouring country’s willingness to pursue reforms and to accept the ‘common values’ espoused by the EU. The ENP was translated into individualised Action Plans within twelve of the sixteen ENCs (Moldova and Armenia included) to allow for a more tailored approach to structural reform in each country (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022, p. 280).

Thus, the EU’s ambition through the ENP and through those structural reforms is normative: to spread the EU’s member states’ (MS) common values of democracy, good governance, rule of law, and human rights to neighbouring countries in order to create a ‘ring of friends’ (Commission, 2003) aligned to the EU’s core normative principles.

B. Democracy And Good Governance In The ENP

The EU supports ENCs in their path towards sustainable democratic reforms by addressing democracy and good governance through multiple programmes of the ENP, particularly the Action Plans. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, during the programming period 2021-2027, as stated in the Joint Communication on the Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020, the EU will support judicial reforms, efforts to combat corruption and organised crime, and the promotion of democracy (EEAS, 2023).

The support for democracy and good governance is central to the EU’s foreign relations. In the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, Articles 3(5) and 21(1) stipulate that the EU’s international actions should promote the same norms and values it was built on (European Union, 2016, p. 28). This focus on values as a constitutive feature of the EU and of its foreign policy explains why the EU has been labelled as a ‘normative power’. After the Lisbon Treaty, the Action Plans on Human Rights and Democracy covering the period 2020-2024 also set out democratic and anti-corruption objectives to be implemented at the national, regional, and multilateral levels through the ENP (European Council, 2020, p. 5).

To promote democracy and good governance through the ENP, the EU usually focuses on a model of ‘embedded democracy’ consisting of several elements: promoting democratic elections, civil rights, political rights, separation of powers, horizontal accountability, the assurance that power lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives, and the fact that citizens are implicated in democratic life (Wetzel, 2015, p. 4).

‘Good governance’ and ‘rule of law’ are often used by the EU as more politically acceptable objectives to partner countries than ‘democracy’, and also because they link the political and economic interests of the EU towards partner countries (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022, p. 150). Indeed, ‘good governance’ implies stable democratic institutions and trustworthy economic actors. This thesis will mainly focus on anti-corruption efforts as representative of enhanced good governance, as both Moldova and Armenia are notoriously affected by corruption (Bak, 2022; Jenkins and Ortrun, 2022; Markevych and Marinkov, 2024).

C. ENP Tools

Several tools are useful when looking at how the EU pushes for democracy and good governance towards its Eastern neighbours in the ENP: bilateral tools, regional cooperation partnerships, and financial tools. This study will focus on the bilateral Action Plans for two reasons: first, they are renewed periodically, allowing for a continuous analysis of structural reforms in partner countries. Second, they always consider the recommendations and progress made by other bilateral tools (such as Partnership Priorities, Association Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements), regional tools (such as the Eastern Partnership) and financial tools (such as the Neighbourhood Investment Platform and the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument) (Petrova and Delcour, 2020, p. 164).

Action Plans are bilateral tools framed by joint documents between the EU and the partner country. They rely on a shared commitment to common values and focus on consolidating democracy and economic development by supporting structural changes. The progress made through implementing these bilateral plans is addressed in country-specific reports released by the European External Action Service and the European Commission (European Commission, 2023).

D. ENP Actors

To make effective use of these tools, the implementation of the ENP relies on several actors within the European Union as well as partner countries who have a crucial role in shaping ENP policies implemented within their borders.

First, the European Commission represents the common interests of EU Member States (MS) and manages the definition and implementation of the ENP and all bilateral and regional tools. The ENP is managed by a commissioner and their Directorate General (DG), the DG Neighbourhood, and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR). The European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Delegations in partner countries then help to implement the policies on the ground.

Second, EU Member States have a substantial role in shaping decision-making in the ENP. Indeed, the EU and MS’ foreign policies are interconnected and mutually influencing. The constitutional design of MS, as well as its power relations, interests, and identities, influence the EU’s foreign policy, including that of the ENP. This interconnectedness both nourishes and hinders the construction of a common EU foreign policy: divergent interests and differing worldviews between member states can become an obstacle (Holsti, 1970, p. 245; Hadfield et al., 2017, p. 52).

Third, the European Council shapes country-specific Action Plans not only based on recommendations from the Commission, and Member States but also from other bilateral and multilateral ENP tools. The Council is led by a Secretary-General, which implements the Action Plans based on the decisions of a Committee of Ministers from the forty-six EU Member States. It also includes a Parliamentary Assembly and a Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, hence taking into account the views of MS’ national and local representatives. Thus, its main missions are to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance across Europe and with its neighbouring countries (Council of Europe, 2023).

III. Analytical Framework

A. Normative Power As A Concept

The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) was first defined by Manners, who suggested paying attention to the EU as a ‘normative power’, referring to its ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’, i.e. to transfer its norms and values to the international scene (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Because of the EU’s constitutional focus on values of democracy and fundamental rights, as seen in Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU, it is predisposed to acting normatively in its foreign policy by placing a distinct set of norms at the centre of its relations with other countries. The EU tries to export five ‘core norms’, including democracy, and four ‘minor norms’, including good governance. Manners shows how the EU increasingly uses normative power as it ‘seeks to redefine international norms in its own image’ (Manners, 2002, p. 252) and argues that the ability to shape what becomes the norm is the greatest power of all (Manners, 2002, p. 253). The ENP participates in this norm-setting process by exporting political and economic benchmarks to the EU’s neighbours, as claimed by former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in a 2007 interview (Peterson, 2008, p. 69).

