Abstract
In recent times, the influence of international organisations (IOs) in upholding established norms has diminished, exemplified by Hungary’s populist leader Victor Orbán’s explicit rejection of EU sanctions on Russia and Turkey’s controversial foreign policy decisions, such as the purchase of a Russian S-400 air defence system. This departure from normative frameworks raises crucial questions in International Relations (IR), necessitating a re-evaluation of the constructivist hypothesis of socialisation and normative convergence among IO Member States. The paper argues that populism significantly shapes foreign policy outcomes, challenging the constructivist socialisation hypothesis. Examining Turkey and Hungary as case studies, this article emphasises that populism has disrupted the collaborative atmosphere within NATO and the EU, challenging the normative framework of liberal IOs and influencing foreign policy outcomes. The constructivist socialisation hypothesis can no longer be taken for granted, particularly as populism rises in countries initially motivated to integrate into the western liberal alliance system. Hungary’s democratic identity has been constrained by institutional reforms, enabling Orbán to shape a foreign policy aligned with illiberal regimes. Similarly, Turkey, under Erdoğan’s leadership, has alienated itself from Western allies, leveraging anti-Western rhetoric for electoral success. The EU and NATO’s attempts at socialising their members are deemed unsuccessful, prompting the need for a reassessment of institutional socialisation.
Introduction
In recent years, the binding nature of norms defused by international organisations (IOs) appears to have evaporated. Consider, for example, the case of Hungary, where populist leader Victor Orbán told his party in late September 2022 that European Union (EU) sanctions on Russia, imposed following its invasion of Ukraine, should be lifted (Than 2022). Orbán explicitly stated that he was ready to block EU decisions to secure favourable policy outcomes aligned solely with Hungary ’s national interests. Additionally, with regards to other timely questions, such as the treatment of refugees, the Hungarian way clearly deviated from the normative framework of the EU. A similar case can be made for Turkey. On various foreign and security policy issues, Turkey has taken controversial decisions at least from the perspective of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. Prominent examples include the 2017 purchase of a Russian S-400 air defence system, as well as its interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
While traditional social constructivist theory of International Relations (IR) would predict states to adhere to normative convergence within IOs, a growing body of literature revolving around norm contestation casts doubt on the linear view of a world progressively converging towards liberal models of international order. However, the drivers of norm contestation often remain underspecified (Betizza and Lewis 2020). In Hungary and Turkey, there is ample evidence to suggest that in both cases foreign policy outcomes are influenced by the populist appeal of particular ‘hot ’ topics such as migration or westernisation. Consequently, this article poses the question: To what extent does populism account for member states ’ deviation from norms in their foreign policies with IOs? Starting from the assumption that IOs socialise their members, we argue that populism is reflected in foreign policy. It thereby itself becomes a reason for policy outcomes that lead to norm contestation. Turkey and Hungary serve as suitable examples for this purpose. Both countries have undergone systematic changes in the past that seem to follow a similar pattern: They have experienced democratic backsliding reflected, for example, in the strengthening of presidential powers (Önis and Kutlay 2017). Moreover, populist discourses are part and parcel of political life in Turkey and Hungary alike, where liberal and democratic values are continuously questioned. Yet, instead of exerting a constraining effect, IOs often become the object of populist debates themselves. Policies that contradict common values are not seldom the declared goal. Therefore, this article makes an important contribution by linking an inquiry into the populist root causes of foreign policy outcomes in Turkey and Hungary with the key tenets of constructivist theory.
How might populism lead to norm contestation within IOs?
First, this article outlines a theoretical framework, beginning with constructivism ‘s view on institutional socialisation, that emphasises how international organisations like NATO and the EU shape state behaviour through norms and values. Subsequently, this article explores populism ’s influence on foreign policy, positing that populism challenges the liberal order of IOs, resulting in norm contestation.
Institutional socialisation
The concept of institutional socialisation was developed by the constructivist school of IR theory, whose beginnings date back to the 1980s (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). In comparison to realism and liberalism, constructivism is therefore a relatively recent theory that attempts to identify how and when ideas influence the shaping of international politics (Park 2018). It uses norms, values, culture, and identity to explain the world around us. According to constructivists, these norms create a stable international order in which states operate (Brunnée and Toope 2012). Constructivism also holds that everything in the world is socially constructed, leading to the creation of ‘social facts ’ in society (Park 2018).
