
Leonas Pausch
International Relations
Michaelmas Term, 2024
Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 33-46
Abstract
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) occupies a contested space within the European geopolitical landscape, oscillating between conformity to Western integration and disruptively challenging established norms. This article examines the historical stigmatisation and contemporary dynamics shaping the region, focusing on the Visegrád Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). It explores how CEE’s identity has been influenced by its socialist past, neoliberal transitions, and the rise of populism, leading to a dual character, oscillating between being compliant ‘students’ of Western integration or ‘enfants terribles’ challenging neoliberal systems. The article also analyses the implications of these dynamics on CEE’s relationships with NATO and the EU, highlighting the region’s ongoing struggle for recognition and respect within the European framework. This duality underscores the broader systemic crisis of liberalism and its institutions’ ability to deliver economic promises, reflecting deeper ontological insecurities and a quest for identity within the European order.
Introduction
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has long occupied a contested space in both the geographical and political imaginations of Europe. From shifting perspectives and anchor points in eighteenth-century Vienna to Berlin in the early twentieth century to Moscow pre-1989, there is no unanimously accepted definition of the geographic region. As Milan Kundera (1984, p. 6) put it:
It would be senseless to try to draw its borders exactly. Central Europe is not a state; It is a culture or a fate. Its borders are imaginary and must be drawn and redrawn with each new historical situation.
If the Iron Curtain had forced a stark division of the region, its subsequent crumbling thrust the issue of defining who counts as ‘inside’ Central Europe and who stands at its periphery back to the forefront of European debates. Even prior to 1989, CEE began moving towards the centre of Europe as a means of emancipation from the Soviet spectre and committing to a ‘return to Europe’ (Havel, 1990).
This discourse is also anchored and reflected in the terminology. ‘CEE’ is fundamentally a political term insofar as it tries to acknowledge the reality that lies east of ‘Western’ Europe while also explicitly distancing itself from the label of ‘Eastern Europe,’ which has been equated with either the Soviet Empire or the ‘Balkans’ in international political discourse. After 1989, CEE, as a term, became associated with the transition to a capitalist marketisation, being a symbol of liberation from socialist pasts and a defining feature of the Western system the countries tried to return to (Martin, 1999, p. 56). As the ‘global leader’ in accepting capitalist systems during the era of ‘shock therapy,’ CEE also became most vulnerable to the downsides of the economic system, leading to the rise of Eurosceptic populism as a backlash and counterbalance to the liberal politics before and a result of ontological insecurity.
This article’s original contribution lies in its focused examination of the Visegrád Group’s unique role within CEE’s post-socialist transitions and European integration, highlighting how these four countries—Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—distinctively balance their position as both integrators into and challengers of the Western neoliberal order. To best inquire into these dynamics, this article will define CEE narrowly, as the states that have belonged to the satellite states of the Soviet Union and then experienced the ‘first wave of Europeanization, directly following the West European models’ in 2004, justifying the limitation to the four countries comprising today’s Visegrád Group (Ágh, 1998, p. 4). These states hold a distinctive position in the broader post-communist transitions, having experienced an accelerated shift towards neoliberal market economies and integration within the European community that set them apart from countries such as Ukraine or Belarus, which remained outside the EU and NATO. Further, Visegrád differs from the Baltic countries, which have significantly smaller populations and lean towards the Nordic countries rather than Central Europe. These four nation’s differences also showed in the transition away from socialism. Whereas the Baltic states concentrated on attracting capital primarily through debt into emerging digital technologies and real estate, the Visegrád nations focused on upgrading their industrial capacities towards higher-value production to attract especially German investments (Stockhammer et al., 2016, p. 1816). As a result, the Visegrád states uniquely positioned themselves ontologically towards the ‘centre’ of Europe, reflecting their desire to integrate fully with Western Europe over remaining aligned with the Soviet model or becoming closer to the Nordic countries. It is this drive for centrality, combined with a shared historical experience, that prompted these four countries to formalise their cooperation through the establishment of the Visegrád Group in 1991.
This article will argue for the dual character of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as either conformist ‘students’ of Western integration or disruptive ‘enfants terribles’ challenging the neoliberal Western system, contingent on the government in power (Strnad, 2022, p. 75). Firstly, the article will delve into the historical context, tracing the evolution of CEE’s role from a ‘defining other’ in Europe to its post-Cold War integration into Western political and economic structures. Secondly, it will examine the impact of varying government policies in CEECs on their relationships with the EU and NATO. This section will consider specific case studies to scrutinise how shifts in political ideology towards neoliberalism affect the alignment of ECCs with broader European policies and goals. Finally, the article will consider the implications of these relationships for the broader structure of international relations within Europe. It will explore how CEE can swing between collaboration and contention, influencing EU policy and challenging established norms depending on the prevailing government ideology, which significantly influences both their internal dynamics and their broader relationship with Europe by bringing with it either unity or division.