B. Normative Power As An Approach

The NPE concept can also be operationalised as an analytical approach to empirical research. Manners suggests such an approach, proposing to study the cognitive and ideational aspects of the ENP by focusing on EU principles found in its core texts and actions and how they are promoted in its foreign policy. Such cognitive and ideational aspects include the legitimisation of principles, the persuasiveness of actions, and the impact of socialisation (Manners, 2010, p. 44). Börzel and Risse also emphasise the importance of socialisation as a diffusion mechanism of Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 6). They show that EU members and non-members change or adapt their domestic institutions following EU rules and regulations and that such changes can be induced through coercion, calculations, persuasion, or socialisation. Socialisation mostly relies on domestic actors, as local ‘norm entrepreneurs’ make EU policies resonate with domestic norms and beliefs, leading to domestic change: by ‘talking the talk’, actors end up changing their dispositions and ‘walking the walk’ (Börzel and Risse, 2012, pp. 7,8). To analyse the cognitive and ideational aspects of EU foreign policy underlined by Manners, Börzel, and Risse and how they relate to EU normative power, de Wekker and Niemann develop a specific theoretical framework. Taking Manners’ NPE concept as a starting point of their analysis, they operationalise it for empirical research (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 3). Doing so, they distinguish between three levels of operationalisation: the normative process, i.e. to what extent the EU’s foreign policy is tailored to each country; the normative impact, i.e. how the EU’s foreign policy participates in the development of new policies in each country; and the normative intent, i.e. the genuineness of the EU’s commitment in its foreign policy (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 9). Borrowing from Manners, Börzel and Risse, and de Wekker and Niemann, I use a specific theoretical framework to study the EU’s Action Plans with Armenia and Moldova within the ENP.

First, I analyse the normative process of the EU, that is, whether it takes the views of Armenian and Moldovan officials into account (inclusiveness) and whether it builds on previous policies (reflexivity) when writing policy recommendations. I consider inclusiveness and reflexivity as cognitive aspects of normative power under the label ‘normative process’.

Second, I analyse the normative impact of the EU (whether its promotion of democratic and good governance reforms in Moldova and Armenia goes beyond the declaratory level), if it plays a role in the implementation of reforms, and whether these reforms lead to actual progress. I consider democracy and good governance as core norms the EU tries to export, thus constituting ideational aspects of normative power, also termed as ‘normative impact’ (Manners, 2002, p. 252).

I will also focus on alternative sources of norm change when studying the normative impact of the EU in Armenia and Moldova. Indeed, international actors, as well as local political cultures and domestic actors, play a role in the effectiveness of EU normative impact by pushing for or resisting the adoption of EU norms.

Thus, by studying the normative process and the normative impact of ENP policies, I use a two-step framework to show how normative power translates empirically in ENP policies (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 9), explained in further detail below.

The normative process relies on two factors: inclusiveness and reflexivity. Writing on inclusiveness in ENP policies, Bicchi (2006, p. 289) emphasises that there is a fine line between ‘giving voice to’ and ‘speaking for’ partner countries. Inclusiveness, therefore, means that EU decision-makers take into account the views of Armenian and Moldovan officials to tailor policy recommendations to each country’s reality (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 9). Reflexivity can be measured by whether EU officials critically analyse the effects of past policies and the expected effects of new policies and adapt the proposed policies accordingly (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 9). Reflexivity, hence, means that EU officials build on the successes and failures of previous policies to develop new policies.

Normative impact considers whether normative changes towards democracy and good governance (in this case, anti-corruption efforts) promoted by the EU have been implemented. To evaluate the degree of implementation of democratic and anti-corruption reforms in Moldova and Armenia, I analyse the progress of reforms following the most recent Action Plans. Democratic progress can be assessed through effective reforms in the electoral regime (Wetzel, 2015, p. 6). Other indicators of successful democratic reforms include enhanced local self-governance, increased integrity of local and national administrations, and increased accountability of the judiciary. Anti-corruption progress involves actions limiting corruption in the executive, legislative and judiciary bodies, such as the implementation of anti-corruption commissions or courts and higher cooperation between local and European anti-corruption authorities.

IV. Methodology

The choice of Armenia and Moldova is based on the concept of the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) (McCormick, 2019, p. 40). Indeed, both countries are very similar in many aspects but differ in their levels of democratic stability and good governance. Both countries are members of the ENP Eastern neighbourhood framework, and as such, the EU has developed Action Plans with both countries over several years. They are similar in size, population, and GDP (PPP), are both landlocked and located in relatively unstable neighbourhoods (Armenia with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia; Moldova with the Transnistrian conflict and the Russo-Ukrainian war). Additionally, having both been part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), they transitioned to democracy after 1991 and have since experienced the progressive strengthening of their respective democracies. Their partnership with the ENP is notably centred around strengthening democracy and good governance since both countries experience external authoritarian influence and high levels of corruption. Interestingly, while Armenia remains an ENP country in 2024, Moldova became a candidate for accession to the EU in June 2022 after a decision from the European Council (European Council, 2022). This shows that Moldova has evolved in the past decade towards relatively better governance and strengthened democracy, among other determining factors in order to become a candidate country for accession to the EU. Yet, this is not the case for Armenia.

My primary data sources are the Action Plans between the EU, Armenia, and Moldova taking place after the 2011-2015 ENP revision, namely the most recent Armenian Action Plan for 2023-2026 and the Moldovan Action Plan for 2021-2024. I chose these bilateral tools because they are the most comprehensive and specific programmes within the ENP. Firstly, they are renewed periodically, hence allowing for continuous analysis of structural reforms in partner countries. Secondly, they always take into account the recommendations and progress made as a result of bilateral, regional, and financial tools. I also use the Progress Reports of Action Plans, official communications from the EU or Armenian and Moldovan authorities, media articles, and independent evaluations of the Action Plans’ effects. By choosing a diversity of primary and secondary EU and non-EU sources, I aim to form the most objective picture possible of the impact of EU Action Plans.

