Jemba Valerio
Political History
Easter Term, 2024
Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(1), pp. 138-151

Introduction

The Bengal Famine of 1943 was ‘one of the worst disasters in twentieth century South Asia’ (Mallik 2022, 5). The famine cost more than three million lives (Yates 2043). This article shows that genocide is not a useful concept for understanding the government’s role in the Bengal Famine. Genocide is here defined as ‘not a specific type of violence’, but rather ‘a general charge that highlighted the common elements of many acts’ (Yates 1943, 122). Due to the necessity of clear intent to kill in genocide, faminogenic behaviour is the most useful concept regarding government accountability and the Bengal Famine because it looks more at negligent and reckless actions. Three primary lines of argument characterise the existing literature on culpability for the severity of the famine. Madhusree Mukerjee argues that the cause of the famine was food availability decline. This assessment emphasises the culpability for the severity of the famine of the British government, and primarily Winston Churchill. The British government refused to send aid when first requested and then delivered at levels significantly less than needed due to the pre-eminence of wartime considerations.

Amartya Sen identifies a shift in exchange entitlements due to war-induced supply-side shocks. The price of rice rose considerably without parallel wage increases, which caused speculation and hoarding, exacerbating the decline in exchange entitlements. She argues that culpability rests jointly with the Bengal government for its poor distribution and mishandling of the food supply and with the British government for its reluctance to intervene. Sen also notes that, had India been a full democracy, the Bengal government would have responded quicker lest they were punished at the next election.

Cormac Ó Gráda, whose line of argument this article primarily adopts, takes the middle path, arguing that a decline in food availability triggered the decrease in entitlement exchange and exacerbated problems of distribution. Culpability is attached mainly to the prioritisation of wartime concerns by London t and a lack of engagement with the Indian and Bengali governments’ mishandling of the crisis. While these authors contribute to understanding of the role of political institutions in the Bengal Famine, they fail to consider it from the perspective of famocide. This article aims to rectify this failing.

Genocide as a legal concept

First, this article considers genocide and famocide as theoretical concepts and assesses their applicability within the literature on the Bengal Famine. The concept of genocide and its relevance in historical analysis has been debated at length. There are multiple understandings of what genocide is and how it should be defined. Gunter Lewy asserts that, ‘[practically] all legal scholars accept the centrality of the intent clause in the Genocide Convention’ (Lewy 2007, 661). To Lewy, intent must be specific. His argument draws from the Genocide Convention and other legal texts and rulings. Article II, the intent clause, of the Genocide Convention of 1948 states that genocide is a series of four acts ‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a nation, ethnical, racial or religious group as such’ (UN General Assembly 1948, 277-278). This emphasises the centrality of specific intent and identifies it as the main reason for the killings. This emphasis on intent was continued in legal rulings and documents after the Genocide Convention. Commentary from the International Law Commission on the 1996 Codes of Crimes Against the Pace and Security of Mankind outlines how [t]he definition of genocide ‘requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act’ (Lewy 2007, 663). As stressed by Nehemiah Robinson, this means that there can be no negligent or structural genocide; the term genocide only applies if ‘the intent to destroy the group existed or could be proven’ (Lewy 2007, 662). Genocide becomes, when conforming to this legal argument, a very narrow and rigid concept. It must also fulfil the legal requirements of proof and evidence. . This precedent was largely set at the Nuremberg trials when guilt was regarded an individual responsibility, not merely held solely by a state itself. Delivering its judgments on 30th September to 1st October 1946, the Nuremberg Court declared that crimes against humanity, such as genocide, ‘are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’ (Lewy 2007, 665).