Literature Review
The intersection of identity, neoliberalism, and populism in CEE has been the subject of growing academic interest since the mid-1990s. The concept of stigmatisation in the context of the region has been extensively discussed in the literature, particularly in relation to the region’s historical role as Europe’s ‘other’ (Wolff, 1994; Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Kuus, 2004; Zarycki, 2014). Larry Wolff’s contribution (1994) is noteworthy, as he traces the cultural dichotomy between a ‘civilised’ West and a ‘barbaric’ East through the last 300 years of history – identifying a consistent dichotomy dividing Europe. This article contributes to this body of literature by deepening the analysis of stigmatisation through the lens of ontological insecurity. While scholars such as Erving Goffman (1963) and Tomasz Zarycki (2014) have explored the external aspects of stigmatisation, this article integrates the internal dimension, i.e. how stigmatisation affects CEE’s self-perception and its perceived relationship with Western institutions. By framing CEE’s identity crisis within the broader concept of ‘ontological insecurity’, as discussed by Anthony Giddens (1991) and Catarina Kinnvall (2004), the article advances the argument that stigmatisation is not just an external label, but it is also a dynamic that deeply impacts the internal identity and political behaviour of CEECs. It differs, therefore, from much of the existing literature, which has traditionally focused on the external socio-economic impacts of neoliberalism in the region (Ost, 2005; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Orenstein, 2013; Krastev and Holmes, 2018). It finally argues that populist movements in the region are not merely reactions to economic inequality but are also attempts to restore ontological security by redefining national identity in opposition to the EU’s liberal values. The dual identity framework—one where CEECs are both compliant ‘students’ of Western integration and disruptive ‘enfants terribles’ resisting neoliberalism – helps to better understand the internal contradictions within identity construction in the region.
A key contribution of this article is its differentiation of the Visegrád states from other Eastern European countries. Unlike much of the literature, which treats CEE as a monolithic entity (e.g. Ágh, 1998; Krastev, 2017; Adler-Nissen, 2014), this article differentiates the Visegrád states from other Eastern European nations and from each other, offering a more granular view of their roles in Europe. It explores the unique position of these Visegrád states as both wishing to be integrated into the EU while simultaneously resisting aspects of its neoliberal policies through populist movements. The Visegrád Group’s ability to shift between these dual roles is, as this article argues, a manifestation of the ontological insecurity that underpins CEE’s relationship with the EU. The article thereby bridges the gap between research on ontological insecurity and populism in CEE and more focused studies on the Visegrád Group’s role within the EU and provides a theoretical framework that unites these fields, articulating how ontological insecurity drives the political behaviour of the Visegrád states and shapes their interactions with the EU.
From The ‘Other’ To ‘New’: The Stigmatisation And Liminality Of Central And Eastern Europe
From the eighteenth century onwards, Europe found a complementary ‘defining other’ to its ‘civilised’ Western European identity in CEE (Wolff, 1994, p. 7). Indeed, popular travel accounts of the time like Voltaire’s History of Charles XII and works of fiction such as Bram Stoker’s Dracula — in which Dracula is the emblem of an ‘Eastern’ European danger threatening the West – characterise the region as barbaric, pagan, oriental and dangerous (Dittmer, 2002, p. 234). This dichotomy continued during the 20th century, with Neville Chamberlain describing the region as ‘far away countries of whom we know nothing,’ and later developed to be a clear ‘other’ once it had merged in the Western European imagination with the Soviet bloc. While the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fast-tracked accession of the Visegrád countries into NATO and the EU in 2004 formally integrated the region into the West and ‘Europe,’ it was not an emancipation towards full agency or an equal and central role in Europe. Furthermore, rather than dismantling dichotomies, the integration of some post-Soviet countries into the European community merely pushed the symbolic border between ‘Europe’ and the ‘East’ further eastwards.
Once the Visegrád states joined NATO and the EU in 2004, the language of stigmatisation shifted from the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamic to a new framework. While the label changed from ‘other’ to ‘new,’ the deeply rooted characteristics developed over previous centuries persisted, now justified in terms of a perceived lack of experience or failed integration (Goffman, 1963). Those countries that were integrated into the West´s institutions remained ‘on the margins, on the verge of Europe’ and were generally seen as ‘naïve and immature’ (Zarycki, 2014, p. 4; Kuus, 2004, p. 478). This gap between CEEC’s self-perception and the perception of Western European powers is clearly seen during the accession process. From the perspective of Visegrád, their ‘return to Europe’ had been through their efforts and on their own terms because of the decade-long struggle against communism by dissidents like Lech Wałęsa in Poland and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia (Wydra, 2000, pp. 288-310). However, the efforts of these countries’ own populations were routinely underplayed throughout the accession negotiations, with the success of CEECs commonly characterised as benevolent ‘acts of grace in Brussels and Washington’ (Dawson and Fawn, 2002, p. 3). The stereotypes which dominated CEECs’ perception between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries had become so deeply ingrained in the ‘Western’ psyche that even the economic progress of the 1990s could not alter it (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 150).