The dependent variable I wish to explain is the variation in the effective promotion of democracy and good governance by the EU through the ENP in Moldova and Armenia and how it supports or hinders the normative power of the EU.

There are multiple independent variables influencing the EU’s promotion of democracy and good governance. Firstly, whether the EU is genuinely involved in the bilateral relationships with Moldova and Armenia. Secondly, how customised the Action Plans in each individual country are. Thirdly, whether democratic and good governance reforms are implemented and whether they lead to actual progress.

To assess the effective promotion of democracy and good governance, I analyse the EU’s normative process and normative impact in the most recent Action Plans for Armenia and Moldova, respectively.

To assess the normative process of the EU, I look at signs of inclusiveness and reflexivity using current Action Plans, previous Action Plans and official communications from Moldovan and Armenian officials. Through a chronological comparison between the most recent Action Plans and the previous ones, I underline the evolutions or shortcomings of the EU’s inclusivity and reflexivity in both countries in recent years.

To assess the normative impact of the EU, I look at evidence of progress following the effective implementation of democratic and anti-corruption reforms. I search for such evidence in Action Plans, their related Progress Reports, media and official communications, and external independent evaluations and indicators.

Finally, I compare the normative process and the normative impact of each country and assess whether these results support or hinder the EU’s normative power.

V. Empirical Findings And Analysis

A. Armenia

The EU’s diplomatic relations with Armenia started in 1999 with a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), from which the Action Plans are derived. With the creation of the ENP in 2004, EU-Armenia relations were further developed: Action Plans setting the priorities of EU-Armenia relations were set up periodically to assist Armenia in aligning with European standards, notably in terms of democracy. In 2018, the Velvet Revolution ended the country’s kleptocratic ruling elite (Bak, 2022, p. 1). A new government elected at the end of 2018 and led by Nikol Pashinyan soon faced the challenges of pro-democratic and anti-corruption reforms and turned to the EU and its Action Plans for assistance. Indeed, Armenia is not yet a consolidated democracy, as corruption and organised crime remain the main obstacles to democratisation, fuelled by the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1988 (Osipova, 2010, p. 40). The most recent Action Plan with Armenia is the 2023-26 Action Plan (hereafter AP2). The previous Action Plan was for 2019-2022 (hereafter AP1).

A.1. Normative Process

Inclusiveness:

In an October 2023 speech at the European Parliament, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan highlighted his defence of democratic principles and called for the EU and the international community to support Armenia in reinforcing its democratic institutional reforms (European Parliament, 2023). Earlier in 2023, Pashinyan had underscored that many substantial institutional reforms were underway to reinforce the rule of law and weed out corruption (Armenpress, 2023).

Armenia’s clear alignment with the objectives of democracy and anti-corruption seems to be mirrored in the latest Action Plan for 2023-26 (AP2). Whereas the Action Plan for 2019-22 (AP1) is very EU-centred, seeking to bring Armenia ‘closer to the standards and principles of the European Electoral Heritage’ (Council of Europe, 2018, p. 26), AP2 is much more directed towards supporting Armenia rather than imposing EU values on Armenia. AP2 ‘will continue to assist the improvement of local democracy in Armenia by supporting the adoption of enabling legislation’ (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 32). Regarding democracy, AP2 insists on reinforcing democratic governance by promoting good governance and local government reforms and ensuring electoral support to Armenian authorities (Council of Europe, 2022a). It is stated that the AP ‘assists’ and ‘supports’ the improvement of local democracy in Armenia, suggesting that the EU does not impose its values but suggests them.

However, like AP1, AP2 does not describe thoroughly the consultation process with Armenian officials. The same single line is used in AP1 and AP2 to describe the consultation process, with little further details: ‘This Action Plan has been prepared following consultations with the authorities of Armenia’ (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 8). This casts doubt on the true inclusiveness of AP2.

Reflexivity:

AP2 builds on progress and issues resulting from AP1. AP1 considers a great number of EU decisions and recommendations but appears to only take into account one framework when it comes to the national reform agenda of Armenia (Council of Europe, 2018, p. 2). This shows a lack of engagement with Armenia’s efforts and views on the Action Plan. On the contrary, AP2 states that it considers an even greater number of decisions from EU institutions and Armenian institutions regarding democracy and good governance (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 2). Thus, AP2 displays greater reflexivity than AP1.

Additionally, AP2 states that it builds on the achievements of AP1. Regarding democracy and good governance, it contains notably ‘the enhancement of the Armenian Corruption Prevention Commission’s capacities and the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Committee’ (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 2). Interestingly, AP2 emphasises the fact that it builds on AP1, stating that ‘The Action Plan 2023-2026 is largely based on the lessons learned in the framework on previous action plans and their evaluations’ (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 2). On the other hand, the sentiment of building on previous actions is absent from AP1, thus showing enhanced reflexivity of EU officials in AP2 compared to AP1.:

Regarding the implementation of the Action Plans’ objectives, AP2 mentions repeatedly considering the lessons learned during the implementation of AP1. It includes the main results of AP1 on democracy and anti-corruption (Council of Europe, 2022a, pp. 8, 27) and cites independent evaluations of the level of corruption in Armenia, such as anti-corruption recommendations by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 28). Finally, it mentions the significant progress made by Armenia for a stronger democracy before setting the new objectives of the Action Plan (Council of Europe, 2022a, pp. 32-34).