Bearce and Bondanella (2007) see the concept of institutional socialisation as a core component of constructivist theory of IR. The concept postulates that IOs gradually align member state interests over time, in a process known as interest convergence. Park (2006) remarks that IOs not only foster similar interests but also function as norm creators in world politics. They disseminate these norms throughout the international system by teaching states their interests. Schimmelfennig et al. (2006, 130) see socialisation as ‘a process in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community/organisation. It is a process leading to rule-adoption by the targets. ’
The norms that IOs create and diffuse are often codified in international law. Consequently, international law represents the norms and values present in the legal and statutory frameworks of IOs. Therefore, constructivism also offers an explanation as to how international law can exist and influence behaviour. It follows that both NATO and the EU should both constrain and socialise their Member States, promoting norm abidance and interest convergence. As stated in its well-known Article 5, which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of its members is deemed an attack against all, NATO essentially serves as a political and military alliance centred on collective defence against external aggression. Primarily through military cooperation, joint exercises, and devotion to liberal democratic norms, this concept is expected to foster solidarity and establish mutual defence mechanisms among its members (Gheciu 2005). The EU, on the other hand, is essentially a political and economic union that prioritises integration and policy harmonisation in a number of domains, such as the legal system, economics, and human rights. The acquis communautaire, a complicated framework of laws and regulations, is one of the ways the EU socialises its members and fosters a sense of European identity (Jørgensen 1999).
The socialisation effect is expected to be even stronger in the EU, as it is an IO of exceptionally deep integration compared to NATO (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). At least since the introduction of conditionality, the EU actively encourages the adoption of liberal, democratic norms and demands that domestic institutions reflect these norms. According to Schimmelfennig et al. (2006), central and eastern European states, when negotiating their accession, were strongly motivated by the normative framework of the EU. As this article will show, Turkey faced similar incentives during the earlier stages of its NATO membership. It is against this theoretical background that the current developments in Hungary ’s and Turkey ’s foreign policy must be evaluated.
Populism and foreign policy
The current most widespread understanding of populism refers to it as a ‘thin-centred ideology ’. A narrow set of ideas or beliefs allows this approach to typically coexist with a ‘thick-ideology ’, such as socialism or ethno-nationalism (Hawkins et al. 2018). The fundamental populist argument divides society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the ‘good ’ people and the ‘corrupt ’ elite. Usually, the leader claims that only they, alone, represent the people and have the ability to serve the ‘general will ’ (Destradi et al. 2021, 666). The ‘thin-centred ideology ’ approach to populism has become the main reference of studies on the positioning of parties and leaders because it can account for different populistic alignments. Therefore, this article will focus on this approach.
Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) identify four different types of populist parties that are expected to take different positions on foreign policy. The populist left-wing follows the general attitude of pursuing international arrangements to protect the weak and to counter the existing hegemony. Still, they remain somewhat critical towards Europeanisation and often adopt protectionist measures to avoid labour displacement. However, they demonstrate willingness to engage with IOs and to support transborder migration. The attitudes of the populist regionalists remain rather unclear in some spheres, as their positions depend on whether globalisation, migration or Europeanisation contribute to the prosperity of the regions or align with their goal of achieving greater autonomy. Meanwhile populist market liberals take a clear stance towards an open market and an internationalisation of trade and finance. Verbeek and Zaslove describe them as ‘economic cosmopolitan open to multilateralism ’ (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). Quite the contrary is the case regarding the populist radical right. Nationalism and protectionism are constitutional to their belief and, therefore, they oppose Europeanisation, globalisation and transborder migration. Indeed, most of the research on populism in Europe has focused on this specific alignment of populism, given the numerous prominent cases that are often considered a threat to liberal democracy (Chryssogelos 2017). While different types of populist parties take various positions on foreign policy issues, they share some ideas, such as anti-Americanism and a favourable view of Russia ’s role in European security (Chryssogelos 2017; Liang 2007). This broad strand of research on political parties in foreign policy argues in sum that the partisan positions are reflecting ‘visions of domestic society ’ as integration in IOs have turned these issues from intergovernmental bargaining to ideological contestation (Manow et al. 2008, 25; Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2008).