However, this legal approach in its current form bears little relevance to our understanding of the historical Bengal Famine and should not be used when analysing historical events. Lewy takes little consideration of the historical context in which the Genocide Convention was written. The Genocide Convention, intended to represent the beginning of a new age for humanity, quickly became ‘a battleground for the emerging superpowers’ (Weiss-Wendt 2017, 3). It was not meant to look retrospectively at past genocidal acts, but rather to dictate future proceedings and attempt to prevent genocides from happening in the future. Prevention was a central aim when the definition of genocide was being drafted, largely as a way to ensure thatthe Cold War parties knew that, if they levied charges of genocide against the other side, equal charges would be brought against them (Weiss-Wendt 2017). Hence, it is clear that the definition of genocide that Lewy stresses needs to be viewed in its historical context. This definition of genocide, with its lens of law, court, trials and evidence, was not designed to be used to charge past cases but rather to fulfil a specific political purpose (Barta 2008). David Stannard continues this line of reasoning by stressing how even Lewy recognised that, when dealing with historical cases of genocide, those responsible are often ‘long since dead’ and ‘cannot be tried in a court of law’ (Stannar 2008, 130). The centrality of specific intent, as a means of determining guilt, is therefore of limited use. The use of such a narrow definition when conducting an entirely ex post facto examination of conduct that may or may not constitute ‘genocide’ is too restrictive; a more contextual view is necessary.

For genocide to be relevant in the literature surrounding the Bengal Famine, it would need to take into account how history requires ‘a degree of subtlety, inference and imagination’ that is not to be found in legal courts (Barta 2008, 111). Therefore the legal approach is not useful to historians (Stannard 2008), at least in its current form. Norbert Finzsch contributes to these arguments against such a narrow definition of genocide by demonstrating that Raphael Lemkin, the Polish international lawyer who first coined the term genocide and was the architect of the Genocide Convention, himself viewed genocide as ‘not a specific type of violence’, but rather ‘a general charge that highlighted the common elements of many acts’ (Finzsch 2008, 122). Interpreting genocide through this definition presents the most relevant reading of genocide in relation to the Bengal Famine. Intent is still necessary through the ‘common elements’ of the actions, but it is approached in a way which allows for a more contextual reading. By acknowledging that there is not one ‘specific type of violence’, political historians can look at different types of violence – such as economic or structural violence – that would otherwise be overlooked. This is the widest credible reading of ‘genocide’ that can be understood and applied to the famine.

Faminogenic behaviour

Nonetheless, genocide as a concept remains deficient as an conceptual basis for studying the Bengal Famine. Instead, faminogenic behaviour is a more suitable concept for assessing culpability for the famine. It is due to the centrality of intent within the concept of genocide, regardless of whether it is general or specific, that this article concludes that genocide should not be used to understand the government’s role in the Bengal Famine, or in famines themselves more generally. At no point during the Bengal Famine did the British government act deliberately to kill any group of people. A concept, however, that is more useful in understanding the government’s role in the Bengal Famine is that of ‘faminogenic behaviour’, of which there are, according to David Marcus, four degrees. The first two degrees, to Marcus constitute crimes against humanity and of criminal liability. First-degree faminogenic behaviour indeed fits under the umbrella of genocide as it currently stands. This is because it requires intentionality, and therefore the deliberate use of hunger as a tool to bring about the extermination of a specific group of people. In contrast, second-degree faminogenic behaviour is characterised by government ‘recklessness’. Here, governments need not intend to kill, but may be held accountable for pursuing policies risking mass starvation (Marcus 2003).

The Bengal Famine comfortably aligns with second-degree faminogenic behaviour. This better encapsulates the role of government in the famine, given that the Bengal Famine was largely caused and worsened by the war-time prioritisation of the British government’s and their lack of interference with the Indian and Bengali governments’ handling of the crisis. This did not necessarily reflect any direct intent to harm the citizens of Bengal. Famines from the twentieth-century onwards were rarely caused by an actual decline in food availability, but were rather the consequence of human action. Sen has shown that famines are sufficiently avoidable, so it is effectively a government’s responsibility as to whether a famine occurs or not. Likewise, Marcus argues that famines are ‘so easy to prevent that it is amazing that they are allowed to occur at all’ (Marcus 2003, 245). Due to the primacy of genocide within international law regarding crimes against humanity, it is easy for faminogenic behaviour to be overlooked. Marcus, advocating for the codification of faminogenic behaviour in international law, argues that in the absence of specific intent, those who facilitate mass deaths through reckless conduct – which demands a lesser mental state – should still be held accountable (Marcus 2003). This article aims to contribute to the literature of faminogenic behaviour by viewing it in relation to the Bengal Famine. In doing so, the faminogenic behaviour of the British government, the central and provincial Indian governments, and the local political parties are revealed.