A.2. Normative Impact

Democracy:

AP2’s authors describe the reforms implemented following AP1. A shift between AP1 and AP2 can be felt, as AP2’s authors display a much higher level of transparency and empirical knowledge about which reforms were successful and which were not.

Regarding democracy, AP2 mentions that the outcomes of AP1 are mostly related to spreading democratic values throughout civil society (such as the strengthening of the Communities Association of Armenia) and promoting openness, transparency, and accountability in local administrations (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 8). Hence, priorities are set on reinforcing local self-government and the different levels of political decision-making in the country. The Armenian government amended its Electoral Code in April 2021, in line with recommendations made in previous ENP Action Plans and reports. Following the June 2021 parliamentary elections, reports from EU institutions assessed that the Armenian electoral framework was able to facilitate well-managed and democratic elections (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 34). Yet, regarding the 2021 elections, international observers showed that Pashinyan’s victory was contested by opponents based on allegations of electoral fraud. In that sense, elections were not unarguably free and fair (Agence France Presse, 2021).

At the launching conference of AP2, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that the implementation of AP1 had brought ‘positive dynamics’ in areas such as ‘promotion of local self-governance’ and that all stakeholders in AP1 had provided ‘positive feedback’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, 2023). Yet, the Evaluation Report of AP1 shows that whereas the drafted Action Plan was comprehensive, it was not fully implemented because of a lack of funds. The objectives relating to democracy were especially hindered: whilst ‘strengthening democratic governance’ was partly funded, ‘promoting participation’ received no funds at all and was not continued in AP2 (Council of Europe, 2022b, p. 27). This poor implementation of democratic reforms is corroborated by independent evaluations. Whereas Armenia’s score in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)’s Democracy Index grew from 5.35/10 in 2020 to 5.42/10 in 2023, it still remains a ‘hybrid regime’ due to low scores in ‘government functioning’ and ‘political culture’ in 2023 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2024, p. 50).

Anti-corruption:

Regarding anti-corruption, AP2 mentions several successes of AP1, such as the reinforcement of the Armenian Corruption Prevention Commission’s capacities in assessing the transparency of public officials and the establishment of various bodies aimed at supporting anti-corruption investigations—including the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Court to become operational by the end of 2022 (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 8). Most of these advances were recommendations of the Council of Europe’s monitoring bodies, such as the GRECO, which shows that the ENP allows for institutional reforms regarding anti-corruption.

Despite these advancements, the 2021 evaluation of corruption in Armenia by the GRECO identified shortcomings in anti-corruption measures with respect to MPs, judges, and prosecutors. Moreover, it stated that the level of compliance with EU recommendations remained unsatisfactory. Regarding money laundering, Armenia has a fairly sound legal and institutional framework in place, although some challenges still remain (Council of Europe, 2022a, p. 28).

As for the Anti-Corruption Court, a November 2022 article shows that it was made operational at the end of 2022, as stated in AP2. Yet, the new Court presents several problems: for instance, many of the judges appointed have little or no professional experience in their role (Mamulyan, 2022). A 2022 report by Transparency International also highlights that while progress has been made in tackling corruption thanks to the EU, further efforts are still required. Although the report acknowledges the main anti-corruption institutions established through the 2019-2022 Action Plan—including the Corruption Prevention Commission established in 2019, the Anti-Corruption Committee established in 2021, and the Anti-Corruption Court established in 2021—as key pillars of Armenia’s anti-corruption framework, observers point out the need for further reforms regarding asset recovery and integrity in the judiciary (Bak, 2022).

B. Moldova

In their 2014 paper, Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hullen describe Moldova as an example of coherence between the Commission’s declarations and the priorities defined in Action Plans, especially regarding democracy (Börzel and van Hullen, 2014, p. 1035). The Action Plans with Moldova build on the 1998 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and on the successive Association Agendas negotiated with the European Commission. Moldova’s accession to the negotiations for EU membership in December 2023 suggests that it has implemented concrete changes in conformity with the ENP’s objectives. The most recent Action Plan with Moldova is the 2021-2024 Action Plan (hereafter AP4). The previous Action Plan was for 2017-2020 (hereafter AP3).

B.1. Normative Process

Inclusiveness:

Regarding democracy and anti-corruption, the State Secretary of the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Cuc, as part of the Steering Committee of the Council of Europe Action plan for Moldova 2021-2024, made clear that implementing the democracy reform agenda of AP4 remained a priority. Cuc emphasised the importance of the Action Plan for Moldova and the fact that it was ‘periodically adjusted to the challenges’ faced by Moldova, hence underlining a tailored approach of AP4 to Moldova’s needs. Moldova’s Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, Stela Braniste, also pointed out that the implementation of AP4 led to ‘several deliverables needed to strengthen the integrity mechanism’ in criminal policy, linked to the fight against corruption (Council of Europe, 2024). Thus, the inclusion of Moldovan officials in the Steering Committee and their positions on the latest Action Plan reflect inclusiveness in the implementation process.

AP4 takes into account several national reform agendas of Moldova, as well as recommendations from the GRECO (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 23). Additionally, a detailed list of the main national partners for anti-corruption in Moldova is given in both AP3 and AP4. In AP3, it is mentioned that they constitute the ‘basis of a solid anti-corruption architecture’ (Council of Europe, 2017, p. 19).