The resistance against IOs is expected to be the strongest when populism fuses with nationalism, as is the case for the populist radical right. Here, the critique of many established international organisations centres not on their lack of transparency or effectiveness, but on their embodiment of a liberal, elitist order that fails to represent ‘the people ’. This perspective argues that some IOs are governed by a global elite whose interests and values are misaligned with ordinary citizens, perpetuating policies that prioritise global governance and liberal norms over national sovereignty and local traditions. This alignment with globalised elites, identified by populist nationalist leaders as adversaries, leads to populist governments being more likely to oppose IOs vehemently, seeing them as threats to national sovereignty and conduits for unwanted foreign influence. Yet, portraying populists as unilateralists oversimplifies foreign policy because contestation of one IO is often followed by support of others (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Spandler and Söderbaum 2023). As will be shown, Turkey and Hungary both fall in the category described above, leading us to expect that they will contest the normative framework diffused by the EU and NATO.
Two examples of populist norm contestation
Hungary and Turkey are among the most dramatic cases of contentious politics generated by democratic backsliding in Europe that is driven by right-wing populist parties. Despite their dissimilar histories and cultural traditions, similar patterns of systemic change emerged. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) both attained significant parliamentary majorities in 2002 and 2010, respectively. These right-wing populist parties integrated neoliberal economic policies with conservative cultural agendas during periods of economic turmoil. Once in power, both parties exerted partisan control over state institutions, tightly regulated national media, and manipulated the political landscape to their advantage. Turkey ’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán have frequently used populist strategies such as polarisation, attacks on representational institutions or anti-elite mobilisation to secure their power (Esen 2018). In recent years, both leaders also declared their intentions to strengthen bilateral relations and strategic partnership by cooperating on a number of foreign policy issues (Deutsche Welle 2023). Assuming that populism is reflected in foreign policy, these trends provide a compelling backdrop for delving into case studies of norm contestation within the EU for Hungary and within NATO for Turkey.
Hungary and the EU
During the past few decades, Hungary has experienced important changes in its political system. Following the end of the Cold War, the country began its journey towards becoming a liberal democracy with EU-membership as a clearly stated goal (Önis and Kutlay 2017). Meanwhile, the centre-right party of Fidesz, which had a pro-European agenda at the time, emerged under its prominent leader Viktor Orbán, first elected Prime Minister in 1998. Due to the formal conditions outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria, a successful Hungarian accession to the EU required the implementation of institutional measures aimed at consolidating the rule of law, adopting a market economy and stabilising internal democracy (Michalski 2006). Fidesz ’ pro-European and liberal programs, however, granted the party only temporary electoral success and it was sent back to opposition in 2002.
After eight subsequent years, the public support for the ruling Socialist coalition collapsed, mainly due to scandals surrounding politicians and a severe currency depreciation in the aftermath of the global recession of 2008. Meanwhile, Orbán ’s Fidesz had discovered the strategic use of populist rhetorics and agenda-setting by emphasising ‘social issues, fears and insecurities of the common people ’ (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021, 688). Combined with an exploitation of popular scepticism towards the EU ’s capability of financial crisis management, the new strategy led to a landslide victory of Fidesz in the 2010 elections (Önis and Kutlay 2017). Hence, the time in opposition can be described as a period of transformation for Fidesz, after which the party emerged with a new populist agenda.