Supply of rice

The official response from the Famine Inquiry Commission’s ‘Report on Bengal’ attributed the Bengal Famine to ‘the serious shortage in the supply position of rice available for consumption in Bengal’ (The Famine Inquiry Commission: Report on Bengal 1945, 77). This absolved governments – British and Indian – of any responsibility, for the famine would negate both genocide and famocide as concepts relevant to this discussion. However, upon closer examination, the claims made by the Commission are lacking and faminogenic behaviour remains central. The Commission noted that, firstly, a cyclone in Midnapore in October 1942 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of rice valued at over Rs. 112 million (Tauger 2009). This meant that Midnapore went from a surplus district, exporting their rice across the province, to a deficit district (Law-Smith 2089). Secondly, there was ‘unusually heavy rainfall in September’ which contributed to the third factor, the brown rust plant disease. The rainfall not only flooded and destroyed crops, but also helped spread the spores of the disease which affected all twenty-one rice varieties studied in an investigation by S. Y. Padmanabhan. The Commission argued that it was these unfortunate natural conditions that ultimately caused the famine because, when it became apparent that the rice crop would be poor that year, the prices in the rice markets rose. The increase in the price of rice was not based on government action in London or Bengal, but rather poor harvest conditions (Tauger 2009). This article does not contest that the unfortunate crop conditions up to 1943 contributed to the famine and therefore need to be factored in. However, as Ó Gráda convincingly recognises, this reduction in food availability was not enough on its own to cause a famine of such severity. As Paul Greenough noted, this was plainly not enough to make ‘widespread starvation inevitable’ (Tauger 2009, 169). Sen has also shown that while 1943 was an unfavourable year for crops, it was not disastrous. Yields were in fact only five per cent lower than the average over the past five years and thirteen per cent higher than in 1941, when no famine took place (Sen 2083). It was the knowledge of this drop in food availability that caused the first spike in prices and a decline in exchange entitlements. This was worsened by the British government’s insistence of prioritising the war.

Prioritisation of war

The prioritisation of the war is a clear demonstration of second-degree faminogenic behaviour. This is encapsulated by both the Denial policy’ and the British government’s pressurisation of the Bengal government to secure Calcutta’s food supply. While there was no intent to cause harm to the people of Bengal directly, the British government in London continued to pursue these wartime policies despite knowledge of their effect on the ground. This is a prime example of the British government engaging in ‘reckless’ behaviour in relation to Bengal (Marcus 2003). One of the clearest wartime policies implemented at the expense of Bengal was the British government’s ‘Denial policy’. The Denial policy was a scorched earth policy implemented in 1942 in reaction to the threat of Japanese invasion after they swept across South-East Asia (Mallik 2022). The policy demanded all boats which held ten or more passengers be destroyed or impounded, as well as the destruction of any large supplies of grain seen as a surplus. Authorities in Midnapore, Khulna and Bakarganj were required to destroy any and all pre-existing stocks of rice (Mallik 2022). This had catastrophic consequences for Bengal. Indeed, T. Narayan places the Denial policy at the beginning of the famine’s chronology. Law-Smith argues that it ‘affected the trade and crop production of the people living in the areas as radically as did the cyclone’ (Law-Smith 2089). Bengal had a thriving fishing trade which was damaged by the destruction or impounding of 66,000 boats. Fishermen and boatmen were two of the hardest hit professions during the famine (Ó Gráda 2010). Furthermore, the 66,653 boats that were impounded or destroyed stopped the much-needed rice trade from surplus zones to deficit zones throughout the province, contributing to lack of inter- and intra-provincial trade during the famine. It is also important that the Denial policy be viewed in the context of the recent loss of Burmese rice imports, which made up fifteen per cent of Bengal’s annual rice imports. This meant that even more rice was lost in a short space of time. Kasem Fazlul Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal, protested to London about the detrimental effects that this policy would have on Bengal and the rice deficit that had occurred already through the cyclone; however, his plea fell on deaf ears. L.G Pinnell, the Director of Civil Supplies, insisted that there was sufficient rice available (Mallik 2022). The concept of faminogenic behaviour – recklessness as a central component of it – is clear in this context: the policy was pursued by the British government despite the knowledge that it would likely contribute to famine.