However, as for Armenia, the consultation process with Moldovan authorities is insufficiently detailed in both AP3 and AP4. Like in Armenian Action Plans, a single Steering Committee meeting with both EU and Moldovan officials is mentioned (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 9). Yet, there is a small addition compared to Armenian Action Plans: in AP3 and AP4, authors mention that a ‘Committee of Ministers’ was informed of the Progress Report of the previous AP and authorised the Council to continue with the new Action Plan (Council of Europe, 2017, p. 8; 2020, p. 9). Hence, one finds in AP3 and AP4 the same lack of description of the consultation process as in the Action Plans with Armenia.

Reflexivity:

AP4 seems to be building on the progress and errors of AP3. It states that despite the progress resulting from AP3, significant challenges remain, notably in implementing democratic reforms in the field of justice (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 2). Yet, while AP3 only makes general references to improving ‘governance at all levels’, AP4 makes a very detailed and precise description of the objectives pursued (Council of Europe, 2017, p. 2; 2020, p. 2). This shows greater reflexivity from the authors of AP4, who built on the mistakes made in AP3.

Regarding democracy, AP4 mentions the extensive list of achievements of AP3, among which is the enhanced ability of electoral administration to conduct free and fair elections. AP4 also explicitly mentions that it builds on the challenges that have not been sufficiently tackled in the previous Action Plans (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 2). There are several long-term projects that were tackled by AP3 and AP4 successively, showing a great deal of reflexivity. For instance, a focus on good democratic governance and elections at the local level exists in AP3 yet is emphasised in AP4 by the addition of a subsection entitled ‘Good governance at the sub-national level’ (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 27). Similarly, AP3 helped expand the 2010 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) programme to reinforce cooperation between the two banks of the Nistru/Dniester River. AP4 builds on progress made in CBM as a result of AP3 and proposes even more ambitious objectives. AP4 mentions that CBMs work ‘in full consistency with the Moldovan authorities’ policy on the subject’ (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 29). The same analysis applies to corruption: in both AP3 and AP4, authors consider the latest recommendations of GRECO and plan objectives based on the shortcomings highlighted (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 23; 2017, p. 17).

B.2. Normative Impact

Democracy:

Among the achievements of AP3 highlighted in AP4 is democratic progress focused on enhancing the ability of the electoral administration to conduct elections under a new electoral system (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 9). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted good progress regarding elections, and the February 2019 elections were considered competitive and generally fair by observers. Hence, AP3’s objectives were met. Yet, some further objectives regarding elections are noted in AP4, notably reinforcing the role of judges in validating elections and encouraging the participation of women in elections (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 28). Based on the Commission’s 2023 Progress Report, such objectives were clearly met: between 2021 and 2022, the electoral legislation was amended to address inconsistencies, and a new Electoral Code was adopted. The latest round of parliamentary elections in July 2021 was well-run and competitive, according to the EU’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (European Commission, 2023b, p. 11). The only remaining issues surround the transparency of parties’ funding and the accountability of campaign finance, which resemble the issues of long-established Western democracies. External observers described Maia Sandu’s victory as democratic while emphasising the fact that Sandu, a former WB economist, favours ‘closer ties with the European Union’ than with Russia (Tanas, 2021).

Moreover, the Progress Report of AP4 shows that despite the unprecedented instability of the political scene since 2022, the Moldovan government remained stable, with a strong parliamentary majority supporting the reforms initiated by President Maia Sandu, and a government reshuffle in February 2023 did not affect the political stability (European Commission, 2023b, p. 15). The Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit also shows progress in democratic reforms. In the 2020 report, Moldova was classed as a ‘hybrid regime’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021, p. 34), while the 2023 report indicated that Moldova has progressed to the status of ‘flawed democracy’ due to increased scores in ‘electoral process and pluralism’, ‘functioning of government’ and ‘political participation’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2024, p. 51).

Anti-Corruption:

AP4 shows that the fight against anti-corruption remains a priority for the government of Moldova. Perception of corruption remains high, especially for the judiciary. It also indicates that the Council of Europe has launched a ‘targeted technical assistance programme directly linked to GRECO’s recommendations’ in 2020, which include preventing corruption in the Parliament, Magistracy, and the Council of Prosecutors (Council of Europe, 2020, p. 23). Interestingly, AP3 already mentioned the need to reinforce the integrity of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, based on two GRECO reports, one from 2013 and one from 2016, both insisting on this pressing issue (Council of Europe, 2017, p. 17). Hence, it appears that the ENP’s action in the field of anti-corruption was quite ineffective since the very same objectives have remained since 2013 without mention of substantial progress.

The 2023 Commission Progress Report makes the same conclusion: Moldova still has to implement EU standards in the fight against corruption. Some progress was made, such as a joint arrangement between the Moldovan General Prosecutor’s office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exchange training and information (European Commission, 2023b, p. 9). Yet, despite working closely with the EU, Moldova still has a long way to go to tackle corruption. Additionally, the EU is not the only institution working on anti-corruption in Moldova: the IMF and the OECD, among others, also play a role. A February 2024 IMF report shows that despite solid legal frameworks, corruption remains a significant challenge in Moldova. The report joins the EU in advocating for enhancing the power of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (Markevych and Marinkov, 2024, p. 2). A 2022 report by Transparency International highlights that while some progress has been made in compliance with the EU’s GRECO recommendations (hence showing that the EU’s Action Plans do influence the fight against corruption in Moldova), systemic forms of state corruption endure, and addressing these corrupt networks is an extremely complex endeavour (Jenkins and Ortrun, 2022, p. 2).

VI. Discussion

A. Respective Analyses Of Armenia And Moldova

In this section, I analyse the normative process and the normative impact of the EU in Armenia and Moldova separately. A strong normative process relies on high inclusiveness and high reflexivity in making policy recommendations, meaning that EU officials consider the views of Moldovan and Armenian officials and that they build on previous policy recommendations. A strong normative impact relies on the effective implementation of democratic and good governance reforms, meaning that the EU went beyond the declaratory level in both countries, playing a role in the implementation of reforms and that these reforms led to actual progress.