The promise of radical change was undoubtedly appealing to the Hungarian electorate. Following his victory, Orbán immediately began to undertake structural reforms targeting Hungary ’s democratic institutions, steering the country in a more authoritarian direction. In constitutionally sensitive sectors like the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, which had earlier been the focus of the EU ’s reform agenda, his government successively dismantled previous liberal improvements (Pappas 2013). Orbán strengthened the Prime Minister ’s Office by extending his mandate to critical foreign policy domains including EU affairs. This process took place simultaneously with the nomination of Fidesz-loyal officials to central positions within his ministerial cabinets (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). By consolidating his power, Orbán created an environment in which he could challenge the institutional framework of the EU, into which Hungary had integrated over the past decades. Consequently, in the case of Hungary, domestic developments are reflected in foreign policy. Hungary ’s illiberal turn created a polarisation between Hungarian and foreign interests, which has become a frequently-used tool of Orbán ’s populist foreign policy. His self-proclaimed aim to pursue a fight for freedom against ‘EU colonisation ’, a concept with obvious ethno-populist traits, has resulted in an adoption of a confrontational approach towards several policies of the EU (Ágh 2016, 282; Varga and Buzogány 2021). According to Ágh (2016), today there is no country diverging equally as much from the EU ’s normative agenda as Hungary.
Hungary ’s constitutional revisions were heavily criticised by other EU Member States as these revisions opposed the foundations of European values (Varga and Buzogány 2021; Kenes 2020). During the refugee crisis of 2015, Orbán ’s populist approach materialised nationally through an extensive distribution of anti-immigrant posters. Written in Hungarian, these were aimed at fueling xenophobic and eurosceptic sentiments among the domestic population (Ágh 2016; Kenes 2020). At an EU-level, Hungary voted against common declarations deemed pro-migrant and threatening towards national sovereignty (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). Orbán moreover forcefully opposed the proposed plan for a migrant resettlement scheme and a Common European Asylum System, while blaming the migrant influx on foreign conspiracies (Kenes 2020). Hence, Hungary rejected the collaborative atmosphere of the EU and took a national approach to issues that necessitated a collective effort. For Hungary, asserting national interests that had been heavily influenced by populism became a key foreign policy objective.
Not only has Hungary alienated itself ideologically from the EU but it has also embraced strategic incentives to expand beyond the Western bloc to ensure beneficial partnerships (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). Orbán, who called diplomacy ‘a race of nations ’, has argued that the nurturing of diverse economical bonds ‘serves the Hungarian population ’s interests ’ more than being locked up in a Western bloc (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021, 697). The purpose of Orbán ’s so-called Eastern Opening Policy was to reduce Hungary ’s dependence on the EU while still reaping the benefits of its membership. Through financial support from the Russian and Chinese governments, Orbán guaranteed the expansion of the Paks nuclear power station in 2014 and the reconstruction of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line respectively. These increasingly established relations play a crucial role in Orbán ’s threats to block EU decisions that he considers harmful to Russia (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). In diversifying its partnerships with countries that stand in opposition to the liberal world, Hungary has put its ideological departure from the EU into practice. Yet, considering the political developments which have shaped the country over the past decade, this does not come as a surprise; rather, it appears to be a logical consequence.
Turkey and NATO
Turkey ’s foreign policy has been directed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) for the last two decades. While initially, democracy and relations with the West were bolstered, this development took a turn after 2011 as a result of the populist leadership of Recep Erdoğan (Öniş 2015). The success of modern-day AKP style populism has a firm historical foundation. Mardin (1973) identifies a sociocultural divide inherited from the Ottoman Empire, where Turkish politics consists of the ‘centre ’, represented by the ruling elites, and the ‘periphery ’, consisting of culturally heterogeneous groups of people. While the secular and westernised elite focused on nation-building efforts, the political parties of the periphery emphasised conservatism, nativism and Islamism (Aytaç and Elçi 2019). On this cleavage, the AKP takes the stand of the ‘people ’ following a self-proclaimed ideology of ‘conservative democracy ’. Islam is given a nationalist connotation by defining the criteria regarding who belongs to the ethnoreligious community and who is excluded (Yabanci 2022). According to Özpek and Yaşar (2018), the AKP, as a populist-right wing party, has over time adopted an assertive foreign policy based on nationalism with a strong islamist outlook. President Erdoğan spearheaded this development by pushing through institutional reforms since he first became Prime Minister in 2002. He focused on a liberal reform process that restructured civil-military relations and the judicial system, thus increasing the prospects for EU-membership. By weakening traditional counterweights, especially the historically strong military, he initially enhanced democracy in Turkey. However, when his power was threatened, he abandoned liberal democratic values and began concentrating power in his hands by introducing several constitutional reforms (Selçuk 2016; Castaldo 2018). The averted military coup in 2016 provided him the opportunity to align the military more closely with the government, rendering it a useful tool for foreign policy implementation. Finally, after the referendum of 2017, Turkey adopted a presidential system where Erdoğan became the head of the state and of the executive (Rumpf 2017; Waldman and Caliskan 2020). This allows him to steer Turkey ’s foreign policy without being checked and balanced by democratic institutions, the military or the opposition.