Wartime policy also manifested itself in London’s pressurisation of the Bengal government to prioritise Calcutta’s food supply. Calcutta was the industrial centre of India and the site of most wartime manufacturing, with over half of war related output produced in Calcutta. The Bengal Government, seeking to guarantee food supply to Calcutta, intervened in the wholesale rice market. It was this intervention that caused the initial panic and rise in prices (Greenough 2082). Law-Smith asserts that, had Bengal not been ‘combed’ by the Bengal government to feed Calcutta, then the rest of Bengal would not have been so susceptible to the supply-shocks which caused the shift in exchange entitlements and the increase in prices (Law-Smith 1989, 60). In late December 1942, forcible requisition of rice from mills and warehouses took place throughout the city and the province to give to Calcutta’s ‘priority classes’ (Ó Gráda 2010, 3). This was used to stock the control shops that the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Foodstuffs Scheme set up in August 1942, which sold rice at lower prices for people in the military, civil defence, army and other wartime related industry. This created an increase in inequality between incomes and purchasing power (Mallik 2022). When the Bengal government lifted price controls on the whole-sale rice markets in February 1943 with the aim of buying up stocks for the army, the first hit of panic buying and price increases occurred (Padel 2021).

Faminogenic behaviour therefore remains more useful than genocide for evaluating the role of government in the Bengal Famine. Both the British government and the Bengal government, through their prioritisation of the war effort and interventions, caused the decline in exchange entitlements and the spiralling price of rice. This mainly caused the Bengal Famine due to the ordinary citizen being unable to afford rice. Genocide is not a useful concept here due to the lack of intent to directly harm the people of Bengal. Instead, as above, it was the reckless actions of governments in pursuance of their policies that best explains the severity of the famine.

Relief of the famine

The Basic Plan was Linlithgow and the Indian government’s attempt to remedy food scarcity in Bengal. The Basic Plan aimed to set up a central purchasing organisation which would get grain from provinces to send to Bengal. This followed the recommendations of the Sixth Price Conference in September 1942. The Basic Plan was executed in March 1943. However, it was thoroughly mismanaged. The Indian government did not inform the surplus provinces that the plan would be executed in March 1943 until January that year, giving them limited time to prepare and collect the grain. Moreover, there was little binding the provinces to their commitments. Linlithgow notified Bengal to expect 350,000 tons of rice between April 1943 and March 1944, with Assam, Bihar, the Eastern States and Orissa all agreeing to send 60,000 tons as an immediate emergency measure. However, only 25,000 tons of rice from Orissa were received until the programme restarted in September (Mallik 2022). When criticised for this failure, the governor of Bihar told Linlithgow that, ‘[b]y conviction I hold with Adam Smith but in a crisis like this I am prepared to accept 100% control’ (Ó Gráda 2010, 21). In this instance, both provincial governments throughout India and the central Indian government carried out faminogenic behaviour. They did not directly intend to cause death through keeping a surplus stock of rice and grain. However, by pursuing policies which prioritised themselves by keeping such a stock, the governments knowingly contributed to the spiralling prices. Furthermore, the Indian government in New Delhi allowed the famine to worsen by their reluctance to compromise provincial autonomy and the risk of worsening the British position within India. These factors meant the breaking of the famine did not occur; the actions of the Indian government did not allow for the large supply of food that was necessary to reach Bengal (Sen 2083).