A.1. Armenia

The analysis of Armenian Action Plans shows mixed results regarding the normative process since both Action Plans lack inclusiveness yet reveal strong signs of reflexivity. Looking at inclusiveness, AP2 seems more inclusive than AP1 as it showcases more efforts: it considers recommendations for anti-corruption measures by the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), it is built in order to assist Armenia rather than to project and impose EU values on Armenia, and its focus on democracy and anti-corruption is also aligned with the objectives of Armenian officials. Yet, neither AP describes in detail the consultation process with Armenian authorities, which is a crucial part of the bilateral making of the Action Plan. Hence, inclusivity is low.

Looking at reflexivity, there is a definite effort in AP2 to acknowledge the reforms implemented by Armenia in relation to EU norms, which was not the case in AP1. Likewise, in many instances AP2 refers to AP1, stating that it builds on AP1’s successes and failures. Regarding the implementation of the Action Plans’ objectives, AP2 repeatedly mentions taking into account the lessons learned during the implementation of AP1, cites independent evaluations of AP1’s results, and mentions the notable progress made by Armenian officials towards strengthening democracy. Thus, AP2 portrays a great deal of reflexivity.

Secondly, the normative impact in Armenia was relatively weak. There were reforms implemented following the EU’s Action Plans, but these had a relatively low impact on democracy and only allowed for limited progress relating to anti-corruption.

Looking at democracy, it appears that AP1 had a positive impact on electoral transparency, with the Armenian government amending its Electoral Code in February 2021 following Action Plan recommendations and Armenian officials stating that the implementation of AP1 further promoted local self-governance. Yet, allegations of fraud in the June 2021 parliamentary elections and a lack of funds for other democratic objectives highlighted by the Evaluation Report of AP1 show limits to the positive impact of AP1 on democracy. Moreover, Armenia has been classified as a ‘hybrid regime’ in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index since 2020 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021, p. 34). Thus, reforms implemented following the Action Plan for 2019-2022 had a relatively low impact on democracy in Armenia.

Looking at anti-corruption, my findings show that the EU was a major actor in reinforcing the anti-corruption institutional framework in Armenia, although challenges remain. Several institutional reforms were implemented in AP1 following GRECO recommendations, forming a very strong legal and institutional framework in the fight against corruption, as described in AP2, in the Evaluation Report of AP1, and by Transparency International. Some issues are yet to be tackled, although, as pointed out in the Evaluation Report for AP1, such incremental change in anti-corruption is commendable considering Armenia faced challenging circumstances in this period (Council of Europe, 2022b, p. 4). In that sense, anti-corruption progress was made as a result of EU action, but some important issues still remain, among which include asset recovery and integrity in the judiciary (Bak, 2022).

A.2. Moldova

My analysis of Moldovan Action Plans also demonstrates a nuanced normative process– there is relatively low inclusiveness due to the same reasons as in Armenia and high reflexivity.

Looking at inclusiveness, it seems at first that both Action Plans are built cooperatively with Moldova. Recommendations from EU advisory bodies (like GRECO) and the lessons learned from the implementation of AP3 are detailed in AP4. AP4 also considers several Moldovan national reform agendas. The consultation process is more detailed in AP3 and AP4 than that of Armenian Action Plans. Yet, this consultation process is still not detailed enough to provide solid proof that the views of Moldovan officials were taken into account throughout the making of the Action Plans. Thus, inclusivity can be described as relatively low.

Looking at reflexivity, it appears that authors of AP4 considered the progress and shortcomings following the implementation of AP3 alongside the recommendations of outside organisations such as GRECO. AP4 mentions objectives that were not tackled by AP3, and it also speaks of furthering objectives that were not thoroughly implemented by AP3, hence acting in the continuity of AP3. In that sense, both APs showcase definite reflexivity.

Secondly, the normative impact also shows mixed results: whereas the EU allowed for effective democratic reforms, most anti-corruption reforms still have to be implemented.

Looking at democracy, Moldova seems democratically stable, and this is, to a large extent, due to the ENP’s action. Reforms to enhance electoral democracy advocated for in AP3 were successfully implemented, as shown in AP3’s Progress Report. This helped establish stable democratic elections, as highlighted by external observers. Political stability in Moldova is high due in part to EU efforts in the Action Plans. According to the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, Moldova transitioned from a ‘hybrid regime’ to a ‘flawed democracy’ between 2020 and 2023, showing that democratic reforms led to progress (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2024, p. 51). Thus, the EU’s actions to promote democracy in Moldova have yielded a definite normative impact.

Looking at anti-corruption, it appears that policies have recently started being implemented in Moldova, thanks to favourable political circumstances and the EU’s persistence. However, the ENP’s action plans have been advocating for the same reforms since 2013, without significant progress until now. Both Action Plans, a 2023 Progress Report, as well as an IMF and a Transparency International report, show that Moldova still needs substantial reforms to start tackling corruption seriously (Jenkins and Ortrun, 2022, p. 2; European Commission, 2023b, p. 9; Markevych and Marinkov, 2024, p. 2). Thus, the EU did not manage to tackle corruption in Moldova significantly. In summary, both countries exhibit mixed results regarding the normative process and impact of the EU through the Action Plans. The results of this analysis are described in a simplified manner for clarity in Table 1.