This stigmatisation by Western European countries continues to the present day, with CEECs remaining infantilised and ‘conditionally’ European, meaning that their recognition as European depends on their continued compliance with EU policy. Visegrád, as a collection of states, is seen either as a compliant ‘good student’ or ‘troubled child’ in need of guidance by EU policymakers but remains infantilised, reflecting an ongoing belief within the EU and NATO that CEECs must be taught how to be ‘good Europeans’ (Gheciu, 2005, p. 976). This discrepancy is likewise mirrored in the capability of CEECs to exert influence over EU policy. Nathaniel Copsey and Karolina Pomorska (2014) argue that although Poland possessed a good claim to influence due to its comparative population weight, it scored low in terms of alliance-building and persuasive advocacy, making its contribution to decision-making ‘very limited.’ Indeed, the continued stigmatisation of CEE seems to have led to a partial internalisation of this liminality and ‘otherness’ by CEECs – despite their best efforts to overcome this stereotype. Indeed, the Estonian foreign office particularly emphasised that they didn’t want to be seen as ‘being of the [Eastern] European box we have so much tried to leave behind’ (Raik, 2018; Mälksoo, 2019, p. 377). Thereby, the accession process of 2004 did not bridge the gap left by the Iron Curtain but only created a third category of CEE newcomers —partially integrated into, yet not fully embraced by, the European project (Agnew, 2001). Europe remains divided by different levels of Europeanness and ‘Easterness’, with CEE becoming a liminal entity. The prevalent ‘nestling orientalism’ lays CEECs on a scale of ‘Easterness’ ranging from fully European to the Eastern ‘other’ – most often equated with Russia (Bakic-Hayden, 1995, p. 918).
Much of the stigmatisation and ‘othering’ of CEE can be understood through the lens of ontological security (Giddens, 1991). Established in response to physical security becoming too narrow in times of globalisation, ontological security – or the ‘security of being’- became a popular framework for referring to the state maintaining a stable ‘biographical continuity’ of the self (Giddens, 1991, p. 5). For CEECs, the transformations following the integration process radically changed their national self-identity and perception, constituting a ‘normative threat’ to their ontological security as defined by ‘a promise of destruction to something essential about one´s group or nation’ (Rumelili, 2018, p. 282; Mälksoo, 2019). The fundamental transition away from socialism and the following ‘shock therapy’ with a great drop in GDP and the closing of many businesses – while first met with great euphoria – undermined trust in the identity and self-narrative of the state and created anxiety about the future. After such ruptures, ontological security needs to be rebuilt, with institutional and national memory being a key contributor by building narrative bridges between past and present. Actors further seek recognition and approval from others ‘to find meaning in their lives and create bonds of solidarity with other people’ (Lebow, 2006, p. 8; Rumelili, 2018).
This is what connects stigmatisation and ontological insecurity; stigmatised actors feel ontologically insecure because it makes them doubt their identity, while actors who are ontologically insecure are more likely to be stigmatised, owing to their increased reliance on external validation. Before the formal dual-integration into NATO and EU was completed, there were already concerns and almost prophetic visions of what the consequences of this ontological insecurity would be for CEE. Against the ‘return to Europe’ narrative, some commentators already feared the ‘return of the repressed’ stereotype, wherein only the new member states would be required to adapt. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister at the time, emphasised this as early as 2000, seeing a ‘real danger’ of CEE sliding back into ‘the old system of balance of power with the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies’ (Kuus, 2007, p. 91).