During the Cold War, Turkey ‘s relationship to NATO was driven by its commitment to adopt a Western identity. Later, it developed into a pragmatic and interest-led partnership under Erdoğan. Turkey ‘s pro-Western aspirations were underscored by its participation in NATO missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo and its support for the eastern enlargement in 1999. Nevertheless, scepticism grew as Turks perceived NATO to be suffering a legitimacy crisis and simultaneously being reluctant to recognise Turkey ’s security interests (Oğuzlu 2012). Consequently, Turkey built self-confidence with a domestic origin, asserting its own priorities even within the IO. Kaliber and Kaliber (2019) find that foreign policy has become one of the most discursive fields where domestic power struggles play out. They draw a distinction between two eras of AKP foreign policy: thin and thick populism. The first refers to regional activism which coined Turkey ‘s security interests in the 2000s. Turkey considered itself a peace-promoting soft power with the responsibility to stabilise its region, a mission inherited from the Ottoman empire (Oğuzlu 2012). The transition towards the thick populism of anti-Westernism happened gradually after AKP ’s landslide victory in the 2011 elections and was amplified by the Gezi Park protests in 2013. It defined the West as inferior to the morally superior Islamic culture. The narrative goes that Turkey, as an eastern country, would have to assert its independence from the West, which poses a threat to its sovereignty (Kaliber and Kaliber 2019).
This ideology was transformed into real political actions by opposing NATOs interests and prioritising Turkey ’s interests. In 2011, during the debate on a NATO operation in Libya, Turkey vehemently opposed any involvement, as it wanted to ensure that it was not perceived to be sanctioning an intervention in another Muslim country (Yackley 2011). In 2020 however, Turkey started its own military campaign in Libya without consulting its NATO allies to support the forces of the UN-recognised government and to consolidate its influence in the region (Lund 2022). Furthermore, Turkey has continued military operations against the Kurdish militia People ’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria since 2016. Meanwhile the US, as the most prominent member of NATO, cooperates with the militia in the fight against the terror group Islamic State (ZDF 2022). In 2017, Turkey purchased Russian S-400 missiles, causing a rift among its western partners, from whom it sought to attain greater autonomy. Instead, this created a vulnerability to Russia as well as the increased need for assurances from NATO (Yegin 2019). The split between western and eastern allies is further intensified by Erdoğan ’s statement that it is Turkey ’s aim to join the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Uras 2022). Overall, Turkey has demonstrated a preference for autonomy over alliance conformity through a series of unilateral decisions and actions.
Discussion
The cases of Hungary and Turkey provide valuable insights into the intersection of populism and foreign policy, particularly within the context of IOs like the EU and NATO. By examining how populist leaders in these countries have influenced their respective foreign policies, we can better understand the complexities of normative convergence and institutional socialisation within IOs. As seen in Hungary, Orbán ‘s populist rhetoric has contributed to a confrontational stance on EU policies, marked by a rejection of liberal norms and an embrace of illiberal partnerships. Similarly, in Turkey, Erdoğan ‘s populist leadership has steered the country towards an assertive foreign policy agenda, challenging traditional alliances and pursuing nationalist objectives. These cases highlight the role of domestic politics in shaping foreign policy decisions within IOs. Populist leaders leverage nationalist sentiments and anti-establishment narratives to garner domestic support, often at the expense of international cooperation and norm adherence. Most strikingly, the limitations of the constructivist hypothesis of institutional socialisation are underscored. While IOs like the EU and NATO are designed to promote norm convergence among Member States, the influence of populism introduces a significant variable that can disrupt this process. Populist leaders often frame their policies as expressions of national sovereignty and resistance to perceived external threats, thereby undermining the normative frameworks upheld by IOs.