Country	Results		Results
	Inclusiveness	Inclusiveness	Inclusiveness	Inclusiveness
Armenia	Low	Low	Low	Low
Moldova	Relatively low	Relatively low	Relatively low	Relatively low

Table 1: Findings for Armenia and Moldova.

B. Comparative Analysis Of Armenia And Moldova

In this section, I conduct a comparative analysis of the EU’s normative process and normative impact in Armenia and Moldova. The similarities and differences between both countries will allow me to show that the EU’s normative power is limited in Moldova and Armenia.

B.1. Normative Processes

The EU’s actions in both Armenia and Moldova demonstrate a relatively weak normative process for the same reasons: although reflexivity is quite high in the Action Plans studied, all four Action Plans do not describe the consultation process in detail, and, as such display low inclusiveness. The high reflexivity shows that officials took into account the progress and limitations of previous policies. The Evaluation Report of Armenia’s AP1 mentions a ‘holistic setup’ thanks to the long-term vision of the Council of Europe, which resulted in continuity between projects or from one Action Plan to the next (Council of Europe, 2022b, p. 30). Thus, both the Armenian and Moldovan Action Plans display very high reflexivity.

However, the main similarity between the two countries is the lack of focus on inclusiveness in all the Action Plans. Although it is stated several times in each Action Plan that they considered the views of officials and the national policies of the partner countries, the specific section describing the consultation process is not detailed enough in any of the Action Plans studied. While the Moldovan Action Plan has more information than the Armenian Action Plan, this lack of indication hinders evaluating the normative process for both countries. Hence, inclusiveness is relatively low for Moldova and Armenia.

One recurrent critique of Action Plans is ‘non-differentiation’: instead of being tailored to the country’s needs, Action Plans follow a non-inclusive ‘one size fits all’ pattern (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010, p. 33). The analysis of Moldova and Armenia leads to a more nuanced conclusion: although the overall structure of the Action Plans of Moldova and Armenia is the same, and they both crucially omit to describe in detail the consultation process, the content of all Action Plans are tailored to the specific challenges of the country at a specific time, and every Action Plan builds on the progress and errors of the previous one.

Thus, Armenia and Moldova both have mixed results regarding their normative processes. The salient point is an apparent lack of inclusiveness, which shows that the EU’s normative power in its ENP policies is limited.

B.2. Normative Impact

Both Armenia and Moldova show mixed results regarding normative impact. Interestingly, while democratic and anti-corruption reforms were implemented in Armenia without leading to substantial progress, Moldova had no substantial anti-corruption reforms. Yet, it managed to enact very successful democratic reforms. This is interesting since, despite being a candidate country for EU membership, Moldova still presents high levels of corruption, as shown by both EU and external reports (Jenkins and Ortrun, 2022, p. 2; European Commission, 2023b, p. 9).

Overall, Moldova and Armenia have relatively weak normative impacts for different reasons. In most cases (except for anti-corruption in Moldova), policies recommended in Action Plans were implemented in both countries. Whereas they allowed for little substantial progress in Armenia, they led to definite democratic progress in Moldova.

These results corroborate several critiques of the ENP in Moldova and Armenia, providing potential broader explanations for our results. Regarding Armenia, the relatively low democratic progress from 2019 onwards analysed in this paper corroborates Van Hoof’s 2012 analysis of Armenia as a good case study on the failure of the ENP, as the EU had acted neither towards securitisation nor towards democratisation (Van Hoof, 2012, p. 288). Regarding Moldova, the strong democratic progress observed in this paper goes against the findings of de Wekker and Niemann, who, in 2009 argued that the EU was not a democratic power in Moldova because of a lack of normative impact on democracy and good governance (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 36). Martin Nilsson and Daniel Silander also argued that the EU played only a small role in democratic promotion in Moldova between 2005 and 2014 (Nilsson and Silander, 2016, p. 56). This paper’s analysis of important democratic reforms in Moldova since the Action Plan for 2017-2020 (AP3), therefore, shows a radical change from previous studies. However, this paper also shows that Moldova struggles with important corruption challenges, which prevents Moldova from accessing the status of a fully-fledged democracy.

Thus, both Armenia and Moldova present relatively weak cases of normative impact, which, combined with the mixed results regarding the normative process, creates a complex image of the EU’s normative power.

C. Limited Normative Power

Given the analysis conducted, it is clear that the EU’s normative power vis-à-vis the ENP in Armenia and Moldova is limited. Indeed, the analysis of both normative process and normative impact presents mixed results for Armenia and Moldova, following their most recent Action Plans within the ENP. Although reflexivity was quite high in all Action Plans, as the most recent Action Plan always built on the successes and failures of the previous Action Plan, inclusiveness was still low since there was little evidence of EU officials considering the views of Armenian and Moldovan officials. Looking at normative impact, the EU did advocate on paper for democracy and anti-corruption in both countries. It often went beyond the declaratory level by helping them implement new reforms to promote such values. Yet, these reforms seldom led to substantial or sufficient progress in democracy and good governance, except for democratic reforms in Moldova. As a result, the EU’s normative process and impact are limited, and so is its normative power in Moldova and Armenia. Both countries challenge the EU’s normative power in different ways: Moldova, with its high levels of corruption that the EU struggles to tackle, and Armenia, with democratic and anti-corruption reforms that were implemented but led to disappointing progress. These results echo the academic findings that although the EU manages to promote its values in its neighbourhood beyond the declaratory level, it rarely leads to effective democratisation in targeted countries (Youngs, 2009, p. 903; Freyburg and Lavenex, 2018, p. 467).