Jump Into Neoliberalism: Setting The Scene For Populism
The early 1990s presented an opportunity for the CEECs to redefine themselves economically and politically away from the ‘other.’ Keen to improve their global standing and draw Western investment, CEECs positioned themselves as pioneers in adopting neoliberal policies to align with Western standards (Krastev and Holmes, 2018; Orenstein, 2013, p. 375). During the initial transition period, they underwent neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ to establish their capitalist credentials through competitive signalling (Appel and Orenstein, 2018, pp. 5-6). It was also likened to ‘rebuilding the ship at sea’ (Elster et al., 1998). This aggressive approach led analysts to believe that these nations had irreversibly ‘passed by the point of no return’ for ‘authoritarian reversal’ (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998, p. 579). There was a solid homegrown neoliberal drive, with CEE governments even more neoliberal than the IMF asked them to be (Ost, 2005). They zealously followed the Washington Consensus, perceiving ‘neither poverty nor inequality […] to be problematic’ if economic growth could be achieved (Heyns, 2005, p. 164). Neoliberal economics were influenced by both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, promising economic growth and generally higher standards of living. In contrast, a failure to implement reforms was threatened with reductions in international credit ratings (Appel and Orenstein, 2018, pp. 4-6). The quick introduction of neoliberalism made CEE economies dependent on strong transnational companies with the functionalist hopes that the corresponding rise in GDP would have positive ‘spillover’ and trickling-down effects on the domestic economy. The main fallacy behind integration was that the CEECs were still in the process of rebuilding strong institutions and civil society, with their democratic consolidation being found ‘somewhat illusionary’ (Dawson and Handley, 2016, p. 23). In contrast, Western Europe already had a strong self-defence mechanism in place and experience as a welfare society before neoliberalist structures were implemented. This situation is described as the ‘Central European paradox’ (Krastev, 2017), coupled with the fact that EU policies and regulatory models have been mostly created by and for advanced capitalist economies, rendered the Visegrád region particularly susceptible to the negative aspects of neoliberalism.
Permitting the incursion of a neoliberal global economic framework into semi-peripheral regions such as CEE precipitated ‘premature de-industrialization’ (Rodrik, 2016, p. 2). Transnational companies exploited these economies as third-tier suppliers, engaging in low-wage, labour-intensive export production, while the more lucrative, value-adding activities, the ‘profit-making, managerial control, innovation, and therefore power’, were retained in Western nations (Epstein, 2020, p. 6 in Prushankin, 2023). Consequently, domestic value chains in these regions remained underdeveloped, and from 2004, CEE became more dependent on the West as they lacked the capital and structures to build up a native industrial sector (Ágh, 2020, p. 28). Prior to 1989, Hungary had advanced state-owned enterprises; however, many of these industries went bankrupt as the state stirred away from softening the seismic shifts in economic policy, which transitioned the state almost instantaneously from a cohesive socialist market into a neoliberal global market. As of 2012, the proportion of exports attributable to Hungarian domestic firms was less than fifteen per cent, whereas foreign-owned companies accounted for nearly seventy per cent, most of which were concentrated in the major urban centres (OECD, 2019). On the other hand, Czechia and Slovakia remained on a more protectionist path, thereby averting mass bankruptcies in the 1990s. In the 1990s, Czechia relied predominantly on voucher-based mass domestic privatisation and the support of state-owned domestic banks, which allowed its industries sufficient time to adjust to global competition. Slovakia, inheriting the Czech approach, also preferred domestic privatisation up until the end of the Mečiar era (Duman and Kureková, 2012).
While the industrial policies of Czechia and Slovakia and the instalment of a functioning developmental state made the transition easier than in Hungary, some general trends can be seen regardless. The transition to foreign direct investment (FDI) economies with significant de-industrialisation might have led to gradual GDP recovery after the initial ‘shock therapy’ GDP drop, but it significantly damaged the social fabric of the CEECs with many changes to the labour market and effective job loss, especially in the wider economy outside of the internationalised production sector and the capital. This period also highlighted stark economic disparities, as profits often flowed to FDIs and many ‘ex-members of the communist apparatus and administration’ (Kaminski and Kurczewska, 1995, p. 135). These gaps created a growing sense of injustice and widespread perceptions of corruption among the population. Income inequality and wages also hit across the region. Taking Visegrád and the Baltic countries together, the average Gini coefficient grew seventy-two per cent between 1989 and 1996, with Poland —dominated by its agricultural sector—being most affected (Leitner and Holzner, 2008, p. 159; OECD, 2019). Further, all Visegrád countries had a decline in real wages in the 1990s, with Czechia being the first country to reach 1989 real wage levels in 1996 and Hungary only managing to have twenty per cent higher real wages in 2012 than in 1990 (HCSO, 2020). There were clear losers of the transition, with examples such as the citizens of Opava expressing grievances that individuals earning a minimum wage were incapable of attaining the standard of living once accessible during socialism (Wyss, 2021). David Ost (2005) highlights how the neoliberal policies and ‘shock therapy’ led to rapidly declining living standards and politicians’ reluctance to listen to their citizens’ concerns. These factors of socioeconomic disintegration, combined with ‘jobless growth’ —a term denoting the paradox of rising GDP alongside stagnant employment rates— led to the widespread perception that large parts of the population couldn´t participate in the economic success of their nation (Onaran, 2008, p. 90).