Indeed, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha perpetrated faminogenic behavior at the local party level. Both parties accused each other of preferential treatment of their respective religious groups and this led to highly communalised relief of the famine. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, sent a cheque to the Muslim Chamber of Commerce’s relief fund for the explicit reason of ‘Muslim relief’, while Vinayak Damodar, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, told Hindu organisations to only send relief to Hindu victims (Sarker 2020, 2035). Instantly, both parties displayed second-degree faminogenic behaviour. They prioritised winning votes by their own people above aiding the victims of the famine, despite the knowledge of the suffering that was being experienced in Bengal.

This is taken further by the communalisation of ration shops and communal kitchens. Communal kitchens were indispensable methods of relief. For many, the daily single meal from the kitchens was their only source of food. It would often be seen within villages and towns that Hindus and Muslims would ‘predominate’ particular neighbourhoods and communities (Sarker 2020, 2044). Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha wanted to keep these neighbourhoods separate. This meant that those working in the shops and kitchens in a Muslim neighbourhood would have to be Muslim and those working in a Hindu area would have to be Hindu. J.R. Symonds, the officer-in-charge of the Friends’ Ambulance Unit, a volunteer Quaker Christian organisation that provided famine-relief, complained that ‘[t]he communal ration, applied strictly by the Bengal Public Service Commission, had such a crippling effect in holding up recruitment of urgently needed staff that at one point we considered withdrawing our members from working within Government offices’ (Sarker 2020, 2044). Not only did they hinder themselves from giving out relief, but they hindered other, private, organisations as well. Faminogenic behaviour is clearly being displayed here by the provincial government in Bengal and their political counterpart, the Hindu Mahasabha party. Neither party had any direct intent to see the people of Bengal killed. However, both proved that their own priorities and policies came first over the lives and safety of those affected by the famine despite the levels of famine being known and often witnessed first-hand.

Conclusion

To conclude, this article has demonstrated how the concept of genocide is less relevant when assessing accountability for the Bengal Famine. Instead, the concept of faminogenic behaviour, and more specifically second-degree faminogenic behaviour, is more appropriate. Previous debates surrounding the Bengal Famine have tended to focus on genocide and its relevance, whereas faminogenic behaviour has been overlooked. This essay aims to contribute to the growing literature on faminogenic behaviour by demonstrating how genocide has been incorrectly emphasised in relation to the Bengal Famine. Instead, faminogenic behaviour is a more accurate term to describe government accountability. The necessity of intent within genocide is one of the key factors that makes it ineffectual in relation to the Bengal Famine, and famines more generally. This is too narrow and requires the government to deliberately seek out the deaths of civilians through famine. This intent was not present in the British or the Indian governments at any point. However, the characteristic of ‘recklessness’ within second-degree faminogenic behaviour was present at all levels of government – British, central and provincial Indian and local political parties. Britain’s prioritisation of war time policies such as the Denial policy, the rerouting of Bengal’s food supply to Calcutta, and the refusal to send sufficient grain were all enacted with an understanding of the consequences, but they were carried on regardless. Similarly, the central and provincial Indian government failed to adequately provide grain to Bengal. The provincial governments were reluctant to send grain for fear of their own stock levels and the Indian government refused to compromise provincial autonomy for fear of backlash. Local politics too demonstrated second-degree faminogenic behaviour through recklessness, rather than any direct intent to cause harm, through politicising support programmes and prioritising their religious groups over others. This demonstrates the centrality of faminogenic behaviour over genocide when discussing the Bengal Famine. Faminogenic behaviour is still a relatively under researched area compared to that of genocide and this essay has contributed to closing this gap in the literature.