The findings from our analysis align well with the conclusions drawn by scholars studying norm contestation, indicating that the assumption of liberalism ‘s uncontested spread can no longer be taken for granted (Betizza and Lewis 2020). Yet, it is noteworthy that the field has not produced one dominant theory of norm contestation and researchers still debate whether contestation during norm formation or localisation/diffusion problems should receive more attention (Lantis 2017). Addressing these issues, falls outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these case studies provide insight into populism as a driver of norm contestation, making an important contribution to the existing research. While this article has focused on states ’ concrete foreign policy actions contradicting the norms and interest of IOs they are members of, populism can also be expected to serve as a source for (de)legitimating IOs by transforming the normative premises of discourse. In this vein, Spandler and Söderbaum (2023) argue that populist leaders base their (de)legitimation mainly on the representational aspect of IOs. That is, their assessments of the organisations ‘ authority is framed through the lens of popular sovereignty and identity. The leaders evaluate them according to their perceived stance in the ‘people vs elite ‘ conflict. This approach aligns with and strengthens their domestic strategies for acquiring and maintaining political support. Spandler and Söderbaum (2023) also point out that populist leaders simultaneously contest some IOs while expressing support for others. This article has shown how populism contributed to norm contestation within the EU for Hungary and within NATO for Turkey. However, both countries are also working on diversifying their partnerships with organisations that stand in opposition to the liberal world. These ongoing splits warrant further observation and it would be relevant to study how the cooperations between normatively diverging states like Turkey and Hungary increases pressure on the respective IOs and the liberal order.
Conclusion
Over the course of the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has challenged the collaborative atmosphere within NATO and the EU. Unity has become increasingly precious considering that there is now a growing number of countries contesting the normative framework of liberal IOs. These developments are reflected above all in foreign policy. There is no longer a clearly defined grand strategy setting out goals to be reached in a joint cooperation-based effort. Therefore, the constructivist socialisation hypothesis can no longer be taken for granted.
This article argued that this trend goes hand in hand with a rise of populism in countries that were initially highly motivated to integrate into the Western liberal alliance system, which has created such strong organisations as the EU or NATO. Hungary ’s democratic identity has been severely constrained by institutional reforms targeting the cornerstones of any democratic state like the rule of law, freedom of the press, and checks and balances. Orbán has consolidated his presidential powers to the point that he has almost a free hand in shaping the country not only internally but also in its external actions. This has resulted in a new foreign policy whose strategic outlook is characterised by increased proximity to illiberal regimes such as China and Russia. What we observe are the results of years of populist agitation, which has allowed Orbán to rally majorities for his own vision of Hungary ’s future. In a similar vein, Turkey has alienated itself from its Western allies. Erdoğan has successfully capitalised on the appeal of anti-Western rhetoric to secure electoral success. Since the military was streamlined with the government following the 2016 coup attempt, he has enhanced his ability to take actions that mainly serve his interests. Overall, therefore, the EU and NATO were unsuccessful in socialising all of their members.
It appears as if the constructivist socialisation hypothesis belongs to a time where the bulk of the evidence spoke in its favour. It is true that in both these cases, the populist turn in politics was particularly pronounced. Additional research is needed to decide with more certainty on the fate of institutional socialisation. A fruitful approach might be to test the hypothesis again by looking at countries such as Germany or France, where populist trends are weaker. Lastly, it is important to note that in both cases, the last verdict has not yet been delivered. In Turkey, for example, presidential elections in 2023 yielded merely a close majority for incumbent President Erdoğan. Meanwhile, Orbán faces severe pressure from EU institutions and is more isolated than ever after Poland ’s populist Law and Justice Party – his ideological ally – lost the recent elections to a pro-European party. Still, populism poses a unique challenge to the liberal world order, to which no remedy has yet been found. Now, more than ever, there is an urgent need for all Western partners to adapt to the new realities of global governance to maintain international cooperation and stability.