These developments closely mirror the predictions made by Karl Polanyi (1944) more than 50 years prior. Polanyi posits that while the market system expands, society inevitably reacts to its destabilising effects by seeking protective measures, leading to a ‘double movement.’ CEE governments, encouraged by international financial institutions and Western powers, embraced neoliberal reforms with aggressive ‘shock therapy,’ dismantling welfare structures and state-owned industries in favour of privatisation and market liberalisation (Ost, 2005). However, this sudden exposure to global market forces left large swaths of society vulnerable as unemployment surged and inequality widened. The consequences of these neoliberal policies reflect Polanyi’s argument that the commodification of labour, land, and money—central elements of market liberalisation—disrupts social relations and creates ‘fictitious commodities’ that societies resist (Polanyi, 1944). Society tries to shield itself against the disintegrating effects of neoliberal capitalism, and it is unsurprising that some of the most successful populist and illiberal forces have come out of the Visegrád countries. Following Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s ‘Cleavage theory’ (1967), the transition to a market economy was perceived by a substantial portion of the society as a moral transgression into rampant self-interest and corruption, undermining the ethical foundations established during the socialist era and increasing the cleavages between the self-perceived winners and losers of neoliberalism.
How The Neoliberal Tables Turn: Explaining The Rise Of Populism
The 2008 financial crisis and the concomitant ‘genuine failure of liberalism to deliver on its promises’ further intensified the situation that started the ‘unravelling’ of the post-1989 liberal order in the region (Krastev, 2016, pp. 36-7; in Mälksoo, 2019). Luigi Guiso et al. (2024) and Austin Botelho (2019) highlight economic insecurity and rising income inequality as catalysts for populism, seeing it as a ‘side-effect of the elite-focused, incentive-driven reform processes overseen by the EU’ (Krastev, 2016, p. 36). Neoliberalism created inequality domestically but also internationally, as the West and Europe missed making CEE economies equal partners, prompting Saša Uhlová (2018) to report that ‘every Czech knows that a shop clerk in Germany or Austria will make three times as much as one in Czechia. [They are] consumed by a deep feeling of injustice. They believe they have been left behind.’
The region’s heavy reliance on foreign capital and exports left it vulnerable to sharp economic downturns. The Visegrád states—especially Hungary—faced significant challenges in managing fiscal deficits and inflation, which drove up domestic interest rates. This incentivised borrowing in foreign currencies, where interest rates were significantly lower. By 2009, most of the Hungarian household debt, notably mortgages, and around one-third of Polish household debt were denominated in foreign currencies. When the financial crisis hit, the rapid depreciation of the Hungarian forint and Polish zloty rendered these loans prohibitively expensive to service, pushing many Hungarian households into severe debt. Borrowers found themselves trapped, with little chance to repay the escalating monthly instalments, leading banks to enforce foreclosure rights under mortgage contracts. Hungary, in particular, suffered acutely, with its GDP contracting by over 6.6 per cent in 2009, prompting an IMF and EU bailout to stabilise its economy (Epstein, 2020).
More troubling, however, was a growing perception of unequal distribution of economic benefits. The rewards of liberalisation seemed concentrated in the hands of urban elites and foreign investors, while large portions of the population bore the brunt of the hardships. Between 2008 and 2013, income inequality surged across the region: Hungary exhibited a 65.1 per cent gap between the lowest and highest income brackets, with a 9.11 per cent increase in overall inequality. Poland followed with an 85.7 per cent difference and a 5.67 per cent rise, while Slovakia experienced the steepest inequality at 135.4 per cent, albeit with a relatively stable trend (0.21 per cent). The Czech Republic was the only exception, showing a 60.8 per cent difference and a slight decrease in inequality. These disparities exposed the vulnerabilities of neoliberal policies and unfettered foreign capital inflows, which lacked sufficient regulatory safeguards, leading to widespread resentment toward both domestic elites and the EU (Koczisky et al., 2018, p. 11).
Economic difficulties and inequality, while important on a micro-individual level, are insufficient to explain the emergence of populism in the Visegrád Group (Noury and Roland, 2020). CEECs relative economic insecurity and inequality, compared to their Western counterparts, eroded trust and pushed voters into cultural and political anxiety, as they brought together economic hardship with envy of the liberal elites. In other words, not economic difficulties alone, but a feeling of inferiority vis a vis the relative wealth ostensibly displayed in the West can explain why populism was able to emerge as a recognisable force within the Visegrád Group. The neoliberal crisis, coupled with Giddens’s ontological insecurity, led to an emphasis on Kinnvall´s (2004) concept of secure identities protecting citizens against identity threats. Parties increasingly adopted populist appeals, intensifying their focus on protecting the interests of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ against perceived enemies like opposition elites and foreigners, which overshadowed political debates on socioeconomic issues (Prushankin, 2023, p. 213). As Polanyi (1944) predicted, these movements try to reassert control over economic and social life by promoting policies aimed at restoring national sovereignty and protecting the ‘people’ from market forces and external threats. According to the cultural backlash theory, populism and illiberalism are seen as irrational, highly subjective reactions against the perceived inferiority of one’s own culture to a foreign one (Krastev and Holmes, 2018). The refugee crisis of 2015-16 – being in the main discursively constructed by populists – only intensified the threat to their ontological security and made it possible for political actors to gain political capital on the back of a potential ‘clash of civilizations’ (Botelho, 2019, pp. 46-56). When liberal parties are weakened by external shocks (e.g., the refugee crisis), show disappointing performance while in governance, or divisions within their ideological ranks, as seen in Hungary in 2006, the alternatives frequently lean towards the illiberal and diminish in democratic quality.