These findings also allow for broader implications. Looking at the EU’s normative impact, these results seem to show that the EU prioritises democratic reforms over anti-corruption reforms when granting an ENP country the candidate status: while the EU’s normative impact was limited in both countries, democratic reforms were more successful in Moldova than in Armenia, and Moldova was granted the status of candidate country for accession to the EU in June 2022. Looking at the EU’s normative process, it seems that the EU struggles to establish effective transgovernmental cooperation with partner administrations in both countries, perhaps because of its traditional top-down approach to promoting democracy through foreign policy diplomacy and conditionality (Freyburg and Lavenex, 2018, p. 477).

One could argue that the limited democratic progress is perhaps due to Russia’s influence on Armenia and Moldova. Indeed, Russia has stakes in the region, as exemplified by Russian military bases in Armenia (Delcour and Duhot, 2011, p. 9). Furthermore, Maass argued that the EU’s ability to implement democracy in Armenia was hindered by Russia’s influence (Maass, 2019, p. 100). Another possible explanation for the poor results in democratic and anti-corruption progress in Armenia could be the ENP’s ambiguities regarding the possibility of EU membership, which often discourages countries from engaging in costly structural reforms (Edwards, 2008, p. 46; Borzel and van Hullen, 2014, p. 1034; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2022, p. 281). Problems of internal cohesion between EU actors can also influence the goals of the ENP: whereas the Commission often focuses on democracy and good governance, member-states tend to focus on security and stability, hence creating a ‘democratisation versus stabilisation’ or ‘values versus interests’ dilemma in EU foreign policy (Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010, p. 33; Borzel and van Hullen, 2014, p. 1033; Noutcheva, 2015, p. 21).

A potential explanation for the EU’s limited normative impact is that the EU is not the only power promoting its values in the eastern neighbourhood: apart from Russia, the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and, perhaps most importantly, the US, also influence the region. The US has substantial regional leverage through its long-standing military, economic, and financial assistance. New actors such as Iran and Turkey also play an increasing economic and cultural role in the region (Delcour and Duhot, 2011, p. 8). This is also a challenge for empirical research, as it is harder to untangle which influence is more influential in encouraging structural reforms in these countries (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 11). Additionally, domestic actors interacting with the EU can slow down or resist the effective implementation of new norms. For instance, the institutions dealing with EU issues in Moldova often lack the proper expertise to thoroughly implement EU norms regarding democracy and good governance (Popescu, 2006, p. 4). Likewise, the Moldovan government cooperates with civil society through NGOs when writing reports on implementing EU Action Plans. Although they allowed for more objective monitoring of Action Plans implementation, NGOs were often slow to react when asked by the Moldovan authorities to contribute to the reports, hence slowing down the process (Popescu, 2006, p. 7). Other studies also highlight the difficulty local civil society organisations have in mobilising when asked to contribute to a bottom-up approach to norm implementation in partnership with EU and local administrations (Freyburg and Lavenex, 2018, p. 478).

Thus, to answer the first research question, while the ENP often managed to influence the implementation of reforms promoting democracy and good governance (analysed through anti-corruption) in Moldova and Armenia, these reforms seldom led to effective or sufficient progress in democracy and good governance. Consequently, in response to the second research question, the cases of Armenia and Moldova reveal the limited role of the EU as a normative power in its neighbourhood.

VII. Conclusion

I argued in this article that while the ENP promoted democracy and good governance reforms in Armenia and Moldova, it was not successful in doing so due to the low inclusivity in the consultation process and the fact that most reforms did not lead to effective progress in democracy and good governance. The analysis showed that the role of the EU as a normative power in its eastern neighbourhood is limited. After establishing the background of my analysis, my empirical research illustrated that the EU was invested in democracy and good governance reforms beyond the declaratory level in Armenia and Moldova. In the discussion, I then demonstrated that despite being involved beyond the declaratory level, the EU had limited normative processes with limited normative impact on democracy and good governance reforms. Such reforms did not lead to sufficient progress—except more effective democratic reforms in Moldova. Thus, the EU’s normative power is limited in both countries.

Although academics have described the EU as unsuccessful in its promotion of democratic reforms in Armenia and Moldova (de Wekker and Niemann, 2009, p. 36; Van Hoof, 2012, p. 288; Nilsson and Silander, 2016, p. 56), this article provides more nuance to these arguments by showing that the EU’s influence is limited yet not entirely unsuccessful in advocating for reforms that lead to effective progress. The EU does influence democratic and good governance reforms, enabling the implementation of some of them. However, these reforms rarely lead to actual or sufficient progress in democracy and good governance. Such a limited normative power can be seen as beneficial for partner countries: academics argue that the EU’s claim that the values it exports are universal (European Commission and High Representative, 2011, p. 3) is problematic because it can help justify a Eurocentric approach from the EU, trying to impose its values on neighbouring countries without taking their specificities and realities into account (Diez, 2005, p. 628; Cebeci, 2017,p. 64; Verdun, 2022). Thus, the EU’s limited normative power can provide leeway for partner countries to tackle the issues regarding democracy and good governance by themselves.

In summary, this article contributes to the literature on the EU’s normative power through the ENP by specifically analysing the promotion of democracy and good governance using an extensive methodological framework and through a comparative analysis of Armenia and Moldova. It concludes that the EU’s normative power is present but limited, as the effective promotion of democracy and good governance is insufficient. One potential limitation of this analysis is the narrow focus on two specific countries, which can prevent the results from generalising to the whole eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, I did not cover other norms, such as human rights or the rule of law. Future research could focus on Action Plans with other countries in the eastern neighbourhood, studying the promotion and the implementation of either the same norms or others to gather a more exhaustive picture of the current state of the EU’s normative power in the neighbourhood.

Adrien Daniere

© The Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.