The newly emerging resistance tried to reframe the post-Soviet identity away from Europe and move towards more historical and religious elements that existed before the socialist regime. In Poland, Catholicism was deeply embedded in its national identity, a connection that dates back to the 18th-century partitions when the Church became a symbol of continued Polish sovereignty. During the socialist regime, this role continued with the Church playing a dual role—not only as a religious institution but as an alternative civil society, providing social services, moral authority, and a platform for resistance (Sarkissian, 2009). As Poland moved towards EU membership, this religious identity became a pillar of its ontological security, influencing political currents such as the rise of the Law and Justice (PiS) party. PiS leveraged the notion that EU policies, particularly those concerning LGBTQ+ rights and immigration, posed a threat to Poland’s traditional values. Similar trends can be seen in Hungary’s post-1989 transition, which focused increasingly on Christian values and, in doing so, gave a broader nationalistic image of the past, portraying Hungary as a glorious nation that fought off foreign powers like the Ottomans and Huns.
Once populists were in power, it was almost as if ‘Central Europe […] lived 1989 in reverse’ amidst the emergence of ‘a new Authoritarian International’ (Müller, 2016, p. 1). The illiberal populist parties challenged the political mainstream and the liberal ideology itself, framing themselves as ‘anti-system,’ ‘anti-elite,’ and ‘anti-EU’ (Puhle, 2020, p. 6) and profit from the struggle between the ‘people’ and ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1669). In government, illiberal forces tried to corrupt democratic safeguards and take control of media channels, therefore slowly eroding trust in institutions and the separation of power. They strove to establish what Levitsky and Way (2002, pp. 51) call ‘competitive authoritarianism,’ wherein formal democratic mechanisms serve as avenues for acquiring power, yet ‘fraud, civil liberty violations, and abuse of the state and media resources’ significantly distort the competitive environment to such an extent that the regime no longer qualifies as democratic. In Hungary, Orbán’s enactment of a new constitution significantly eroded the checks and balances, used government funds to finance his electoral campaign, and successfully ‘shaping the Constitutional Court into a loyal body’ (The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015). In Poland, one saw a similar picture regarding the constitutional court under PiS, and the BTI 2022 country report for Poland highlighted a decline in the separation of powers index from ten to five points – a first since 1990. Following this, Freedom House (2022) identified Hungary as a ‘transitional or hybrid regime’ and Poland as a ‘semi-consolidated democracy.’ Conversely, while being electorally successful in Slovakia and Czechia, populists so far have failed to corrupt the democratic institutions, mostly due to the different post-communist experiences.
In Czechia and Slovakia, both neoliberalism and the populist reaction to it were markedly less pronounced. In Czechia, the ANO 2011 party leveraged the discontent of the working class through populism, yet nationalism gained less traction compared to neighbouring countries. This context mitigated the appetite for vehement populism, positioning Babiš—himself a billionaire—as emblematic of a ‘technocratic populist’ by ‘run[ning] the state like a firm’ (Buštíková and Guasti, 2019, p. 302). Although Fico initially gained power in Slovakia in 2006 by critiquing Dzurinda’s neoliberal policies, he largely maintained these policies until recently. This continuity may be attributed to the country’s negative experiences with Mečiar’s authoritarian-nationalist and economically isolationist populism in the 1990s (Scheiring, 2021). Even Orbán seems to leave much of the neoliberal framework untouched, as Fidesz constructed a – clientelism system, lowered corporate taxes and flat tax rates to personal income. This approach primarily benefited national oligarchs and multinationals, especially German car manufacturers, effectively making Hungary a ‘good province’ of the neoliberal ‘empire’ (Antal, 2019, p. 12).
It is, therefore, essential to avoid generalising Central and Eastern Europe as a region, given the diversity in post-communist developments and the varying levels of party solidification in civil society institutions across different countries. Unlike Hungary, Poland continued to have robust opposition parties and a strong civil society, which enabled Donald Tusk, a neoliberal EU politician, to become Polish prime minister. The failed coalition-building of PiS further speaks to a popular desire to go back to a pre-PiS idea of normality using the memory and rhetoric of 1989 to drive resistance, something which the SPOLU bloc in Czechia also could capitalise on in 2021. Generally, the region grapples with its post-communist identity, where either the adoption of liberal market economics or later populist and nationalist agendas have emerged as the two dominant responses. These trends have shifted the traditional ‘left and right’ dichotomy towards a ‘liberal versus non-liberal’ one (Dawson and Hanley, 2016, p. 23), exemplified by Slovakia’s blend of populism and socialism.
Central And Eastern Europe Strikes Back
The shift towards illiberal governance in CEE can be understood as part of a broader ontological crisis that questions the identity and role of these nations within the European Union. The ontological state of being a CEEC post-1998 and 2004 is one of deep uncertainty and insecurity regarding their identity and place in the world. This state is dominated by a sense of liminality and ‘in-betweenness’ that exacerbates the identity crisis within these nations and disturbs the ontological foundation of the EU and NATO that these countries joined with enthusiasm at the turn of the century. Bahar Rumelili (2012, pp. 495-498) describes this dual function as a conflict between pre-existing structures and liminalities, where the structure tries to impose its identity on the liminality and where liminality undermines the structure by showing the limits of its identity and the possibility of an alternative. The ascendance process enabled the EU and NATO to establish their political, socio-economic, and security structures in the region, but at the same time, it opened up ways to subvert the existing ‘Western’ order. Due to its liminal position, CEE was highly perceptive of the failures of those structures and was also highly receptive to alternatives to this model, which came in recent years through the subversion of liberal democracy in Hungary and Poland. The depiction of nationalist and populist values by these leading parties in CEECs purposefully clashes with the liberal mainstream values of the EU, allowing populist governments to hitchhike on the EU’s positive reputation while simultaneously undermining it. Instead of accepting European values of tolerance, justice, and democracy, they posit themselves as a nationalist, Christian and populist alternative, and, indeed, as the ‘truer’ Europeans telling the remaining Europe what needs to change (Mälksoo, 2019, p. 20). This stance is evident in Orbán’s speeches; in 2020, he critiqued Western Europe for abandoning ‘a Christian Europe’ in favour of ‘a godless cosmos, rainbow families, migration, and open societies.’ Orbán further emphasised in 2024 the need ‘to go deeper, occupy positions, gather allies, and fix the European Union’ (Mälksoo, 2019). By acting as ‘enfants terribles,’ they represent a direct threat to the EU’s foundational myth of serving as a democratic beacon and a mechanism for liberal regional integration beyond national histories, having failed to deliver on the neoliberal promise of growth and prosperity (Krastev, 2016, p. 36). There is a clear fear that this form of politics will successfully make its way through Europe (e.g., the rise of AfD in Germany), undermining Project EU by reducing its loose purpose, ‘cohesion,’ and ‘external clout’ (Grabbe and Lehne, 2017; Mälksoo, 2019). Therefore, the description of ‘enfant terribles’ is not limited to CEE but rather – has siblings across Europe. The success of these movements is an attack on the ‘moral core of the European project,’ endangering liberal democracy as a core component of the EU (Müller, 2015).
The Visegrád Group, originally a forum to ease the transition into the NATO and EU institutions, served in the first decade of EU membership as a coordination forum to increase their negotiating power in the Union (Strnad, 2022). However, internal shifts towards a more Eurosceptic stance, catalysed by the 2015 migration crisis—which intensified discussions around identity and security—sparked a rise in populist movements across the region. These movements not only united the V4 countries but also fostered a collective narrative of a distinct Visegrád identity (Manners and Murray, 2016, p. 191; Strnad, 2022). The refugee crisis in CEE, largely exaggerated by populists to boost their electoral prospects, heightened cultural and existential fears and intensified dismay over perceived intrusions by ‘Brussels’ and Germany’s ‘Willkommen’ policy (‘Willkommenspolitik’) into national sovereignty. In response, the Visegrád Group mostly rejected the EU’s migration and asylum agenda, including the quota systems for refugee resettlement, positioning themselves as protectors of ‘Christian’ Europe against foreign intruders. Despite Slovakia’s more EU-aligned stance, the group significantly influenced EU policy, leveraging their self-perception as monocultural nation-states where such homogeneity was deemed an essential aspect of national identity. The grouping successfully amplified the member states’ shared interests and became perceived by the EU as effective ‘sovereigntist’ nay-sayers and disruptors to their project. The refugee crisis turned Visegrád ‘from best pupils of European integration to les enfants terribles’ as it made it difficult for the EU to formulate a common migration strategy (Visvizi, 2018, p. 44). This role largely continued post-2015, focusing on issues concerning the EU´s rule of law and LGBTQ+ issues and – at least concerning Zeman, Fico, and Orbán – relations with Russia. Visegrád and the broader CEE region resurged in the 2010s as the retrospective self of the EU, exhibiting a clear disregard for the norms of the European order, which was primarily founded on the rejection and ‘othering’ of authoritarianism and illiberalism.
After the election of Tusk and Fiala, policies in the member states, both internally and vis-à-vis Russia and the EU, became more divergent, increasingly putting a question mark on why the forum still exists. Depending on the type of government in power, the V4 regularly turns into a V2+2 or V3+1. The V4 is only effective if its members share the same goals, serving as a coordination forum rather than a space to bridge national policy differences (Rácz, 2014, p. 46). Prague and, recently, Warsaw have been trying to distance themselves from Budapest and Bratislava, showing willingness to work with EU institutions. Indeed, both countries are now disregarding the ‘toxic’ V4 brand (Dvořák, 2023), as the Group is not welcomed in Brussels – reigniting instead forums like the Weimar Triangle – while Hungary continues using Visegrád as much as possible to legitimise its policy stance (Strnad, 2022). As Robert Beck (2024) describes, there is now a ‘complete breakdown of relations’ between the V4, clashing primarily over their Russia policy – becoming ever more important through the recent energy crisis.
Concurrently, the EU has played a multifaceted role with these governments, particularly with Hungary. It has acted as a regulator, for instance, by the ECHR adjudicating on Hungary’s human rights violations and the European Council initially freezing €10 billion in EU funds to Hungary in December 2022. But it can also act as an enabler, having had to de-freeze the funds when Orbán used his veto power strategically to block EU funding to Ukraine, inadvertently bolstering his government’s standing despite widespread criticism of its authoritarian practices. Additionally, the EU Cohesion Fund continues to provide significant financial support to Hungary, amounting to approximately four per cent of its GNI (Bozoki and Hegedüs, 2018, p. 1182), indirectly enhancing Orbán’s regime by not censuring his actions. The same applies to Hungary’s threat of vetoing Sweden´s NATO membership, while Orbán ‘sleeps under his NATO article 5 blanket’ (Nuland, 2014).
Conclusion
Central and Eastern Europe is faced with historical stigmatisation and contemporary challenges that oscillate between integration and disruption. CEE’s participation within international frameworks such as NATO and the EU is profoundly influenced by the prevailing governmental ideologies – either being liberal and EU-friendly or illiberal and Eurosceptic. These nations have showcased dual personas: on the one hand, as eager learners embracing Western integration principles, and on the other, as disrupting actors challenging the established norms and values of their Western counterparts. This dichotomy can be attributed to the residual legacies of their socialist pasts, coupled with the neo-liberal pressures of the post-Cold War era – mostly leading to FDI-dependent market economies- which have shaped their domestic and international policies. The Visegrád Group, in particular, exemplifies this, being initially celebrated as prime examples of European integration, but recent years have seen a pivot towards more sovereigntist and Eurosceptic agendas, particularly in the face of crises such as migration and disputes over the rule of law. These tendencies have also made Visegrad states increasingly turn to non-Western partners like China to diversify away from EU dependency and gain leverage over Brussels’s institutions – leading to new challenges within the region and the EU.
However, CEE also speaks to a broader systemic crisis of liberalism and its institutions to deliver on economic promises and to mitigate the backlash against globalisation and cosmopolitan values. The rise of illiberalism in CEE can be seen less as a failure of the region’s commitment to liberal democracy and more as a reaction to liberalism’s shortcomings. The economic transformations that have dominated the post-1989 landscape have created dependent economies vulnerable to external shocks and criticisms. The populist parties in the region have exploited these conditions, increasingly adopting a welfare chauvinistic stance that promises enhanced social services and economic protections for native citizens while excluding immigrants—a strategy reminiscent of recent political shifts in Western Europe and the United States as well, with Barber (2019) noting stark parallels between the re-election campaigns of Poland’s PiS party and Boris Johnson in the UK. Simultaneously, there are substantial differences among the countries being discussed.
Since 1989, Europe has changed rapidly, leading to anxiety about the role of nations, traditional values, faith and identity. Thus, the role of CEE is not merely reactive but is also emblematic of deeper ontological insecurities and a quest for respect and recognition within the European framework. The region will likely continue to be characterised by this fluctuation between conformity and contestation, reflecting its ongoing struggle to define its place within the European and broader international order. This dual role as both a ‘dutiful student’ and a ‘troublemaking enfant terrible’ is not just a reflection of CEE’s identity crisis but also a significant factor shaping the dynamics of European unity and division.
Leonas Pausch
© The Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.